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The last few decades have seen an increasing use of merit-based immigration systems, 
whereby migrants are treated differently on the basis of their skills, education, and wealth. In 
this thesis I argue that there are justice-based reasons to be sceptical of such policies. While I 
agree that there are good grounds for states to control their own borders, related to self-
determination and the welfare of their citizens, I argue that there are also contribution- and 
benefit-based reasons for states to take global inequality of opportunity and structural 
injustice into account when deciding on their admissions policies and treatment of migrants. 
The core of the thesis is made up of three articles. The first argues that states have an 
obligation to consider global equality of opportunity in relation to immigration requirements 
and proposes a fairer migration model that takes equality of opportunity into account. The 
second argues that skills-based restrictions can have adverse effects on the citizens in states 
employing such policies. The third article shows how a lack of opportunities to migrate, and 
unequal treatment of migrants, is a structural injustice, and how individuals have a 
responsibility to remedy such an injustice. I finally argue that the value of these arguments 
does not merely consist in clarifying the implications of normative ideals for admissions 
policies and treatment of migrants, but that they can help us to reimagine the current global 


















De siste tiårene har stadig flere land tatt i bruk ferdighetsbaserte innvandringskriterier. Slike 
kriterier forskjellsbehandler migranter på bakgrunn av deres ferdigheter, utdanning og 
velstand. I denne avhandlingen argumenterer jeg for at slike kriterier kan være urettferdige. 
Samtidig som jeg er enig i at det er gode grunner til at stater skal kunne kontrollere 
innvandring, for å opprettholde sin selvbestemmelse og beskytte velferden til sine innbyggere, 
argumenterer jeg for at stater også bør ta hensyn til globale forskjeller i folks muligheter og 
strukturell urettferdighet når de bestemmer seg for hvilke innvandrere de slipper inn og 
hvordan de behandles. Kjernen av avhandlingen består av tre artikler. I den første artikkelen 
argumenterer jeg for at stater har en forpliktelse til å vurdere hvordan deres 
innvandringspolitikk påvirker globale forskjeller i folks muligheter, og foreslår 
innvandringskriterier som tar hensyn til dette. I den andre artikkelen viser jeg hvordan 
ferdighetsbasert innvandring også kan ha negative følger for borgerne i land som bruker slike 
kriterier. I den tredje artikkelen hevder jeg at manglende muligheter til å migrere, og ulik 
behandling av migranter, er en strukturell urettferdighet, og argumenterer for at individer også 
har et ansvar til å bekjempe slik urettferdighet. Avslutningsvis konkluderer jeg med at verdien 
av disse artiklene ikke kun består i at det klargjør hvilke moralske forpliktelser vi har i 
innvandringspolitikken, men at det også hjelper oss å gjenfortolke det internasjonale 
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Migration is one of few constant features in the history of humankind. Yet, despite the fact 
that only a small percentage of human beings migrate internationally − around 272 million 
migrants in 2019, or about 3.5 percent of the worlds’ population (United Nations, 2019, p. 
245) − migration is one of the most controversial political topics in many countries. Migrants 
are often blamed for a society’s ills, yet many are highly sought after. Some are deemed 
praised, and welcomed, while others are vilified, put in camps and expelled.  
While migration is nothing new, the nature of migration has changed due to globalisation and 
technological change. Easier travel has increased the distance and global scope of migration, 
at the same time as demographic changes are giving rise to different needs for workers, and 
policy changes are altering how states evaluate these workers. In recent decades many states 
have begun employing sophisticated admission systems in order to accommodate such needs 
and to attract the kind of migrants states need to satisfy their labour requirements. These 
systems rank and evaluate migrants according to such criteria as their skills, education and 
wealth. They are often thought of as meritocratic and fair, since they are, at least in principle, 
transparent, do not discriminate based on race or ethnicity, and are open to all applicants. Yet 
these migrant selections take place in a world of extreme inequalities, both with regards to the 
wealth of states and the opportunities of the individuals within them.  
In the case of some migrants, such as refugees fleeing war-torn countries, it is quite clear that 
both states and individuals have a moral responsibility to help them. How to discharge this 
responsibility, and how much one owes refugees, is much debated in the philosophical 
literature on migration. But few would dispute the existence of some kind of responsibility 
towards these migrants. On the other hand, the responsibilities states have with respect to 
other migrants, often on the move for economic reasons and in search of new opportunities, 
are much less clear, and here there is little consensus. After all, many of them arrive 
voluntarily, are not subject to persecution, and willingly submit to the state they migrate to. It 
is therefore often taken for granted that states are free to decide which so-called ‘economic 
migrants’ they admit. This common view of state’s policies on economic migrants rightly 
being at their own discretion, whereas they have a moral responsibility for refugees, is one of 
the issues that sparked my interest in the philosophy of migration. Against the background of 
global inequalities and the harsh treatment many migrants receive, something seemed morally 






In this thesis, I consider the fairness of skills-based admission rules in the light of theories on 
equality of opportunity and structural injustice. By skills-based selection, I mean admissions 
policies that differentiate admission and treatment of migrants based on criteria such as skills, 
education, and wealth. While I agree that states have good reasons to control immigration 
stemming from their interest in collective self-determination and the welfare of their citizens, 
it is also necessary to investigate the normative status of skills-based admission requirements. 
More specifically, do states have obligations to global justice that require that such policies 
need to be altered, and if so, how can this be done while still taking into account their right to 
control immigration? The three articles I have written present three novel arguments which 
aim to contribute towards answering this question. But before I expand on the specific 
questions I discuss, I will give a brief outline of the present text that situates the articles in the 
appendices within the relevant literature.   
1.1 The structure of this text 
I begin in Chapter 2 by giving an overview of some of the literature on philosophy of 
migration, in order to introduce the main types of arguments in the debate and situate my 
contributions. In 2.1 I discuss some of the key terms used, such as ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, 
‘economic migrants’ and ‘skills-based selection’, and highlight the contentious nature of these 
terms. I then, in 2.2, introduce philosophy of migration, by considering the main arguments 
for states’ rights to control migration and for more extensive freedom of movement, before 
discussing some of the philosophical arguments on skills-based selection in particular. In 
section 2.3 I summarise and categorise solutions philosophers have suggested to remedy 
migration injustices, such as limiting the emigration of skilled professionals, and prioritising 
poorer migrants in admissions. In section 2.4 I briefly consider the variety of normative ideals 
that underlie many of the evaluations of what constitutes fairness in migration, and clarify 
what I mean by fairness. I here defend my focus on equality of opportunity as a relevant 
theoretical tool to assess the fairness of migration rules.  
In Chapter 3 I consider methodological issues. I begin by considering two issues of 
positionality: firstly in section 3.1 how my particular life circumstances might influence the 
normative evaluations I make, and how I can attempt to remedy the role of any underlying 
prejudices I might have. I continue, in section 3.2, to discuss the distinction between ideal and 
non-ideal theory, before in section 3.3, applying it to philosophy of migration. Here I clarify 






balanced approach which relies on shifting presuppositions, and consider the implications of 
incommensurability in considerations of justice and migration.  
In Chapter 4, I briefly summarise each article and their conclusions. This lays the foundation 
for Chapter 5, where I summarise my research findings. I argue that taken together my 
conclusions mean that: (1) there are good justice-based reasons to be wary of skills-based 
migration policies, (2) that such policies are not normatively neutral or meritocratic, (3) that 
particularly countries in the Global North ought to take migrants’ needs and opportunities into 
account with admissions policies in general, (4) that responsibility for migration injustice 
ought to be considered much more broadly, and (5) that individuals also have responsibilities 
towards alleviating migration injustice. Before I proceed in chapter 2 to define some key 
terms and give an overview of the philosophy of migration, I will in section 1.2 state my 
overall research question, and the particular questions each of the articles addresses.  
1.2 Research question 
Faced with increased use of skills-based admission policies, the contested political nature of 
immigration in many countries, and the vastly unequal treatment migrants receive, there is a 
need for increased normative discussion on migration policies. My thesis can be formulated as 
asking one overarching question, with three sub-questions, answered in the three articles in 
the appendices. While my overarching question concerns the normative status of skills-based 
restrictions on migrants, the three sub-questions consider various aspects of skills-based 
admission policies. Together they contribute to the philosophical debate on the fairness of 
admission requirements in general, and skills-based selection in particular.   
Main research question: To what extent are skills-based migration restrictions fair, and 
how can they be made fairer? 
Sub-questions:   
1. Why should states care about global equality of opportunity in relation to migration, 
and if they did, what would their admission policies look like?  
This question is addressed in Egan, M. (2018). Towards fairer borders: Alleviating 
global inequality of opportunity. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 
12(2), 11-26. doi:10.5324/eip.v12i2.2421 







This question is addressed in Egan, M. (2020) Statements on race and class: the 
fairness of skills-based immigration criteria, Ethics & Global Politics, 1761192. 
doi:10.1080/16544951.2020.1761192 
3. Do inequalities in opportunities to migrate and treatment of migrants constitute a 
structural injustice, and if so, what responsibility do individuals have to fix it? 
This question is addressed in Egan, M. (Forthcoming). Structural injustice and labour 
migration: From individual responsibility to collective action, Theoria 
In the first article, I consider why states should take global quality of opportunity into account 
when considering their immigration rules, and show what that would mean for their admission 
policies. This article concludes by sketching out an admission policy that gives weight to not 
only how much a country stands to gain from admitting a migrant, but also the effects on the 
sending country and the improved opportunities for the migrants themselves. The second 
article considers the effects of skills-based admission policies on the citizens of the states the 
migrants are moving to, using an analogy to race based selection criteria. Here I argue that 
skills-based admission policies send out a statement of preference to the citizens in states 
employing such policies, and that this can have an adverse effect on their social bases of self-
respect and educational opportunities, which also need to be taken into account in a normative 
evaluation of such policies. In the third article, I argue that the vast inequalities in migration 
opportunities constitute a structural injustice, and consider what moral responsibility 
individuals have to ameliorate this.  
What ties these articles together is their subject matter and normative commitments. All three 
focus on the differentiated treatment of migrants based on their skills, education, and wealth. I 
evaluate the fairness of such policies on the basis of how they impact people’s opportunities. I 
use both relational and luck-egalitarian arguments to argue for why fairness involves 
equalising people’s opportunities. And while I find that there are good reasons that states have 
the right to control immigration policy, such as protecting self-determination and welfare, I 
argue that such concerns need to be balanced against a responsibility for global justice. In 
short, I find that there are good reasons to be wary of skills-based admissions policies.  
The first and the third article focus on global justice and mobility, through the lenses of global 
equality of opportunity and structural injustice, respectively. The second supplements this by 
focusing on the effects of such admissions policies on people in receiving states. The overall 






economic migration are fair, what demands global justice place on the policies of individual 
states, and what responsibility states and individual citizens might have to improve current 
conditions for migrants.  
The articles consider what global justice for migrants entails, as well as how such fairness can 
be practically achieved. They present three novel arguments contributing to the overall 
question of the fairness of skills-based migration restrictions. In the following, I situate these 
arguments in a broader theoretical framework, introduce some of the prior research on the 
topic, describe my methodological assumptions, discuss different solutions to migration 


















































2 Philosophy of migration 
What types of arguments have been advanced for states’ control over migration admissions, 
and on the other hand what arguments are there for people being able to migrate freely? What 
types of restrictions are fair? What solutions have philosophers proposed to remedy migration 
injustices? In this chapter I give an overview of the philosophical work on migration, situating 
my contributions within the existing literature. I move from more general and abstract 
arguments concerning the justifications of border control, to the more specific arguments 
concerning skills-based admission policies. But before I proceed to give an overview of some 
main arguments in migration philosophy, we must consider who the debate is about by 
defining a few key terms. I therefore begin section 2.1 by discussing terms such as ‘migrant’, 
‘the migrant-refugee distinction’, ‘economic migration’, and ‘skills-based selection’. 
Subsequently in section 2.2, I discuss some of the normative philosophical work on migration, 
focusing on the division between cosmopolitan and state-centred positions, which form the 
backdrop of many current debates. I then consider some of the work on skills-based 
regulations, before in section 2.3 discussing different solutions philosophers have proposed to 
ameliorate migration injustices. Finally in section 2.4 I consider the normative foundations for 
the various philosophical positions, such as luck egalitarian and relational arguments, and 
argue for the relevance of global equality of opportunity when considering the fairness of 
migration rules.  
2.1 Key terms 
Who are migrants? What is the difference between a migrant and a refugee? What are skills-
based admission criteria? When considering the fairness of migration admittance it is 
important to nail down the meaning of key terms. Let me therefore begin by discussing a few 
of these. It is worth mentioning at the outset that the categories under consideration are not 
fixed and often highly contentious. How one interprets the various terms can often also have 
severe consequences in real-world situations, for example in the case of someone who 
deserves protection as a refugee and is therefore given asylum, or who is denied it and 
deported. Let us therefore turn to how one might define ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘economic 
migrants’, and ‘skills-based’.  
2.1.1 Refugees and migrants 
A common way to define a migrant is to distinguish between a migrant and a refugee. 
Whereas the former is often used as a catch-all term for people who cross borders for 






category. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention a refugee is “someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion” (UNHCR, 1951). In short, a refugee is someone fleeing persecution. Yet, on closer 
scrutiny the refugee definition raises difficult conceptual, normative and pragmatic questions. 
Who counts as someone fleeing persecution? Who deserves refugee protection, perhaps 
people fleeing other dangers? And, in a politically charged environment, how should we use 
the term refugee to ensure that those who deserve protection get it?  
According to Andrew Shacknove a conception of a refugee is something different from a 
definition (Shacknove, 1985). States and organisations around the world operate with 
different definitions, and as refugee status also confers rights to the migrants and obligations 
for states, states often use a narrow definition in order to limit their obligations. Shacknove 
argues that when considering how we should conceptualise ‘refugee’, we should consider 
what is essential about refugeehood. This is that their “basic needs are unprotected by their 
country of origin” (Shacknove, 1985, p. 277), and that they therefore require international 
assistance to meet such needs. This would of course mean that many more people are refugees 
than according to the UN definition, but that is partly the point. According to this line of 
thought, it should not matter what the reasons for someone’s basic needs going unfulfilled are 
- whether they be persecution, incompetent governance, extreme poverty or climate change - 
what matters is that people’s basic needs are not being met by the state.1  
Matthew Lister has objected to such a wide definition, arguing that it fails both practically and 
methodologically (Lister, 2013). He argues that practically it fails because it “does not help us 
to meet the needs of those in danger” (Lister, 2013, p. 658), and methodologically it fails 
because “basic principles of justice give rise […] to significantly different duties in different 
situations” (Lister, 2013, p. 659). Lister believes that Shacknove’s account obscures this last 
point, and while acknowledging the difficulty of defining a refugee, he argues that an account 
of who is a refugee cannot be determined independently of an inquiry into what duties we 
have to them. Lister settles for a narrower definition, closer to the one espoused by the 
UNHCR.  
                                                            
1 Other notable contributions to expanding the refugee definition include Luara Ferracioli (2014), Matthew 






Another response to the difficulty of drawing a distinction between migrants and refugees, is 
to argue that it is a fruitless endeavour. As Chandran Kukathas argues: “the history of the 
development of an institutional framework to deal with the plight of refugees does not suggest 
that it is even remotely possible to do justice to the people in question. Making refugees 
special neither makes sense conceptually, nor looks possible practically on the evidence we 
have to date” (Kukathas, 2016, p. 265). Kukathas therefore think we instead need to get rid of 
strict distinctions between citizens and foreigners, and therefore argues for an open borders 
position. It seems clear that one’s view on whether and how we can define a refugee is 
intimately linked with what duties we think we have towards them. And, as Serena Parekh 
notes, while it is difficult to conceptually arrive at a definition, and any distinction will at best 
be blurry, there is some consensus in the literature (2020). Parekh argues that this consensus 
involves the idea that “states have stronger obligations to refugees than they do to immigrants 
in general” (Parekh, 2020, p. 42), “that persecution by one’s government should not be the 
only ground for refugee status” (Parekh, 2020, p. 43), and that “there is a growing recognition 
that we must take seriously the harm individuals are fleeing from, rather than the source of the 
harm, and broaden our definition accordingly” (Parekh, 2020, p. 43). 
A migrant, however, is more broadly defined in the literature, and is usually considered as 
someone who moves habitual residence for some reason or another. The reasons for their 
movement, whether they have to move across international borders, and how long they have 
to stay, in order to be considered a migrant, can vary according to the definition one 
subscribes to. The lines of this definition are also likely to be blurry, but usually a migrant is 
thought to be someone who crosses international borders, and settles for a protracted period of 
time. Whether or not one should, for pragmatic reasons, include refugees in the category of 
migrant, is also disputed. As Jørgen Carling has noted, one can distinguish between an 
inclusivist or a residualist definition of a migrant, the former including refugees, and the latter 
excluding them. Some maintain that diluting the term ‘refugee’ can lead to worse protection 
for refugees and that is what has led the UNHCR to argue that “refugees are not migrants” 
(Carling, 2016). The argument seems to be that as migrants are often not deemed to be 
deserving of protection, whereas refugees are, describing refugees as migrants will make it 
easier for states to limit their protection of refugees. As Carling has argued however, this can 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby such a distinction is reinforced, and states are able 
to limit their protection of people who need protection, whether or not they are granted 






anyone on the move may have a well-founded fear of persecution and be entitled to 
international protection. The circumstances of refugees are specific ones – but so are those of 
victims of trafficking and undocumented migrants, for instance” (2016). 
So while on the surface the distinction between who is a migrant and who is a refugee appears 
clear, in theory and practise it is less so. Indeed, refugees are not only admitted according to 
their need for protection, but are sometimes also subject to the same kinds of selection criteria 
as other migrants. Antje Ellermann has shown how ‘market fundamentalist practices’ and skill 
ranking are increasingly being used on all migration streams, including refugees (Ellermann, 
2019b). Furthermore, countries interpret refugee criteria very differently, and the categories 
often fail to correspond to the lived experiences of those categorised by them. As Heaven 
Crawley and Dimitris Skleparis argue, the way one interprets the term ‘refugee’ often reflects 
national interests: “This means that the seemingly neutral and objective category of ‘refugee’ 
is in fact being constantly formed, transformed and reformed in response to shift in political 
allegiances or interests on the part of refugee receiving countries and the evolution of policy 
and law” (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018, p. 51). By exploring the lives of people who crossed 
the Mediterranean in 2015, they show how the categories of ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ are 
deeply problematic, highly politicised and do not match the lives of the people they are used 
to describe. Many people can find themselves shifting between different externally imposed 
categories, both in relation to their own situation and in the country they find themselves in. 
Crawley and Skleparis therefore recommend researchers to be aware of the problematic 
nature of the categories, and to maintain a critical perspective on them. While agreeing that it 
is reasonable to be concerned that an expansion of refugee protection to other people might 
limit the rights of those fleeing war and conflict, they argue that a strict adherence to the 
semantic distinction reinforces a dichotomy that discriminates against migrants.  
The distinction between refugee and non-refugee migrants is also problematic because it is 
often implied that the latter migrate voluntarily. Ottonelli and Torresi argue that such a 
distinction also plays into the normative evaluations: “Political theorists have also often 
employed the notion of voluntariness in discussing the phenomenon of migration and, 
specifically, as contributing to defining what duties states may have toward migrants, and, 
correspondingly, the extent of migrants’ justified claims against receiving and sending states” 
(Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013, p. 784). They argue that the understanding of ‘voluntary’ that is 






be considered voluntary: non-coercion, sufficiency, exit options and information. In short, 
voluntary migrants cannot be forced, must have enough, must be able to leave, and have 
adequate prior knowledge of where they are going (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013, pp. 796-804). 
This of course limits the group we can consider voluntary migrants, and there will be degrees 
of non-voluntariness.  
In short, how one should define the terms refugee and migrant is contested. Theorists disagree 
on how we should understand the different terms, as well as what the practical effects of using 
the different terms might be. This does not mean that the terms should not be used, but rather 
that we should be aware of the politicised and contentious aspects of their use. If the 
distinction is not clear-cut in practice between who is a refugee and deserving of protection, 
and who migrates of their own volition, then we should keep that in mind when considering 
the normative conclusions we reach when using these categories. I.e. if the lived experience 
and vulnerability of someone classified as a migrant and someone classified as a refugee are 
similar, it is not readily apparent why they do not deserve similar protection. Yet, whether we 
subscribe to the inclusivist or the residualist definition, this thesis is mainly concerned with 
migrants in the non-refugee sense. That is, the normative arguments I am examining do not 
rely on the kinds of arguments offered as reasons the state has to protect refugees. In short, I 
am concerned with people who are not fleeing persecution but migrate for other reasons, and 
who are thus not commonly classified as refugees.  
2.1.2 Labour migrants, economic migrants, and skills-based selection 
In the three articles in the Appendix I mainly use the terms ‘migrants’, ‘economic migrants’, 
and ‘labour migrants’. These terms are used to emphasise that I am concerned with people 
who migrate for economic or labour related reasons, and are not fleeing persecution. That 
said, it is mainly the treatment of migrants and the arguments for differentiated treatment, I 
am concerned with, rather than a particular group of migrants. The use of such terms as 
‘economic migrant’ can be contentious as it is often emotively loaded in the public discourse. 
Indeed, ‘economic migrant’, is sometimes used as a pejorative, often in contrast to ‘refugee’ 
(Ruz, 2015). Yet, people who are referred to as economic migrants do not just migrate for 
economic reasons. We can therefore distinguish between reasons people are migrating and the 
ways they are treated. As we have already seen these designations and their use is likely to be 






Stephen Castles et. al. have identified six general tendencies in migratory patterns: “1. The 
globalisation of migration […] 2. The changing direction of dominant migration flows […] 3. 
The differentiation of migration […] 4. The proliferation of migration transition […] 5. The 
feminisation of labour migration [… and] 6. The growing politicisation of migration” 
(Castles, 2014, p. 16). Migration has become more global, people migrate over longer 
distances, and there has been a change in the direction of migration. For example many 
former countries of emigration, such as England, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, have become 
major destinations for migrants. These migrants often follow a reverse trajectory of earlier 
colonialist migration flows. ‘Migration transition’ refers to the changed nature of migration 
flows, as countries of emigration, such as Poland and Mexico also become countries of 
immigration. In addition to these changing dynamics and movements, most countries also 
have many types of migrants and are differentiating their treatment of them. There is also a 
growing politicisation of migration. Furthermore, more women are migrating for labour, for 
example to work in the health care and hospitality industries. When it comes to the 
differentiation, Castles et. al. point out that: “most countries are not dominated by one type of 
migration, such as labour migration, family reunion, refugee movement or permanent 
settlement, but experience a whole range of types at once” (Castles, 2014, p. 16). Groups are 
perceived differently, treated differently and often given different rights according to their 
background. “ ‘Professional transients’ – that is, highly skilled personnel who move 
temporarily within specialized labour markets – are rarely seen as presenting an integration 
problem, although, ironically enough, such groups often hardly integrate” (Castles, 2014, p. 
19).  
More countries are employing sophisticated measures to attract such ‘desirable’ migrants. As 
Castles has shown: “Today, official policies in the EU (and indeed throughout the developed 
world) target the highly skilled, while less skilled workers are admitted only in limited 
numbers through temporary and seasonal labour programs” (Castles, 2006, p. 760). In 
addition to this, many countries such as the US, rely on a high number of undocumented 
migrants in their agricultural sector. Castles et. al. also refer to how the perception of 
migration often does not match the realities: “One of the dominant, but empirically 
unjustified, images in highly developed countries today is that of masses of people flowing in 
from the poor South and the turbulent East, taking away jobs, pushing up housing prices and 
overloading social services” (Castles, 2014, p. 19). In fact, more migration takes place within 






are frequently, and unjustifiably, blamed for many of society’s ills, yet “migrants are 
generally a symptom of change rather than its cause. For many people, immigration is the 
concrete manifestation of rather intangible processes such as globalization and neoliberal 
economic policies” (Castles, 2014, p. 19).  
As neoliberal economic policy has become more prevalent, it has also impacted migration 
regulations. As Antje Ellerman argues, neoliberalism has also imbued migration regulations 
with a “market fundamentalism” (Ellermann, 2019b). According to this logic migrants are 
(primarily) seen as having a certain labour market value, and are accorded rights and 
citizenship accordingly. Ellerman argues that the human capital market fundamentalism over 
the last couple of decades of the 20th century has led to two major developments: the 
differentiation of rights according to the ‘value’ of migrants, and human capital logic being 
applied to other streams of migrants. This can be seen by wage requirements for family 
integration or skills criteria being applied to refugees. The rights citizens are being granted are 
often the result of an evaluation of their skills or market value.  
I consider what is meant by skills-based admission policies, low- and high-skilled migrants, in 
the article “Statements on race and class: the fairness of skills-based immigration criteria 
(Egan, 2020, pp. 2-4) (see App. ii). In short, the definition of skills is much debated, and in 
practice the definitions of low-skilled and high-skilled vary a lot as they correspond to 
classifications in admissions regulations which vary from country to country. However, some 
general patterns do obtain: people who qualify as highly skilled often have a tertiary 
education, meet certain wage and wealth requirements, and are employed as for example 
doctors or engineers. On the other hand, those who are designated as low-skilled or unskilled 
typically do not have tertiary education and/or do not meet the wage or wealth requirements. 
There are also some contested categories, such as care workers, who while often educated do 
not meet the wage requirements to be classified as highly skilled. What is important to note 
for our purpose here, is the trend towards increased differentiation of treatment of migrants 
based on their skills, the contentious nature of the central terms, the sophistication of skills-
based criteria, and the precariousness of some migrants’ rights, particularly those who are 
deemed low-skilled or unskilled.  
It is against this backdrop; the increased differentiation of migrants, neoliberal economic 
policies, and problems with defining who counts as a migrant, that we are faced with 






be aware of the problematic nature of some of these key terms when discussing the 
philosophy of migration. We should also remember the contentious use of the terms when 
considering the scope and conclusions of normative arguments. For example, a philosophical 
argument that concludes that states have a responsibility to protect refugees, can in practice 
imply a lot of different policies depending on who is considered a refugee.  
2.2 Arguments concerning the right to limit migration 
Before I present some of the proposed solutions to migration injustice, I will briefly consider 
the philosophical discussion on migration. Migration does not feature much in western 
philosophy before the 20th century. And while some philosophers, such as Mill and Kant, did 
occasionally touch on migration, they were mainly concerned with justifying colonialism 
(Sager, 2016a, p. 4). Following increasing globalisation, the end of the cold war, and 
increased interest in global justice in general, migration has towards the end of the 20th 
century become an important topic in political philosophy.  
Much of the philosophical debate on migration during the last few decades has centred on 
arguments between those who defend a state’s right to control its borders and those who want 
more extensive freedom of movement. The most central question has been the justifiability of 
controls on migration. In short: what, if anything, justifies a state’s control over borders? On 
the one hand, philosophers such as Michael Walzer (1983), Michael Blake (2002, 2005, 2008, 
2013), Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman (2011),  and David Miller (2007, 2014, 
2016) have argued that states have quite extensive legitimate rights to control their borders. 
While there are considerable differences between their various arguments, they are sometimes 
referred to as nationalist, statist or state-centred positions. On the other hand, philosophers 
such as Joseph Carens (1987, 2013), Phillip Cole (2000), Seyla Benhabib (2004) and 
Chandran Kukathas (2017) have argued that people should be able to migrate freely. These 
types of arguments are sometimes referred to as cosmopolitan or open borders positions.  
In section 2.2.1 I will briefly describe the main arguments put forward for states to be able to 
control borders, and in section 2.2.2 the main arguments for more extensive freedom of 
migration, and with what counter-arguments these are often met. These arguments form the 
backdrop of much of the subsequent debate and my own contributions. I will then move on to 
consider skills-based migration, and suggestions as to how to remedy migration injustice. It is 
worth noting at the outset that I will not dispute many of the reasons given for states to limit 






global equality of opportunity and structural injustice. Let us begin by looking in 2.2.1 at the 
types of arguments that have been used to defend a state’s right to limit immigration.  
2.2.1 Arguments for the right to limit immigration 
There most common reasons given for states to be able to restrict immigration are linked to 
factors such as the protecting the economy, welfare, security, culture, and self-determination 
of citizens, as well as indirect cosmopolitanism.2 Some argue that states need to be able to 
restrict immigration in order to protect a nation’s economy, the security or welfare of its 
citizens, and/or its specific culture. Others emphasise that the ability to restrict immigration is 
needed in order to ensure political self-determination, while indirect cosmopolitans argue that 
states with the ability to control their borders are most likely to be able to contribute towards 
global justice. Most theorist who defend the right of states to control their borders rely a 
combination of some of these arguments. Let us briefly consider these reasons, and some of 
the counter-arguments they are typically met with.  
Walzer sparked much of the recent debate on state’s right to control borders in 1983 (Walzer, 
1983), and before this it was commonly assumed that states had the right to control their 
borders without explicitly arguing for why this was the case (Song, 2018, p. 387). Walzer 
argued that since people have different kinds of social relations within a state, they have 
different kinds of rights and duties: “People who do share a common life have much stronger 
duties” (Walzer, 1983, p. 33). Using a series of analogies with neighbourhoods, clubs and 
families, Walzer tries to sketch out what constitute appropriate rights and duties within a 
political community. As entry into such a community is a social good, according to Walzer, it 
is rightly distributed by the members. He also argues that the foundation of a distinct cultural 
life, which is valuable, relies on the ability to exclude. The state therefore has vast powers to 
exclude, though, according to Walzer, once someone is granted residential status they should 
be treated as a potential citizen (Walzer, 1983, p. 52). There has since been a lot of debate on 
whether it is legitimate to differentiate between the rights of guest workers and citizens. 
Walzer is against this, as he believes it is illegitimate to have a two-tier society.3  
                                                            
2 For other useful overviews of reasons for and against state’s right to control borders, see for example Christine 
Straehle (2018), Sarah Song (2018) and Christopher Wellman (2020). There is also a set of arguments that rely 
on libertarian tradition, property rights and associate ownership, but as they have less bearing on the topic of this 
thesis, I will not discuss them here. These can be used both to argue for open borders and for a states right to 
control borders. For more on these positions see for example Joseph Carens (1987), Ryan Pevnick (2011) and 
Sarah Song (2017). 
3 For more on this discussion see section 2.3.5 on temporary labour migrants, and the third article in the 






In a similar vein to Walzer, David Miller argues that extensive immigration controls are 
needed in order to protect a state’s ability for “self-determination, the functioning of 
democracy, and population size” (Miller, 2016, p. 75). He also argues that self-determination 
is needed to be able to maintain a collective national identity (Miller, 2016, p. 69). So, 
according to Miller we need to be able to control borders in order to control the population 
size, which impacts public expenditure on welfare, and a collective-identity, which is needed 
to maintain societal and interpersonal trust. The arguments that build on cultural and 
collective-identity, can be met with different types of counter-arguments. Firstly, one can 
argue that the importance of cultural distinctness is exaggerated, that states are multicultural, 
and that a mono-cultural understanding whitewashes many states’ repression of minorities. 
Secondly, the argument from culture and social trust would only seem to justify limiting 
migration of people who are significantly different, so placing limits on the number of 
migrants from a similar culture seems more difficult. And thirdly, that the argument 
oversimplifies the relationship between collective identity and social trust, and that many of 
the arguments that build on culture are not empirically justified (Holtug, 2010, 2017a).  
The arguments for states’ right to limit immigration that build on the economy, can also be 
criticised based on their empirical presuppositions. For while it is indubitable that migration 
can affect a state’s economy, it is less clear whether that effect may be positive or negative, 
and who it will be positive or negative for. After all, foreign labour might benefit corporations 
and a state’s Gross Domestic Product, but might also lead to more competition and lower 
wages on the job market. However, while there is disagreement on the effects of labour 
migration on the economy and job market, and the effects are likely to vary from setting to 
setting, someone defending the right to restrict immigration could respond that it should be up 
to states to make such calls, and limit migration in the interest of the state and its citizens. 
Furthermore, protecting the economy is not merely thought to be important in itself, but often 
also as a means to be able to provide for welfare for the citizens in a state. If the state is 
inundated with new benefit claimants, the argument goes, the state will no longer be able to 
provide welfare for its own citizens. Once again the arguments based on economy and welfare 
rely on not only the empirical assumptions being true, but also that such negative effects 
justify immigration restrictions. Melina Duarte, for example, has argued that this necessary 
connection between restrictive immigration policies and welfare benefits is empirically 
unjustified, and that welfare states and open borders are compatible (2018). Furthermore, 






that while immigration can affect the economy of a state and the welfare of its citizens, there 
are other overriding concerns that outweigh these.  
The argument concerning political self-determination is one of weightiest arguments for a 
state’s right to control borders. The right to self-determination is recognised as a fundamental 
right by the UN, and as Song shows it has both an internal and an external dimension:  
The internal dimension is the idea of popular sovereignty: The people are the ultimate 
source of political authority, and they must authorize the binding collective decisions 
that the government makes in their name. The external dimension finds its expression 
in international law: The people have a right to significant independent control over 
their collective life without the interference of those outside the collective. (Song, 
2018, p. 395) 
So it would seem like the state has good reasons to control their borders in order to 
accommodate collective self-determination. However, as Song discusses and Sarah Fine has 
shown, the argument from self-determination needs to meet three challenges (Fine, 2013). 
Firstly, while a group is entitled to self-determination, what gives a group control over access 
to a particular territory? Secondly, why do citizens’ interest in self-determination outweigh 
prospective migrants’ interests in inclusion? Thirdly, how can we identify the “self” that is 
supposed to be self-determining? Some states encompass many nations, some groups are 
transnational, and what constitutes the “self” can also become difficult to establish in relation 
to legacy of colonialism. Now, while counter-arguments for state’s right to control 
immigration based on economy and self-determination are challenging, I do not think they are 
insurmountable. But perhaps more importantly they point to why the needs for self-
determination and protecting the economy should be balanced against other concerns. But 
which concerns might override such needs, and which might not? 
While both Walzer and Miller argue that states have some duties to admit refugees, they say 
that admittance and selection of economic migrants is rightly a matter of state discretion, so 
long as states give valid reasons for their practice. In other words, they argue that states do not 
have a duty to admit economic migrants. “The receiving state has certain policy goals - for 
example, it is aiming for economic growth or to provide its citizens with generous welfare 
services - and it is entitled to use immigration policy as one of the means to achieve such 






“weak cosmopolitanism”, and argues that the state must give moral weight to any prospective 
immigrant, and give relevant reasons for refusal: “the reasons the state gives for its selective 
admissions policy must be good reasons, reasons that the immigrants ought to accept give that 
the general aims of the policy are legitimate ones” (2016, p. 105). This is a common 
qualification made by theorists who defend states’ right to exclude prospective migrants: that 
they only apply to legitimate states who are working towards legitimate policy goals. What 
are considered legitimate policy goals and how to weigh various concerns is of course up for 
debate. For example, Miller argues that this excludes selection of migrants based on race and 
national origin (2016, p. 106). Michael Blake similarly argues that this excludes racial 
selection, as this also negatively affects the citizens in the states employing such criteria 
(Blake, 2002). In my second article I examine whether such an argument might also be made 
against skills-based selection (see section 4.2. and appendix 2). We will get back to this issue 
when we consider skills-based selection in section 2.2.4.  
Before moving on to the arguments for open borders, it is also worth mentioning the argument 
from indirect cosmopolitanism. It builds on the idea, as argued by Thomas Christiano, that 
“the modern democratic state embodies the best hope we have of ultimately bringing justice 
to the whole of humanity” (Christiano, 2008, p. 934). So, while moral cosmopolitanism might 
seemingly imply open borders, Christiano thinks that controls on migration are justified given 
that they are arguably the best way to bring about cosmopolitan justice. However, as 
Christopher Wellman makes clear, this argument relies on a series of controversial premises, 
amongst others that liberal democratic states are actually likely to favour, and be interested in, 
bringing about moral cosmopolitanism (Wellman, 2020). 
In sum, there are many ways in which one can ground states’ right to exclude prospective 
migrants. While I think the argument based on culture has a lot of weaknesses, namely that it 
often exaggerates and oversimplifies cultural distinctness, I think the arguments concerning 
economy, welfare of citizens and collective self-determination, carry more weight. However, 
such concerns also need to be balanced against other considerations, in particular prospective 
migrants’ interest in being admitted. So before we move on to consider skills-based migration 
in particular, let us consider some of the arguments generally put forward for open borders 






2.2.2 Arguments for open borders 
Arguments for open borders, or more extensive freedom of movement, typically rely on the 
cosmopolitan idea that every human being has equal worth, and that this realisation should 
have implications for admissions policies. In a seminal article Joseph Carens (1987) lays out 
some of these arguments, building on Nozick, Rawls’ original position and utilitarianism. 
While acknowledging that immigration can effect a nation’s culture, economy and state 
sovereignty, Carens argues that this does not outweigh the principle of liberty, and the 
interests of migrants in being admitted:  
Free migration may not be immediately achievable, but it is a goal toward which we 
should strive. And we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than we 
do now. The current restrictions on immigration in Western democracies […] are not 
justifiable. Like feudal barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege (Carens, 
1987, p. 270).   
Arguments for open borders or more extensive freedom of movement typically utilize two 
types of arguments: (1) that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with liberal values, and 
(2) that vast global inequalities lead to moral demands, which can be met in part by open 
borders or less stringent immigration policies. Let me first consider four examples of the first 
type of argument, before considering the second.  
A well-known description of the inconsistency argument is made by Phillip Cole, who 
questions the asymmetry between the right to exit and the right to entry (Cole, 2000). In short, 
he argues liberal states cannot police strict immigration requirements without using illiberal 
principles against the migrants. They thereby contravene the liberal principle of moral 
equality between persons by restricting immigration. Furthermore, Cole disagrees with the 
state-centred justifications based on the particular relationship between citizens. He points out 
that the shared cultural life, and national values they refer to, are neither as shared nor as 
necessary as they claim, and that any selection of criteria will be somewhat arbitrary. Cole 
therefore argues that selection criteria cannot be compatible with liberal democratic 
principles, as they cannot respect the moral equality of humanity (Cole, 2000, p. 81).  
It should be noted that there are many different ways people have fleshed out the argument 
concerning the inconsistency of migration restrictions with liberal values. Julie Arrildt (2018), 
for example, focuses on Blake’s argument which establishes that states have a right to exclude 






coercion, with particular rights and obligations. As Arrildt points out, coercion also applies to 
would-be immigrants, and Blake “can therefore not justify weighing the moral claims of 
residence above the moral claims of would-be immigrants or placing a heavier burden of 
justification on would-be immigrants” (Arrildt, 2018, p. 518). Patti Lenard has also pointed to 
problems with the asymmetry between the right people have to exit a state, and states’ lack of 
obligation to admit migrants (Lenard, 2015). For whereas the right to exit is commonly taken 
for granted as a basic human right, people do not have a corresponding right to entry. In order 
for the right to exit to be a real, people must be able to enter somewhere. While 
acknowledging here that states may have a right to exclude migrants, Lenard argues that they 
have a duty to contribute towards migrants having the ability to enter. “It may be that exiters 
cannot find admittance in the first choice of state, but it is incumbent on states in general to 
ensure that exiters can exercise their right to at least some degree” (Lenard, 2015, p. 16).  
Finally, Kukathas has also argued that border controls are inconsistent with liberal values, and 
points out that this applies not only to immigrants, but also to citizens more broadly 
(Kukathas, 2017). Immigration control measures also take place within a domestic state, and 
the freedom of citizens is impacted by such control. Kukathas shows how this is often the case 
along ethnic and cultural lines, with US citizens of Mexican origin being deported because 
they are suspected of being illegal immigrants. Another such example is the Windrush scandal 
in the UK, with British citizens wrongly deported to Caribbean countries because they lacked 
the required paperwork. Since states in practice also apply border control measures on their 
citizens, this treatment clearly violates the liberal rights of their citizens.  
When it comes to the second kind of cosmopolitan arguments that build on global 
inequalities, Joseph Carens’ arguments have received a lot of attention. He points out that the 
combination of vast global inequalities and strict migration regulations, is part of an 
international order which is analogous to medieval feudalism (Carens, 2013, p. 226). 
Migration restrictions limit people’s freedom and opportunities, and keep people “in their 
place” by way of borders, in the same way as feudal birthright limited people’s access to 
opportunities according to the estate they were born into. They are therefore unfair and people 
should be able to migrate. Carens also argues, according to the incoherence line of argument, 
that restrictions on migration contradict deeply held democratic principles and freedoms 






should all have equal access to opportunities and therefore be able to migrate freely.4 Before 
we move on to consider skills-based migration restrictions in particular, it is worth noting the 
responses which the inconsistency and global inequality arguments are typically met with.  
State-centred theorists, such as Walzer, Miller and Blake, typically respond to these 
arguments by arguing (1) that liberal values do in fact open for immigration restrictions, based 
on the arguments discussed in section 2.2.1, and that (2) there are better ways to address 
global inequalities than by changing border policies. There are also some disagreements over 
the causes of global inequalities, what responsibility states have for these inequalities, and 
how easy it is to measure differences between states. Cosmopolitan theorists more commonly 
emphasise international reasons for inequalities, whereas state-centred theorists often 
highlight domestic reasons. After all, if you have a relational understanding of responsibility, 
and responsibility is based on how much you contribute to inequality, it is important to note 
how inequality comes about. This is part of the focus of my first article, where I argue that 
states have a responsibility to alleviate global inequality of opportunity (see 4.1 and App. i). I 
will also return this point in section 2.4., when discussing how relational and remedial 
accounts of global justice rely on causal explanations of how injustice comes about, and in 
section 3.1 when discussing methodological and explanatory nationalism.  
For our purposes here we should note that even when acknowledging these vast global 
differences, and that Western states might have a role in bringing them about, state-centred 
theorists typically reject migration as a way to address them. They argue that the mere 
existence of such differences should not lead one to embracing open borders, or to letting in 
more poor and unskilled migrants. As Blake puts it: “Where injustice exists - and especially 
where our society has had a historical role in perpetuating it - we have a duty to effectuate 
institutional change so as to overcome that injustice. Nothing in this, however, requires us to 
think of entry into our society as the favoured institutional response” (Blake, 2008, p. 973). 
However, this denial of using migration to solve global inequalities is not absolute, as Blake 
elsewhere argues that extreme global inequalities, immiseration and destitution mean that 
states have moral duties, and that while not as extensive as domestically, a state does need to 
consider these duties in relation to immigration policy: “Restrictions on immigration which 
help perpetuate such poverty - as, I think, those of all Western liberal democracies now do – 
                                                            
4 It should be noted that Carens also relies on the inconsistency argument, pointing out how important we value 






are illegitimate. If this is correct, then the category of those whose claim to immigration may 
not be refused is wider than we usually think; in particular those fleeing famine and extreme 
poverty have legitimate claims to entry” (Blake, 2005, p. 236). However, Blake does not 
believe this demand extends more broadly, as many cosmopolitan theorists would argue.  
2.2.3 Old and new open borders debate 
The debate between those who defend states’ rights to restrict migration and those who argue 
for more extensive freedom of movement, outlined in the two preceding sections, is what 
forms the background for much of the current debate on the fairness of migration regulations. 
So before we proceed to discuss the fairness of skills-based migration and proposed solutions 
to migration injustice, it is worth noting some general features of the arguments presented 
above. Amy Reed-Sandoval makes a useful distinction between the “classical open borders 
debate” and the “new open borders debate” (Reed-Sandoval, 2016, pp. 13-21). The former 
debate is seen as characterised by its being an abstract, general, and principled discussion. As 
such, the philosophers are generally discussing principles and rights that should apply to all 
states. The arguments are often framed as for or against open borders. As opposed to this, the 
“new open borders debate” draws on real world situations, such as colonial history, tries to 
weigh specific solutions, and draws on descriptions of inequalities or specific injustices done 
to groups. Reed-Sandoval ties this distinction to a difference between ideal and non-ideal 
theory. We will return to ideal and non-ideal theory and its connection to the normative 
arguments concerning migration in section 3.3, so let us just initially consider the distinction 
between different strands in the debate, and the level of abstraction. 
While I am not sure that a strict division between these debates is warranted − after all many 
“classical” debaters use some real world examples and as we will see below many “new” 
debaters use classical abstract arguments − Reed-Sandoval is undoubtedly correct in asserting 
that there are relevant differences in the types of arguments being employed. There seems to 
be a range of various positions within the debate, distinguished by their level of abstraction, 
generality and use of specific real world issues. However, most theorists find themselves 
somewhere in between, as most open borders theories agree that some restrictions on 
migration are warranted, and most state-centred theorists agree that states have responsibility 
to let in some people, notably refugees. As I point out in my first article (App. i), Kollar 






ways in which the joint requirement of global equality of opportunity and collective self-
determination can be coherently upheld”(Kollar, 2017, p. 733).  
In order to accomplish this task one needs to balance various factors. After all, it is perfectly 
possible to agree with both the need of states to determine their own immigration policies, due 
to collective-self-determination and protecting their citizens’ welfare, and argue that they 
should also consider global justice when deciding who to admit. It is therefore important to 
consider what types of immigration restrictions are just, and how admissions policies and 
treatment of migrants might be improved. This is largely the goal of the articles I have written 
(see chapter 4 and the appendices), which focus on the fairness of differentiated treatment of 
migrants on the basis of their skills and education. The evaluations of what is considered fair 
in these articles is based on ideas of global equality of opportunity and structural injustice. In 
order to contextualise this contribution, I consider in section 2.3 various suggestions about 
how we might alter admission policies to bring about fairer migration regulations, but first we 
need to consider what skills-based restrictions actually entail, and the reasons put forward for 
such differentiated treatment.  
2.2.4 Skills-based restrictions  
Before moving on to suggestions on how to reform current admission rules, I here briefly 
consider some of the research on skills-based selection in particular. In short, what are skills 
based admission policies, how did they come about, and what might be their advantages and 
disadvantages? It is worth first spelling out the argument in favour of such policies. Broadly 
speaking if we agree that states have the right to decide their own admissions policies, for 
reasons related to culture, economy or collective self-determination, then education and skills 
seem like a relevant way to decide admission and differentiate treatment of migrants. As I 
also point to in the article “Statements on race and class” in appendix ii, David Miller puts the 
argument in the following manner: 
The receiving state has certain policy goals - for example, it is aiming for economic 
growth or to provide its citizens with generous welfare services - and it is entitled to 
use immigration policy as one of the means to achieve such goals. This explains why 
selecting immigrants according to particular skills that they can deploy is a justifiable 
criterion. […] In contrast, selection by race or national background is unjustifiable, 






goals that a democratic state might legitimately wish to pursue (Miller, 2016, pp. 105-
106). 
In short, if you do not believe the state has a particular responsibility towards non-refugee 
migrants, then you can admit them according to a justifiable criterion. Skills and education are 
generally seen as such justifiable criterions (Egan, 2020, pp. 111-112; Tannock, 2011, pp. 
1338-1339). As I discuss skills- and education based differentiated treatment in all three 
articles, I will not expand on these arguments here, but rather briefly summarise the origins of 
such differentiated treatment, and some of criticisms that have been raised against such 
policies.  
Let us begin with how such admission requirements for migrants came about. Many of the 
modern systems of border control have their origins in the wish to exclude specific ethnic 
groups. As Sarah Fine puts it: “It is no exaggeration to claim that the modern system of 
immigration controls, so much a part of the present political landscape in liberal democracies, 
was born of racism - of hostility to those perceived as inferior races” (Fine, 2016a, p. 129). 
This concern to keep out unwanted ethnic groups is also mirrored in the first skills- and 
education based immigration criteria. As Stuart Tannock has shown, education and skills have 
long been used as a proxy requirement in order to exclude unwanted foreign immigrants:  
The government of Canada passed an amendment to the immigration act in 1919 that 
instantiated mandatory literacy test for immigrants that would keep out the illiterate 
and uneducated: similar tests had already been passed in the USA, Natal/South Africa, 
New Zealand, and Australia. The invocation of education as a barrier to immigration, 
as has so often been the case, was strongly racialized. (Tannock, 2011, p. 1332) 
Skills- and education based criteria were thereby originally a way to exclude unwanted 
nationalities and ethnic groups. Indeed, many people from countries in Northern Europe were 
not be subject to the same requirements (Tannock, 2011, p. 1332). We should therefore keep 
in mind that many of the skills or education-based systems for migrant admissions are born 
from racism. That is not to say that they are currently racist − after all they no longer have 
explicit racial criteria – and, at least most of the time, people are subject to the same criteria 
regardless of their ethnic background. Indeed, one of the merits of such criteria is that they do 






However, some argue that skill-based criteria might still be used in this manner. As Tannock 
argues on this point, the Global North spends far more on education and a higher percentage 
of its young people are highly educated than in the Global South. “All else being equal, any 
immigration system based on skill and education will discriminate against the populations of 
poorer nations (which are predominantly non-white) as a whole” (Tannock, 2011, p. 1336). I 
discuss and compare racial and skills-based admission criteria in the article “Statements on 
race and class: the fairness of skills-based immigration criteria” (see 4.2 and app. ii). For the 
time being, it suffices to say that it matters for evaluations of the fairness of such admission 
rules whether one believes they should not discriminate in practise, or whether it is enough 
that they formally do not discriminate on racial grounds.  
But what do I mean by skills, in skills-based policies? It turns out that what counts as “skill” 
in relation to migration, is very contentious. As Anne Katherine Boucher has made clear there 
are vast differences between how both different states and academic studies define skills. 
Skills can for example mean tertiary education, wages in certain occupations, work 
experience, employer sponsorship, and language abilities, or any combination of these and 
other factors (Boucher, 2019, p. 6). Skills-based admission policies are often tailored to let in 
people qualified for certain occupations. Points-based admission policies are a subset of 
skills-based policies and refer to systems that rank people according to such criteria as are 
listed above, giving a certain number of points for each criterion. If a person gets above a 
certain number of points, they are eligible to apply for a visa. It is important to note that 
skills-based admissions policies are not a simple phenomenon; rather they refer to a set of 
interrelated and highly diverse admissions policies, and visa systems, that differentiate 
treatment according to such factors as education, language abilities, and work experience. It 
should therefore be clear that any discussion of the fairness of such policies must be wary of 
the danger of overgeneralising.  
If we put aside potential proxy effects concerning race and ethnicity, what other effects might 
skills-based admission policies have? Well, rather than offer group based criteria, these types 
of policies were meant to evaluate people on an individual level: “As the rise of skill-based 
immigration selection came to be hailed as the epitome of non-discrimination, inclusion and 
exclusion were seen to operate solely on the basis of individualist, rather than collectivist, 
criteria” (Ellermann, 2019a, p. 1). Rather than evaluating migrants according to their national 






their achievements. However, such a view seems to deny the role of class as a collective 
criteria. Indeed, as Ellermann argues, there is a lack of class based scholarship in the 
discourse on migration: “The lack of analytical integration of cultural attributes and economic 
factors in the politics of belonging is indicative of a broader reluctance within migration 
scholarship to recognise the significance of class as an axis of belonging” (Ellermann, 2019b, 
p. 4). This is one of the issues I address in the article “Statements on race and class: the 
fairness of skills-based immigration criteria” (see 4.2 and app. ii).  
One of the main criticisms philosophers have raised against skills-based selection is the issue 
of emigration of skilled professionals. Frequently referred to as a “brain drain”, this 
emigration contributes to a shortage of skilled professionals in many countries in the Global 
South. There is some discussion about the degree to which brain drain is actually a problem, 
and some argue that the net effect of skilled emigration is mostly positive, due to remittances 
and knowledge exchanges, for example. Whereas Gillian Brock (2009, pp. 204-209) is 
sceptical that remittances offset the negative effects of brain drain, Christian Barry is more 
positive that this is the case (2011, pp. 32-39).5 However, regardless of what view one might 
have on compensatory effects, there is little doubt that many countries in the Global South 
have a high rate of high-skilled emigration, and that this impacts their ability to provide public 
services (Brock & Blake, 2015, pp. 1-3; Oberman, 2013, pp. 428-429).  
In summation, arguments against skills-based selection can be divided into three kinds, based 
on whether the criticism focuses on the effect on the sending society, the receiving society, or 
the differentiated treatment of migrants. These kinds of concerns form the backdrop of the 
three articles I have submitted as part of this dissertation. The first article considers skills-
based selection in the light of global equality of opportunity, and takes into account effects on 
the sending society, the receiving society and the treatment of migrants (see section 4.1 and 
app. i). The second article focuses on the effect on citizens in the receiving society, and draws 
an analogy to Blake’s argument against racial selection (see section 4.2 and app. ii). The third 
article considers differentiated treatment of migrants in light of Iris Young’s theory of 
structural injustice (see section 4.3 and app. iii). As such they use different normative 
frameworks and vary their focus while discussing similar policies. But before we turn to the 
normative foundations and methodology I use, it is worth considering various suggestions 
                                                            






philosophers have made to rectify migration injustices, which will help situate my own 
contributions discussed in section 4 and the appendices.  
2.3 Solutions to migration injustice 
Moving from the general to the more specific, I now turn from the general arguments for and 
against states’ right to control borders, and arguments concerning skills-based selection, to 
specific solutions philosophers have proposed to remedy migration injustices. As we will see 
many of these solutions address the problem of brain drain, though some also address unequal 
access to migration opportunities and global inequalities more broadly. I begin in 2.3.1 by 
looking at the problem of brain drain, and how emigration and immigration restrictions might 
help alleviate it. I then (2.3.2) discuss suggestions for different migration rules, before 
considering indirect solutions such as remittances, taxes and levies (2.3.3). I proceed to briefly 
consider rectificatory migration responses (2.3.4), before finally turning to temporary labour 
migration, and altered terms for guest workers (2.3.5). Throughout this overview, I will also 
indicate the varying normative foundations for these different positions, before discussing 
these normative foundations and arguing for my focus on equality of opportunity in section 
2.4.  
2.3.1 Emigration and immigration restrictions 
As mentioned in section 2.2.4., one of the main problems philosophers have considered in 
relation to labour migration, has been the emigration of highly skilled individuals from 
developing countries. This emigration can affect the living conditions, welfare provisions, and 
opportunities of people in these countries. As a response to this, philosophers have come up 
with solutions to limit the emigration of skilled professionals, and the effects such emigration 
might have on the countries these migrants are leaving.  
Gillian Brock (Brock, 2016a, 2016b; Brock & Blake, 2015) argues that most philosophical 
investigations of labour migration focus on migrants and receiving states. She instead focuses 
on the relationship between migrants and the states they have left, and considers when and 
how developing states may restrict the emigration of skilled professionals. Brock argues that 
there are two legitimate ways of doing so, compulsory service and taxation of emigrants, and 
argues that both these solutions are acceptable under certain conditions. 
Brock’s argument is based on a cosmopolitan egalitarianism, a description of the negative 
effects of brain drain, and an argument concerning the limits of states’ control on individuals. 






equally, and that everyone should be able to meet their basic needs, and enjoy basic liberties, 
fair cooperation, and the societal background conditions to support a decent life (Brock & 
Blake, 2015, p. 25).6 While Brock’s normative argument rests on an ideal of moral equality, 
her arguments for specific solutions are often illustrated by examples of the desperately poor, 
referencing lack of access to decent health care. She points out that such problems are 
exacerbated by the emigration of skilled professionals. As a solution, Brock argues:  
[…] carefully designed compulsory service and taxation programs can be justified 
under certain kinds of conditions, such as when poor, responsible, legitimate 
developing states are making good faith efforts to supply core goods and services that 
citizens need for a minimally decent life, under severe budgetary constraints, and 
where there is full information about those constraints and what is expected when 
students accept opportunities for tertiary-level training. (Brock, 2016a, p. 8) 
Brock argues that states are legitimate in limiting emigration in these instances. However, 
there are many ways in which one might go about limiting brain drain. Whereas Brock 
focuses on the responsibility of states of emigration, Luara Ferracioli has considered what 
wealthy countries can do. The problem Ferracioli seeks to solve is similar, namely the 
departure of skilled professionals, more specifically the cases  “in which professional skills 
are essential for the protection of basic rights in resources deprived settings” (Ferracioli, 2015, 
p. 105). However, she argues for a receiving state’s duty to exclude high-skilled migrants on 
this similar foundation: “I argue that states have a negative duty to exclude prospective 
immigrants whose departure could be expected to contribute to severe deprivation in their 
countries of origin” (Ferracioli, 2015). While Brock’s argument is normatively justified by a 
state’s positive duty to cosmopolitan egalitarianism, Ferracioli’s argument is justified by a 
negative duty: not to cause harm in developing countries.  
So the difference between Brock and Ferracioli’s arguments is not merely the focus on 
different agents, countries of emigration and receiving countries, but also the underlying 
normative justification for policy change. It should be pointed out that, as both Brock and 
Ferracioli mention, the emigration of skilled professionals does have positive effects, such as 
increased autonomy for the migrants in question and increased remittances sent to the 
countries they emigrate from. Furthermore, Ferracioli points out that the duty to exclude only 
                                                            






arises if the transfer of resources from a rich to a poor country is not sufficient to alleviate the 
deprivation caused by emigration. This is a common, and reasonable, reservation in proposals 
to improve labour migration injustice. After all, if the motivating factor is the improvement of 
social goods for the people in the country of origin, any solution to brain drain must at least 
have a net positive effect for them.  
Kieran Oberman (2013) has also offered arguments for immigration restrictions to limit brain 
drain, stating that while coercion is very troubling, it might be legitimate in a limited range of 
cases. That is, if the migrant owes assistance in their home country, can provide such 
assistance, and no other remedy is readily available. As Oberman and Brock both mention 
though, this duty can only arise in free and democratic states, as such duties cannot be owed 
to autocratic and illegitimate states. Therefore, if we agree with this stipulation, which I think 
seems reasonable, this solution will only work for some of the “brain drain”, as many 
countries skilled people are emigrating from cannot be regarded as democratic and free.  
However, there are other actors involved in the problem of brain drain than the receiving 
states and the countries of origin, namely the employers. In the light of this, some national 
health services, such as the UK’s, have codes for best practice in order to avoid their 
recruitment of skilled health workers negatively impacting the countries these migrants are 
moving from (Brock, 2009, pp. 201-202). These systems are voluntary, but the underlying 
problem they seek to solve is similar to the emigration and immigration restrictions discussed 
above, in that they seek to control immigration in order to not adversely affect health care 
services elsewhere. However, as Brock has shown, these guidelines are quite limited. In order 
to effectively contribute to limiting brain drain one would need an international code, an 
international agency, coordination among countries, and would also need to address the 
underlying cause, namely the “seemingly insatiable demand for healthcare in developed 
countries” (Brock, 2009, p. 202).  
Most of the literature on brain drain and other migration injustices focuses on the role of the 
state, so there is a room and need for an increased focus on other agents as well. As little has 
been written on individual responsibilities in relation to migration inequalities, this is one of 
the reasons I address individual responsibility in particular in the third article concerning 






All these proposed solutions to limiting the brain drain, limiting emigration, a duty to exclude, 
and best practice in recruitment, have run up against the following objection: namely, that 
they put an undue burden on or coercion of the migrant. For example, Michael Blake has 
argued that “The action of this state, in prohibiting the would-be emigrant from leaving, is 
morally equal to preventing a useful tourist from departing; the cases of kidnapped tourist and 
prevented emigrant are equally morally prohibited” (Brock & Blake, 2015, p. 209). Yet, this 
only seems to apply if the state does not allow for exit visas, as Blake does say that Brock’s 
example of compulsory service and taxation might be legitimate, if the state is non-coercive 
and the skilled-professional entered into the agreement freely. Blake, however, offers a more 
damning critique of the suggestion that wealthy states should limit immigration of skilled 
professionals. As Blake puts it regarding the suggestion “to exclude highly talented people 
from our own societies. This is politically unpalatable to most parties except for the furthest 
right wing, but it would at the very least stop some of the worst injustices of the brain drain” 
(Brock & Blake, 2015, pp. 219-220). Firstly, he argues that the right to exclude is limited, 
secondly, that exclusion can lead to increased undocumented migration, and thirdly, that it is 
objectionably paternalistic. Instead he suggests more ethical recruitment and better 
cooperation, but he is somewhat sceptical about our ability to limit brain drain, as it is based 
on other fundamental global inequalities. It should be pointed out that while Blake argues 
strongly against limiting the immigration of skilled professionals for social justice reasons, he 
does not seem to have the same qualms about restricting the immigration of unskilled 
migrants.  
Luis Cabrera has also pointed out how restrictions on the movement of skilled professionals 
puts undue restrictions on them: “to impose such rigid limitations on the physical and social 
mobility of individuals could be to make the ‘luck of birth’ doubly disadvantaged to 
them”(Cabrera, 2014). Not only would the skilled professionals be disadvantaged by fewer 
possibilities in their country of origin, they would face more restrictions in leaving these 
countries than others born elsewhere.  
A solution to brain drain that might overcome these objections would be for skilled personnel 
in developed countries to recruit from developing countries, for the purpose of training them 
and their subsequent returning to their country of origin (Brock, 2009, p. 209). While only 
briefly discussed by Brock, this solution would have the benefit of not limiting the agency of 






such arrangements, this might also contribute to alleviating global differences in access to 
health care and the like. However, if the migrants are required to return it would also impact 
their agency, and if the underlying inequalities that cause brain drain are not addressed, this 
solution might have a very limited effect.  
2.3.2 Different admission rules 
Moving on from emigration and immigration restrictions, there are a set of solutions that 
consider altering admissions criteria as a way to address brain drain. In the article discussed in 
2.2.2, Joseph Carens suggests that in non-ideal circumstances, one way to address brain drain 
would be: “that we should give priority to the least skilled among potential immigrants 
because their departure would presumably have little or no harmful effect on those left 
behind” (Carens, 1987, p. 261) Lucas Stanczyk (2016) also suggests that instead of stopping 
the flow of skilled migrants, the problem of brain drain can be addressed by developed states 
prioritising different migrant groups. “[The] problem could be addressed by governments in 
wealthy societies choosing to prioritise the poorest and least skilled applicants for immigrant 
visas, giving them strict priority over their more advantaged compatriots with advanced skills 
and professional degrees” (Stanczyk, 2016, p. 2). Stanczyk argues that most forms of taxation 
and limitations on emigration would be detrimental to fundamental liberties, but that receiving 
countries prioritising differently would be much less problematic. In addition to prioritising 
the poorest and least skilled migrants, he considers the case of a migration lottery. Let us 
consider prioritisation of poor and unskilled migrants, before returning to the idea of a 
migration lottery.  
Stanczyk and Carens do not offer a comprehensive model for how this different prioritisation 
could be made. For such a model we can look to Peter Higgins’ Priority of Disadvantage 
Principle (2013) (hereafter PDP), or my own suggestion for a ‘fairer migration model’ (see 
section 4.1 and app. i). The latter proposes to select migrants according to how much their 
movement increases their overall opportunities, and the opportunities for others in the 
countries of emigration and immigration. The solutions discussed in 2.3.1 have focused on 
ameliorating the bad effects of brain drain. However, some solutions, such as Carens’, 
Stanczyk’s, Higgins’ and my own, also attempt to solve the problem of less opportunities for 
some groups of migrants.  
Higgins has suggested a model which seeks to prioritise disadvantaged groups. The moral 






cosmopolitan ideal of equality. Rather than a specific policy suggestion, Higgins’ model is 
used to evaluate immigration policies. If they, on balance, give priority to disadvantaged 
social groups, they are just, whereas if they disadvantage already disadvantaged groups they 
are unjust. The model does not argue that a state should just give priority to disadvantaged 
groups in admissions, but that it should consider the effects on “the residents of receiving 
countries, prospective migrants, and the non-migrating residents of foreign countries” 
(Higgins, 2013, p. 229). In other words, the PDP is context specific, and more of a general 
framework for interpreting fairness than a specific policy suggestion.  
On the basis of this PDP Higgins considers a long list of policies, including admission 
criteria. Cultural dissimilarity are seen as unjust selection criteria, as it most often 
disadvantages already disadvantaged groups. Higgins’ PDP would also allow for limiting the 
immigration of skilled professionals, in those cases where it would harm social groups in the 
countries they emigrate from. When it comes to emigration, Higgins argues that PDP is 
incompatible with emigration compensation by rich states, as the compensation is unlikely to 
be adequate. However, he argues PDP can be compatible with emigration restrictions, and in 
most cases emigrant taxation. While there is no space here to evaluate all of the arguments 
behind these evaluations, it should be noted that the moral foundation of seeking not to 
disadvantage already disadvantaged social groups might allow for different interpretations 
than those Higgins makes. The model might support different policies, depending on how one 
defines the social groups in question, and the impact one thinks policies might have on the 
disadvantaged groups. For example, one might contend that if emigration compensation 
proves to be adequate, one could use PDP to argue for other conclusions than those Higgins 
reaches.  
While models such as Higgins’ are compatible with several of the solutions to brain drain 
mentioned above, they would also have broader impacts on the migration system. One 
practical drawback is that both examining adverse effects to disadvantaged groups, and 
evaluating improvements in access to opportunities, is liable to be costly, contested and 
difficult to implement. Therefore, some philosophers have suggested a migration lottery 
(Bhattacharya, 2014; Stanczyk, 2016; Woodward, 1992):  
[The] natural way of respecting the force of this right [to equality of opportunity], 
within an egalitarian framework, would be some policy that can be justified in terms of 






gives every prospective migrant, rich or poor, an equal chance to enter, or some other 
system that embodies some other notion of opportunity or access). (Woodward, 1992, 
p. 51) 
Both Woodward and Bhaattacharya refer to equality of opportunity as the normative 
foundation of their arguments, although Bhaattacharya argues that freedom of movement, 
approximating open borders, would be a better solution than a migration lottery. Yet, a lottery 
has the merits of being less bureaucratic, while still limiting the effects of a brain drain, and 
reducing the negative treatment of already disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, it would allow 
equal opportunities for migrants, whether they are skilled or unskilled, and be completely 
neutral in regards to race, religion, gender, etc. Nevertheless, unlike both Higgins’, 
Stanczyk’s, and my own suggested solutions, it would likely not contribute to as much 
positive change; at least in the sense of remedying inequalities of opportunity or alleviating 
other forms of structural inequality. For that to be the case, one would have to give priority to 
those, either individuals or social groups, who stand to benefit the most. However, it should 
be kept in mind that while perhaps having less of an impact on inequalities, a migration 
lottery might be less bureaucratic and perhaps easier to implement than solutions that seek to 
prioritise disadvantaged social groups or unskilled migrants. 
2.3.3 Remittances, taxes and levies  
In sections 2.3.1. and 2.3.2., I have considered solutions to labour injustices which mainly 
focus on changing emigration and immigration rules. In this section, I discuss solutions that 
would instead seek to mitigate the effects of migration injustice by other measures. These 
suggestions include improving remittances, emigration compensation, and a birth right 
privilege levy. As mentioned in section 2.2.4., some philosophers have suggested using 
monetary compensation as a means to make amends for brain drain. For example Brock 
suggests giving funds to developing nations because of the emigration of health care workers: 
“For recruiting healthcare workers trained in a developing country (‘Developing’), the 
developed country (‘Developed’) pays compensation to Developing at the rate of (say) five 
times what it costs to train that worker in Developing”(Brock, 2009, p. 208). As she points 
out, this would contribute to the countries of emigration being able to fund, at least in 
principle, more skilled workers. Yet, as Brock also mentions, it can be questioned whether the 






As remittances are one of the largest resource transfers between the Global North and the 
Global South, several theorists have suggested measures to improve remittances in order to 
compensate for brain drain. On a practical level Ratha and Riedberg (2005) have in a World 
Bank report suggested a series of measures, such as harmonising regulations between 
governments, increasing competition to lower cost of transfers, and improving the ease of 
financial transfers. These suggestions, while limited in scope, could clearly increase the 
effectiveness of remittances, as more money would reach the intended recipients.  
Another suggestion by Christian Barry and Gerhard Overland, is to give tax exemptions on 
remittances (Barry & Overland, 2009). They argue that the normative foundation for such a 
policy is extreme poverty, and give three distinct moral reasons why affluent countries need to 
address global differences: assistance-based reasons, contribution-based reasons, and 
beneficiary-based reasons. Briefly put, affluent countries have the ability and duty to assist 
people who are suffering, they contribute to poverty in developing countries, partly through a 
brain drain, and they benefit from global differences, by taking advantage of migrants being 
available as cheap labour. Therefore, Barry and Overland argue that affluent countries should 
partially remedy the situation by making remittances exempt from taxation. Some of the 
objections to this suggestion are that the migrants will contribute less to public services in the 
country they are moving to, and the remittances may not reach the people who need them 
most in the countries they are moving from. While accepting that both of these objections 
have some merit, Barry and Overland argue that on balance their solution is still justified. In 
general, Barry is sceptical to placing limits on migration generally, and positive to migration 
as a way for people to meet their basic needs (Barry, 2011). He is therefore sceptical of 
Brock’s proposals of using emigration restrictions, and suggests compensation from rich to 
poor states, and a more equitable distribution of migration opportunities between skilled and 
unskilled migrants (Barry, 2011, p. 38).  
Brock also highlights the valuable contribution of remittances, for example in relation to 
systems in Mexico where remittances are being used for public works, and matched by public 
funding (2009, pp. 206-207). By this joint effort of remittances and public funding, 
remittances do not merely contribute to the economy of the person or family receiving the 
money. However, Brock also points to reasons to be sceptical of these systems. Remittances 
can contribute to a state of dependence, remittances reduce over time, and the system may be 






while remittances might reduce poverty in the short term, they are not likely to impact longer 
term poverty and structural inequalities. These arguments concerning compensation and 
remittances, by Brock, and by Barry and Overland, are aimed at injustices brought about by 
emigration. Yet they are perhaps somewhat limited in scope, as they have little to offer the 
various groups of labour migrants who bear the brunt of unequal treatment. In other words, 
such solutions would have to be supplemented by solutions such as those in section 2.3.2, 
concerning different admission rules, if one also wanted to address the issue of differentiated 
treatment.  
Another compensatory suggestion which has received a lot of attention, is Ayelet Shachar and 
Ran Hirschl’s proposal of a birthright privilege levy (Shachar & Hirschl, 2007). Similarly to 
how Carens argues that citizenship can be seen as comparable to feudal birthright privilege in 
how it distributes people’s opportunities (Carens, 2013, p. 226), Shachar and Hirschl argue 
that citizenship “distributes opportunity on a global scale” (Shachar & Hirschl, 2007, p. 254). 
By using an analogy to inherited wealth, they argue that “the intergenerational transfer of 
property allows us to use existing qualifications found in the realm of inheritance as a model 
for imposing restrictions on the unlimited and perpetual transmission of membership - with 
the aim of ameliorating its most glaring opportunity inequalities” (Shachar & Hirschl, 2007, 
p. 253). They suggest a progressive tax or a birthright levy that can help rectify some of the 
global inequalities in opportunities. While not specifically addressing the differentiated 
treatment of different groups in immigration admission or the effect of brain drain, this 
addresses the underlying inequalities which closed borders and different citizenship entail.  
2.3.4 Rectifying specific harms 
Some philosophers have also suggested to rectify migration injustices by targeting particular 
injustices. These solutions aim to give privileged access to particular groups due to injustices 
caused by particular states. More commonly, these types of solutions are used in grounding 
duties to receive refugees, such as states being obliged to accept refugees from wars they have 
taken part in (Souter, 2014). These solutions are less general in scope than the ones discussed 
above, and provide models to address specific groups of migrants, and the specific injustices 
done to them. These are to varying degrees also compatible with the theories discussed above, 
particularly Higgins’ PDP.   
One example is Wilcox, who builds his idea on the “Global harm principle” (hereafter GHP) 






not harm foreigners; and societies that violate this duty must: (1) stop harming foreigners 
immediately; and (2) compensate their victims for the harm they have already caused them” 
(Wilcox, 2007, p. 277). As such this is an example of a broadly liberal notion of global 
justice, focusing on the negative duty to avoid harm. However, interesting for our purpose 
here are Wilcox’ reflections on how this applies to immigration. While her examples 
primarily focus on the effects of the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq, her conclusions for 
immigration admissions apply more broadly. In short, if a society causes harm somewhere 
else in the world, and does not stop harming foreigners, then that society has a duty to admit 
people from these countries: “it must be emphasised that duty to provide admission is borne 
solely by the society that is collectively accountable for producing the conditions that 
necessitate resettlement, not the global community” (Wilcox, 2007, p. 286). 
Another wrong to be addressed by rectificatory solutions, discussed by Sarah Fine, is the 
impact of racism on immigration systems (Fine, 2016a). As Fine argues, it is not enough to 
have formally non-racist immigration criteria: “even policies which are seemingly “neutral” 
with regard to race and ethnicity frequently have entirely foreseeable discriminatory effects, 
as in the well-documented British attempts to close legal migration channels to non-skilled 
non-EU citizens” (Fine, 2016a, p. 133). Here Fine is referring to the kinds of proxy effects 
discussed above (section 2.2.4.), and argues that there is a need for rectificatory justice in 
relation to immigration controls. Now, one way to solve this problem is to open borders, but 
as Fine argues many political philosophers want to defend a state’s right to limit and control 
migration. She therefore argues that states need to specifically acknowledge racial 
discrimination, diagnose the problem and offer a prescription to solve it (Fine, 2016a, pp. 
134-135). Fine stops short of offering particular policy proposals, but uses this model to 
analyse whether other philosophical theories of migration address and rectify racist injustices.  
2.3.5 Temporary labour migration  
One final strand within the literature on solutions to migration injustice focuses on temporary 
labour migration and guest worker programs. Here the main question concerns whether giving 
lesser rights to some immigrants is permissible, given the increased migration this might lead 
to, and the positive effects this would have on migrants’ opportunities and on reducing 
economic inequalities through remittances. And if this is the case, what kinds of rights 
restrictions are permissible? Martin Ruhs for example puts the argument for differentiating 






[…] I contend that there is a strong normative case for tolerating the selective, 
evidence-based, temporary restriction of a few specific rights under new and expanded 
TMPs that help liberalise international labour migration, especially of lower-skilled 
workers whose international movement is currently most restricted and who would 
therefore reap large human development gains from employment abroad. (Ruhs, 2013, 
p. 9)   
In addition to this positive effect on the mobility and access to opportunities for low-skilled 
workers, such programs can have a positive impact on reducing global inequalities through 
migrants sending remittances home. Furthermore, such temporary programs can also be 
defended by reference to the general arguments for open borders, that restrictions on 
migration are incompatible with a fundamental right to free movement, and that open borders 
reduce global inequalities (for more on this see section 2.2.) As I discuss in the article 
““Structural injustice and labour migration” (section 4.3 and App. iii), the main objection to 
using temporary migrant programs are their effects on domestic equality. Walzer for example 
argues that having such a permanent underclass in society is impermissible. “As a group, they 
constitute a disenfranchised class. They are typically an exploited and oppressed class as well, 
and they are exploited or oppressed at least in part because they are disenfranchised, incapable 
of organizing effectively for self-defence” (Walzer, 1983, p. 59). Walzer therefore describes 
having guest workers as a form of tyranny, as long as there is no right of naturalisation after a 
certain period of time. Patti Lenard and Christina Straehle similarly argue that while TLMs 
can have many positive effects through migrants’ increased opportunities and remittances, 
they also lead to many harms, and that without the ability to gain citizenship and participate as 
equals, such systems are impermissible (Lenard & Straehle, 2012).  
There are various responses that have been made against the objections to guest worker 
programs. Firstly, one can argue that the state does not owe prospective migrants equal rights, 
as they arrive voluntarily. Secondly, one can nuance the position by differentiating between 
different kinds of rights restrictions, and point out that certain limited rights restrictions might 
be compatible with domestic equality. And thirdly, one can say that while such rights 
restrictions are unfair, and have the kinds of negative effects Walzer points to, the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  
For example, Robert Mayer argues that even when guest worker programs are exploitative: 






likely nonexploitative alternative worsens the plight of the disadvantaged” (Mayer, 2005, p. 
311). He builds his argument on a sufficiency standard: would a person who has enough in the 
country of emigration accept the terms offered. This would mean that different terms would 
be acceptable, based on the country of emigration. Mayer argues that in the current political 
climate it is not realistic to think that states would increase immigration of disadvantaged 
foreigners, so that guest worker arrangements are preferable as they help reduce deprivation 
overall. Anna Stilz similarly argues that some rights restrictions are permissible, and that the 
citizenship rights Walzer refers to will not necessarily affect the exploitation they are subject 
to (Stilz, 2010, p. 305). She points to the importance of economic rights, like the ability to 
change employer, and argues that so long as migrants do not have to surrender basic rights, 
and are not forced into dominating social relationships, guest worker programs are acceptable.  
Some scholars have also pointed out that temporary migrants often have need of different 
rights than permanent residents. As Ottonelli and Torresi put it, many current practices have a 
“sedentariness bias” (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2019, p. 272). They argue that TLM is a valuable 
trade-off for many, and if we take the migrants’ specific needs and circumstances seriously 
we should give them access to special and differentiated rights. For example, labour migrants 
who spend time away from their family may want to work longer hours for shorter periods of 
time, and would benefit from portable welfare rights  (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2019, p. 273). 
Therefore the migrants themselves would not necessarily want access to the same sets of 
rights as citizens. 
All in all, while potentially useful in the short term to remedy inequalities, and desirable for 
many migrants, I believe there are also good reasons to be sceptical of the use of TLMs and 
guest worker programs as a way to remedy global inequalities. As Lenard and Straehle argue 
it is a mistake to distinguish between domestic and global justice: “since considerations of 
domestic justice and considerations of global justice are interdependent in ways that make 
establishing a hierarchy of normative objectives, absent the relevant contextual 
considerations, impossible” (Lenard & Straehle, 2012, p. 216). This points to the difficulty 
with general arguments that propose prioritising one injustice. And it does not seems clear 
that more temporary migration will actually reduce global inequalities. In fact, it may merely 
institutionalise and make more permanent ways of treating people differently. Furthermore, as 
Nils Holtug argues, if we really base our evaluations on a global luck egalitarian account, we 






labour migrants (Holtug, 2017b, p. 139). Why, if we base our argument for guest workers on a 
global egalitarian account, is it merely the guest workers who get fewer rights?  
As I also point out in the article “Structural injustice and labour migration: From individual 
responsibility to collective action” (see section 4.3 and App. iii), while allowing for more 
temporary migration with less access to rights might be beneficial for the migrants in the short 
term, it can still be unjust. That is, such measures can be justified in a non-ideal situation, due 
to the positive effects on some migrants’ opportunities and alleviating global inequality, and 
yet be objectionable if the way migrants are treated is structurally unjust.  
2.4 Normative foundations 
As we have seen, most researchers agree that states should treat migrants fairly, but what 
constitutes “fairness” is a matter of much dispute. The differing views are often based on 
different conceptions of justice, as well as the implications one thinks justice should have on 
migration policies. I will now briefly consider the normative foundations of the evaluations of 
what migration systems are fair, before turning to methodological issues. Due to the 
necessarily limited scope of this text I do not aim to give a comprehensive overview of 
different theories of global justice, or a full defence of one particular view, but rather to 
clarify the normative foundations of some of the arguments that follow and provide some 
useful distinctions. All three articles in the appendix rely on the value of opportunity, so that 
will be my focus. I also primarily rely on luck egalitarian arguments and relational arguments 
to support an ideal of global equality of opportunity. In the following I give an outline of the 
reasons for this choice of normative ideals, and discuss some potential problems.  
2.4.1 Global justice 
Global justice theories agree that vast global disparities are unwanted and should be rectified, 
but there are disagreements on what is unfair, why it is so unfair, and how one can and should 
rectify such differences.7 Accounts of global justice often begin by referring to vast global 
disparities in factors such as life expectancy, wealth, earnings, and literacy. They draw 
attention to these vast differences as a means to show how the world is very unequal, and 
appeal to the intuition that this is something we can and should do something about. Most also 
agree that something needs to be redistributed, for example, wealth, power, resources, 
welfare, capabilities or opportunities. As Armstrong writes, we can classify justice theories 
according to two issues, the “currency” of justice and the “subjects” of justice (Armstrong, 
                                                            






2012, p. 43). As such, theories of global justice agree that something needs to be fairly 
distributed amongst all the worlds’ nations or people, but differ as to what exactly needs 
redistribution. Furthermore, many global justice theories agree that the primary subject under 
consideration, or unit of concern, is the individual (Armstrong, 2012, p. 45).  
In addition to the currency and subjects of justice, justice theorists in general often differ on 
the scope, reasons, target and goals of justice. By scope I mean whether justice should be 
local, domestic or global. By reasons, I mean why something is unjust, for example for 
relational or non-relational reasons. Is it due to our interactions with each other that something 
is unfair or merely because of the existence of vast differences in how much we have? By 
target, I mean whether justice should apply to procedures and/or distribution. And lastly, by 
goal, I refer to the issue that if justice is conceived of as some kind of distribution, should it 
aim towards sufficiency, equality or something else? Summarily then, theories differ on the 
currency, subjects, scope, reasons, target and goals of justice.  
What also complicates the picture is that most theorists operate with slightly different 
distinctions and definitions of key concepts, and many, such as myself, draw on several types 
of arguments when discussing an issue. As the foregoing overview makes clear, different 
theorists rely on different normative ideals and reach different conclusions. For example, as I 
discussed in section 3.4., Brock builds her argument concerning limiting emigration on broad 
cosmopolitan assumptions (2015, p. 25), Ferracioli argues for obligations on receiving states 
to be based on a negative duty to avoid harm (2016), and Mayer builds his pragmatic 
arguments in favour of some guest worker programs on a sufficiency threshold (Mayer, 
2005).  
The main ideal I use for normative evaluations in the articles in the Appendix is equality of 
opportunity. In the first article (see section 4.1 and app. i), I take my point of departure from 
Joseph Carens argument for why global equality of opportunity implies open borders. I 
respond to David Miller’s objections to global equality of opportunity, that it cannot and 
should not hold globally. In the second article (see section 4.2 and app. ii), I bracket global 
issues to consider the impact of skills-based migration on the people in the receiving state. 
Here I evaluate this impact based on how such policies affect their opportunities, as well as 
their social bases of self-respect. The third article (see section 4.3 and app. iii), considers 
individual responsibility for labour migration in the light of structural injustice. While the 






unequal access to migration opportunities and the differentiated treatment of migrants. 
Therefore, in addition to the focus on skills-based selection, what ties these articles together is 
their commitment to equality of opportunity, and I will therefore in the next section focus on 
the choice of opportunity as the currency. In general, I draw on both luck egalitarian and 
relational arguments to support the ideal of global equality of opportunity. I point to how 
where you are born is a matter of chance, as well as two types of relational arguments: that the 
current international migration regime helps perpetuate global inequalities, and that global 
differences rely on forms of trade and interaction, which give rise to moral demands that can 
in part be remedied by altering our migration arrangements.  
2.4.2 Equality of opportunity  
In general, the scope of my arguments is global, the goal is equality, and the currency is 
opportunity.  So, in my articles and in the arguments below, the something which should be 
fairly distributed is ‘opportunity’. Before I argue for why this unit has been chosen, let me 
first explain what this notion entails. The understanding of equality of opportunity, which I 
am committed to in this thesis, can be traced to John Rawls. More than merely the notion of 
“careers open to talents”, it is rather the idea that “positions are to be not only open in a 
formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them” (Rawls, 1971, p. 73). 
Rawls specifies this further by stating that:  
More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are 
at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social 
system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born. (Rawls, 
1971, p. 73) 
This position builds on a broadly held idea that people should have an equal chance to attain 
social positions and their life goals, subject to their willingness to work hard to attain them. 
We should all have a fair shake at living a good life, regardless of our religion, race or class. It 
gets somewhat more complicated when we ask what is necessary for this to be the case. In 
other words, how can we arrange society in such a way that everyone gets a fair shake? 
Rawls’ notion of justice specifically applies to a single society, and is intimately linked with 
his view of a fair society governed by the principles of justice. As he puts it “the role of the 
principle of fair opportunity is to ensure that the system of cooperation is one of pure 






a good in itself, but also allow for the cooperative functioning of society. Furthermore, 
ensuring equality of opportunity is also key in allowing for people to develop self-respect. As 
Richard Arneson puts it “Another consideration is that self-respect is of utmost importance for 
any individual, so one should give priority to sustaining the social bases of self-respect, and a 
society that strictly protects basic liberties and [fair equality of opportunity] sustains the social 
bases of self-respect” (Arneson, 2015).  So, equality of opportunity is not merely important 
for society to function, but can also be viewed as necessary to sustain our self-respect.  
Furthermore, equality of opportunity is also tied to the principles governing the basic structure 
of society, perhaps most importantly those concerning social- and economic inequalities. For 
example, if social and economic inequalities are too large, it is immediately clear that people 
will have vastly different chances to attain positions. It is therefore important to note that a 
normative argument based on equality of opportunity does not negate other distributive justice 
issues, but is intimately tied to them.  
Now, Rawls’ theory was only meant to apply within one relatively confined society, and he 
did not think the scope of equality of opportunity, and other obligations of justice as fairness, 
extended globally. Several problems must be overcome in order for this scope to be extended. 
One must give reasons both for why such obligations to justice have a global scope, and that 
the currency of justice, in this instance “opportunity”, is globally applicable. The second 
objection is put by Brock in the following manner: “One problem we face in trying to extend 
the notion of equality of opportunity from the state to the global arena is that different cultures 
value different ends or goods, and the desirability of the position will often vary in accordance 
with these different valuations” (Brock, 2009, p. 59).  
I address these questions quite extensively in the first article (see section 4.1 and App. I) 
where I argue that even if one cannot make exact comparisons, one can make valuable and 
useful comparisons in the global arena. Furthermore, I draw on both luck-egalitarian 
arguments and relational arguments to extend the scope globally. Many global justice theories 
are forms of global luck egalitarianism (Holtug, 2017b). The luck egalitarian argument is 
based on the intuitively appealing idea that people should not be worse off because of bad 
luck. As Nils Holtug puts it: “According to luck egalitarianism, it is unfair for some 
individuals to have lower levels of advantages than others, through no responsibility of their 






where they are born, this is a matter of brute luck, and such differences are unfair. It follows 
that these are differences we should attempt to remedy.  
It should be noted that luck egalitarianism is sometimes taken to denote a comprehensive 
account of global justice, rather than an argument for why we should remedy inequalities. As 
Kim Angell and Robert Huseby write: “Note also that we intend by luck egalitarianism, 
domestically or globally, something other than equality of opportunity (for welfare). This 
comes in many versions, but the main point […] is that we assume that it is (responsibility-
adjusted) welfare that should be distributed equally and not opportunities for welfare, or 
simply opportunities as such” (Angell & Huseby, 2019, p. 180). The reason for this 
distinction is that equality of opportunity is understood by Angell and Huseby to be a kind of 
starting-gate theory, whereas luck egalitarianism is taken to compensate for cases of brute 
luck. However, regardless of the particular theory of global luck egalitarianism or global 
equality of opportunity one subscribes to, it is quite clear that they favour more extensive 
freedom of movement. In short, if it is unfair that people have fewer opportunities due to what 
country they are born in, and inequalities due to such arbitrary factors are something we 
should strive towards remedying. People should be able to migrate to find more opportunities. 
I expand on this argument in the first article (see section 4.1 and App. i). 
It should be noted that David Miller objects to this argument, by distinguishing between two 
meanings of ‘arbitrary’. As he argues, you can distinguish between two senses of how 
something can be arbitrary: firstly, it can mean that it does not result from choice, and, 
secondly, that it is irrelevant to a policy choice. “[Cosmopolitan theorists] simply assumed 
that because people did not (standardly) choose their national memberships, inequalities that 
stemmed from membership must be morally arbitrary, hence objectionable, in the second 
sense” (Miller, 2011, p. 166). He points out that for state-centred theorists, citizenship is non-
arbitrary in the second sense, and therefore relevantly non-arbitrary. However, this brings us 
back to the question of whether the nature of our intra-state interactions are such that we are 
justified in having a different degree of responsibility for other citizens, as opposed to 
foreigners.  
In addition to luck egalitarian arguments for global bonds of responsibility, I also point to 
relational arguments in the articles, such as how the world is increasingly financially and 
politically integrated. Many of the global differences are due to past or present transfers of 






differences, as many agents, particularly states, have helped not only to bring these 
differences about, but keep perpetuating them. This is therefore a contribution-based and 
beneficiary-based model of justice. Responsibility for justice is here derived both from 
contributing to create inequalities, and from continuing to benefit from unequal structures.  
Now, while on the face of it equality of opportunity might appear less encompassing than 
other currencies of justice, as Darrel Moellendorf has argued it can be quite demanding:   
A great deal would have to be spent on infrastructure among the world’s poor. 
Educational opportunities would have to be equalised across the globe and between 
the sexes, health care access and facilities would have to be approximately equal, and 
all persons would have to be free of persecution on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion and political affiliation. (Moellendorf, 2002, p. 79) 
So, while opportunity on its own might seem like quite a limited standard, for equality of 
opportunity to exist vast differences must be overcome.  
There are several reasons why I believe equality of opportunity is an appropriate normative 
yardstick to use when discussing the fairness of immigration regulations, in addition to being 
a valuable and intuitively appealing normative ideal. Firstly, one of the most important 
reasons people migrate, is for opportunities. This is certainly the case for most non-refugee 
migrants, who I focus on in this thesis. Secondly, equality of opportunity is at least on the face 
of it less encompassing than other global distributive theories, for example global resource 
justice. People who might not agree on a complete global redistribution of resources, might 
agree on to the principle of global equality of opportunity. One might ask why what people 
might agree on should matter; after all, people might be wrong? Yet, if we think that political 
philosophy does not discover independent moral truths, but subscribe to some form of 
constructivism or deliberative democratic theory, whereby moral facts are derived 
respectively from rational judgements on justice, or shared deliberations on justice, then 
people’s intuitions regarding justice are important, and a congruence of opinion might carry 
weight. Thirdly and related to the latter point, in order to agree to global equality of 
opportunity one does not need to endorse equality of outcome, or any specific account of 
distributive justice. That is not to say that equality of opportunity might not be an exacting 
standard, but rather that people with varying views on distributive issues might agree on it. 






equality of opportunity. Recall Joseph Carens’ argument for open borders in section 2.2. As 
he argues, freedom of movement is a prerequisite for equality of opportunity, and this is also 
the departure point of my first article (see section 4.1 and app. i). But before I discuss the 
particular arguments I make concerning justice and migration, we should briefly consider how 
I arrive from some broad normative ideas to the conclusions I reach; namely the philosophical 





















































3 Method  
 
Theory is artful abstraction. It draws our attention away from the welter of ‘confusing 
details’, directing it towards what is ‘most important’ to the case at hand. Theories are 
beacons, lenses or filters that direct us to what, according to the theory, is essential for 
understanding some part of the world. (Donnelly, 2001, p. 30) 
The main thrust of this thesis is normative, not descriptive. I am not mainly concerned with 
describing what kinds of admission policies states have and their impact on people, but rather 
morally evaluating admissions policies. Though as we will see, the view one has of the 
former, will influence the latter. We have already considered the normative bases I use for 
making evaluative judgements, namely equality of opportunity and structural injustice, but by 
what method can I balance various normative commitments? How do I get from some general 
descriptions of global justice, such as global equality of opportunity, to an evaluation of 
immigration criteria? And what are appropriate theoretical tools to conduct such a 
deliberation? These are the questions I discuss in this section. I start by considering the issue 
of implicit bias and positioning myself (3.1), both personally, as a dual-national, middle-class 
Norwegian, and theoretically within a mostly Western and Northern perspective. I continue 
by discussing philosophical methods of ideal and non-ideal theory (3.2), before finally 
discussing the application of such a methodological framework to the philosophy of migration 
(3.3). I maintain that I take both ideal and non-ideal considerations into account, and discuss 
my use abstraction and the feasibility of my proffered solutions.  
3.1 Positionality  
Often considerations of personal positionality are not included in philosophical enquiry. 
Indeed, sometimes they are avoided altogether, as theory, moral reasoning and explicit 
arguments are thought to speak for themselves. Some might ask, particularly within an 
analytic tradition, what is the point of including anything on the author’s biography. If 
rigorous philosophical method can show replicable, objective and universal truths, a person’s 
background is surely irrelevant and distracting. However, if, as I believe, philosophical 
enquiry is more hermeneutic, a kind of artful abstraction, seeking not eternal truths, but 
clearer, fairer and more interesting arguments, then far from a distraction, personal details can 
make us aware of how personal prejudices and individual idiosyncrasies might inform the 






So let me put my cards on the table. I am a 35 year old, cisgendered, male, middle-class, 
highly educated citizen of a Western liberal democracy, Norway. Of perhaps particular 
pertinence to the topic at hand, I am Irish-Norwegian, having a multicultural background and 
bilingual upbringing. I have lived in England, Norway, and Denmark, and enjoy quite 
extensive freedom to travel, particularly in Europe, as Norway is a member of the Schengen 
free travel area. In short, when it comes to the issue of migration, I am privileged. I know 
little, at least personally, of the kinds of challenges people face due to border controls. 
I believe that these facts about myself might make me positively disposed towards broadly 
cosmopolitan ideas of equality, such as those discussed in section 2.4. I am probably less 
hostile to foreign culture, as my experience has done nothing but strengthen my beliefs that 
most people are just people, and that the supposed dangers of multiculturalism are largely 
overblown. I believe people should morally be counted as equals, and that a large influx of 
foreigners poses little risk to our ways of life, whether they be “skilled” or not. This might 
also make me predisposed to accept more readily some studies that confirm these ideas, as 
opposed to studies which contradict my view. However, I believe my awareness of such a 
predisposition makes me more liable to consider contrary evidence. Everyone is prejudiced in 
one way or another, which means that an awareness of our prejudices is important. 
It should be noted that awareness of prejudice does not in itself mean that one is not 
susceptible to it. As Jennifer Saul (2017) discusses in relation to gender prejudice, and 
Clarissa Hayward (2017) discusses with regards to race and structural injustice, being made 
aware of our prejudices does not necessarily mean we change our minds. Indeed, sometimes 
such prejudices operate at a subconscious level and are not susceptible to explicit 
contradiction. While this might be the case, in the cases Saul and Hayward consider - gender 
and race - the prejudices are often used to prop up systems of privilege. Such prejudice can 
reproduce power hierarchies. I do not personally stand to gain anything by the kinds of 
proposals I make in the articles, and I believe I am questioning rather than perpetuating power 
hierarchies. Of course, my objection to these types of power hierarchies might also be seen as 
a prejudice, and there might be other subconscious preferences and mechanisms at play. 
Although if they are subconscious, and not susceptible to explicit scrutiny, it seems difficult 
for me, personally, to be able to access and challenge them.  
I believe it will be up to others to consider whether these personal facts about myself have 






should arrive at the conclusions I do based on the premises I give. To make this process easier 
I have tried to be explicit, both in the articles and this introductory text, about the premises on 
which my arguments are based. These premises are broadly cosmopolitan and liberal. They 
are that every person is of equal moral worth, and that this insight should make us consider 
what such principles mean for state policies and individual responsibility. Specifically, I use 
luck-egalitarian and relational arguments to justify the focus on equality of opportunity and 
structural injustice, as discussed in section 2.4. Now, before we get to the question of how we 
go from these broad premises to conclusions about what they should mean for our 
immigration policies, there are two potentially problematic aspects of my thesis thus far that 
are worth considering, as they relate to my theoretical positionality, in particular my choice of 
subject matter and theoretical focus. These are the northern and western focus, and the focus 
on nation states.  
Firstly, most of the examples I use in the discussions in the articles and that inform my 
normative conclusions, are examples of migration between the Global South and the Global 
North. Furthermore, most of the examples given are of the very poor and the very privileged. 
In fact, most global migration does not actually occur between such countries. It might 
therefore be objected that this perspective overlooks much of migration, and one might also 
question whether conclusions reached from discussing extreme inequalities, are relevant to 
lesser ones. I would argue that this focus is justifiable, given that these differences are both 
more clear-cut and more normatively significant. They are more clear-cut because the 
contrasts in wealth and opportunities are starker, and they are more normatively significant 
because the differences are greater. The greater the inequality the more morally significant it 
is. And as I do not operate with a threshold view of justice, but rather an ideal of equality, I 
believe that conclusions of discussions on greater inequalities are also relevant to lesser ones. 
That being said, it also follows that greater and lesser inequalities will not weigh equally on 
the normative scales in deliberations on policy choices. That is, if the difference between two 
countries in levels of opportunities is very small, it is more likely that concerns such as 
collective self-determination and welfare might override obligations of global equality of 
opportunity, than if such differences are very large.    
Secondly, most normative philosophical approaches to migration focus on the responsibility 
of states, and this is my main concern in the first two articles (see section 4.1, 4.2, App. i and 






right to enter, and what rights they are entitled to. Now, this focus on states is understandable, 
given that these regulate admission policies. However, a drawback of this focus is that it can 
lead to the roles of other agents in the migration system being undertheorized and 
underappreciated by philosophers. An excessive focus on states can also be seen as an 
expression of methodological nationalism. Alex Sager defines this as: “[…] a stance in the 
social sciences that unjustifiably presupposes the nation state, uncritically treats it as a natural 
form of social organization and/or reifies it” (Sager, 2016b, p. 2). By focusing too much on 
states, we might risk taking their powers and legitimacy for granted. We might also be 
overlooking the responsibility of other agents, who are let off the hook with respect to 
structural injustices they contribute to sustaining.  
Methodological nationalism is also connected to explanatory and prescriptive nationalism. 
While methodological nationalism presupposes the structure of the nation state, explanatory 
nationalism traces most of the reasons for domestic conditions to reasons within a state, as 
opposed to foreign influence. This term is used by Thomas Pogge to describe explanations of 
poverty which focus on intrastate reasons (2008b). So explanatory nationalism will typically 
explain poverty in relation to domestic policies, corruption or incompetence, rather than as a 
result of global factors. Lastly, prescriptive nationalism argues that the state should choose 
immigration policy in the national interest (Higgins, 2013, p. 22; Reed-Sandoval, 2016, p. 
16). When it comes to the philosophy of migration then, methodological nationalism 
uncritically assumes nation-state powers, explanatory nationalism explains migration in 
relation to the nation states, and prescriptive nationalism argues that the nation state should 
choose migration rules in the national interest. 
While there are good reasons for this focus on states, it can also impact the conclusions one 
reaches. As Janine Dahinden argues “migration and integration research originates in a 
historically, institutionalised nation-state migration apparatus and is thus entangled with the 
particular normalisation discourse” (2016, p. 2207). This kind of normalisation can be 
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, it can leave the 
responsibility of other agents undertheorised. Yet I think we can consider a focus on the 
nation state in two ways: as an important agent when discussing migration responsibility, or 
as naturally justified in controlling and limiting migration. For while the nation-state powers 
should not be taken too much for granted, there is no doubt that nation-states do set 






other words, one might possibly object that the first two articles (see sections 4.1, 4.2, App. i 
and App. ii) are susceptible to a charge of methodological nationalism, as I do here assume 
that the state is justified in controlling immigration. However, I do not uncritically assume it, 
and I argue that states ought to take into account other factors than their national interest. 
Furthermore, one of the aims of my third article, on structural injustice and individual 
responsibility, is to contribute to rectifying this overemphasis on states within the philosophy 
of migration. With this in mind, the third article attempts to look beyond the responsibility of 
nation states and considers the responsibility of individuals for structural migration injustice 
(see section 4.3 and App. iii).   
3.2 Ideal vs. non-ideal theory 
One of the most central themes of political philosophy concerns the methods by which one is 
able to conceive of a better society. Should we in general terms consider what might be the 
best social arrangements, and subsequently consider how we might make society conform to 
these? Or are we better served by examining particular instances of injustice, comparing them, 
and using such comparisons to consider the merits and drawbacks of various social 
arrangements? These are the kinds of questions that are raised within the debate on ideal and 
non-ideal theory. While I here cannot do justice to all the myriad of views and positions raised 
in this debate, I point to its modern origins in Rawls, consider some of the criticisms of the 
distinction by Amartya Sen and Charles Mills, before discussing Alan Hamlin and Zofia 
Stemplowska description of the debate as a multidimensional terrain. In the following section 
(3.3) I apply this framework to philosophy of migration, discuss which ideal and non-ideal 
considerations I take, and argue for the merits of using a plurality of methodological 
perspectives in such a normative enquiry.  
As with the discussion on equality of opportunity, and many other contemporary debates in 
the liberal philosophical tradition, we can trace this debate back to a distinction Rawls makes 
in A Theory of Justice. When Rawls refers to ideal theory he means the principles regulating 
“a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances” (1971, p. 244), and under “strict 
compliance”(1971, p. 245). This kind of theory is meant to hold in general for human life, 
under some conditions, which “issue from the more or less permanent conditions of political 
life”(1971, p. 244), and are meant to “set up an aim to guide the course of social reform”. 
Non-ideal theory then considers which principles we should follow when “injustice already 






puts it these are two different kinds of inquiries since “how justice requires us to meet 
injustice is a very different problem from how best to cope with the inevitable limitations and 
contingencies of human life” (1971, p. 245). In short then, at least when writing A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls thought we could describe a just society for humans in general, a fair basic 
structure, wherein we assume people comply with the principles of justice, given that they 
have the favourable conditions needed to organise it. This ideal, arrived at by using his 
original position, can then serve as a yardstick for us when considering how to arrive at such a 
structure. So, we first settle the issue of what is just, and we can then consider how we can 
approximate this ideal. Many have since questioned and criticised this distinction, yet, as we 
will see, it remains an important reference point for political philosophers in discussions on 
method. Let us consider the criticisms by Amartya Sen and Charles Mills.  
Amartya Sen characterises Rawls approach as transcendental, in that it seeks to identify 
“perfectly just social arrangements” (Sen, 2006, p. 216). He has argued that such a 
transcendental approach is not only unfeasible, but also unhelpful when evaluating between 
various non-ideal circumstances: “A transcendental approach is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for answering questions on the advancement of justice that urgently demand our 
attention, which call for a robustly comparative approach” (2006, p. 237). Sen argues that the 
latter comparative approach is much more feasible in a global perspective, and would allow 
not only for incompleteness in information about a given topic, but also the incompleteness of 
judgements on justice: “Incompleteness can arise from unbridgeable gaps in information, but 
also from decisional unresolvability involving disparate considerations that may resist 
gradation, even with full information” (2006, p. 237). That is, in addition to an 
incompleteness, there might be incommensurability at play, with competing views on justice 
that cannot be resolved.  
Charles Mills has criticised Rawls’ ideal approach by questioning whether the assumptions 
made in the original position are as impartial as Rawls believes them to be, and whether 
providing such an ideal theory of society as a starting yardstick is a good idea. In his words: 
“Why should anyone think that abstaining from theorising about oppression and its 
consequences is the best way to bring about an end to oppression?” (Mills, 2017, p. 79). 
While acknowledging that Rawls has a different focus and that “Justice as Fairness” is not 
meant to address pressing problems, but rather to clarify an ideal of justice, Mills argues that 






structures of oppression, such as race, is unhelpful, and might even be harmful if our aim is to 
overcome such unjust structures (2017, pp. 157-159). Mills therefore argues that ideal theory 
instead is a form of ideology that masks implicit biases. If your goal is to overcome racist 
subjugation and injustice, why assume that abstracting away race from you ideal theory is 
useful? It should be noted that Mills does not dismiss using ideals, but rather ideal theory, as 
any normative theory needs to make recourse to ethical ideals (2017, p. 73). What Mills is 
objecting to is using generalised, abstract, and simplified models of fair society, as a yardstick 
when trying to solve questions of injustice. He furthermore argues that these kinds of liberal 
models, exemplified by Rawls, actually embody a racial contract, rather than a neutral one. 
Ignoring pressing racial injustice in the formation of ideal theory and using that as our 
yardstick, makes it harder to adequately grasp and examine racial injustice.  
Now, there are several ways one can respond to these criticisms of Rawls’ use of ideal theory. 
For example Laura Valentini argues that Sen misses the mark, that Rawls’ account is more 
flexible and less “transcendental” than Sen makes it out to be, and that you do need some 
kinds of ideals in order to accomplish the kind of comparisons Sen wants us to make about 
justice (Valentini, 2011). After all, how are we to compare societies and social arrangements 
if we have no standard to compare them to? Comparing them to each other tells us little on its 
own about which society is most just. Valentini also points to Rawls’ use of reflective 
equilibrium and argues that what might appear as a fixed view of justice is only provisionally 
so, and that “we have to go back-and-forth between general principles and considered 
judgements in search of overall balance” (2011, p. 19).  
What complicates the ideal-non-ideal debate further is that different theorists define the 
central terms ideal and non-ideal differently. As Hamlin and Stemplowska put it “there is no 
single, categorical and useful distinction to be found and what we see is a multiplicity of 
different ideas and debates which sit within a multidimensional terrain” (2012, p. 48). Yet, 
they point to four relevant aspects of the debate: (1) compliance, (2) abstraction, (3) fact-
sensitivity, and (4) perfect vs. comparative judgements (2012).8 These refer to questions such 
as: (1) Do we assume that people comply with what they should do? (2) To what degree do 
we use abstraction to simplify an issue and focus on its most important parts? (3) How much 
do we let the facts impact our normative judgements? And (4) are we aiming for a perfectly 
just social arrangement or merely comparative improvements? One way of approaching this 
                                                            






latter point in the ideal/non-ideal debate is the distinction between an end-state theory of 
justice and transitional justice.  
Now, as Hamlin and Stemplowska suggest, it seems sensible to consider these issues as more 
a matter of a continuum than a strict division. They furthermore argue that ideal and non-ideal 
theory study different things, and that while ideal theory is concerned with specification and 
grounding of ideals, non-ideal theory is more concerned with institutional design and 
feasibility. Most theorists will therefore find themselves somewhere on the spectrum between 
ideal and non-ideal. No theory can be completely fact-insensitive, as it would be useless in 
addressing real human concerns.9 The degree of fact-sensitivity is here taken to mean “the 
more facts it recognises and incorporates as elements of the model or as constraints on the 
model” (Hamlin & Stemplowska, 2012, p. 51). And as Volacu argues “no model is fact-
sensitive for every assumption, since at the very least it needs to make some abstractions or 
idealisations in order to be operational” (Volacu, 2018, p. 889). All theories must therefore 
make choices about which assumptions to make, and which level of abstraction to employ.  
Faced with questions of global justice, few begin with a description of a perfectly just 
international order, and then seek to show how real world situations can approximate this 
ideal. However, that is not to say that there are not genuine disagreements within philosophy 
of migration about how to apply our ideals, what counts as appropriate levels of abstraction, 
and how fact-sensitive our proffered solutions ought to be. When applied to the normative 
ideals presented in section 2.4, we can now formulate the methodological question as: How 
can and should we apply ideals, such as global equality of opportunity, to practical, real-
world, issues, such as migration?  
3.3 Normative ideals in philosophy of migration 
If we now consider the arguments presented in chapter 2 in the context of this short 
methodological overview, we can see how many of the questions raised in relation to the 
ideal/non-ideal debate can be raised with respect to philosophy of migration. How should 
such reflections on the ideal and non-ideal affect work in philosophy of migration? And 
which ideal and non-ideal considerations do I use in my theory?  
                                                            
9 Notably G. A. Cohen would disagree with this, as he argues that fundamental principles should be fact-
insensitive (2008). While Cohen’s view is intriguing, this meta-ethical position is beyond the scope of the 
present thesis. For more on the topic see for example Thomas Pogge (2008a), Robert Jubb (2009) and Kyle 






Firstly, I think it is worth stating that I believe Sen is right in thinking that there is often likely 
to be an incompleteness and an incommensurability at play in questions of justice, in 
particular when it comes to global justice. I address the issue of incompleteness of 
information in the article “Towards fairer borders: Alleviating global inequality of 
opportunity” (section 4.1 and app. iii), where I argue that while there will be an 
incompleteness in knowledge about the relative value of different opportunities across 
societies, I think reasonable and valuable comparisons can be made.  In relation to 
incommensurability, and as I write in section 2.2, I think there are good reasons both for states 
to be able to control their borders, and for states to take responsibility for global justice in 
relation to migration. The former include security reasons, collective self-determination and 
protecting the welfare of their own citizens. The latter include how such admissions criteria 
and treatment of migrants affect global justice, and specifically in the case of my thesis 
equality of opportunity and structural injustice. It is not given that all claims can be met at the 
same time, so a better question, as discussed in section 2.2.3, is how we can balance such 
considerations. Furthermore, it is not given that we will be able to find such a balance. In this, 
as in many other issues of justice, I believe the degree to which such concerns are 
commensurable is likely to be found in the working out and balancing of different concerns. 
But what methodological assumptions do I make when I consider how to balance these 
different concerns? 
Concerning ideal and non-ideal theory, there are a series of methodological choices I have 
made that warrant attention. Following Hamlin and Stemplowska’s description of the 
multidimensional terrain of the ideal/non-ideal debate, I will focus on the choices I make in 
relation to abstraction, fact-sensitivity and feasibility. Let us first consider abstraction. Alex 
Sager criticises the general debate between state-centred and cosmopolitan positions, 
introduced in section 2.2, for its reliance on an overly simplified and idealised conception of 
migrants:  
Though careful reflection on the permissible grounds for admission and exclusion is 
valuable, much of this reflection takes place at a level of abstraction that is difficult to 
connect with the world in which hierarchy, domination, subordination are enforced 
along gender and racial lines and would still bear the scars of colonialism and 






Sager is criticising much of the abstraction that has characterised the philosophy of migration 
debate. In a similar way to how Mills criticised Rawls above, we might ask what is the value 
of an abstract debate about migration rules between ideal communities that bear little 
resemblance to the world around us? Current migratory arrangements are born out of racism 
and colonialism, and continue to be plagued by injustices and inequalities; should not such 
pressing concerns be our starting point? Much of current work on philosophy of migration 
(see sections 2.2.3−2.3.5) takes such a view, and begins by looking at global inequalities, 
unequal treatment and particular policies towards migrants. While some of my arguments 
consider how migration policies can contribute towards reaching an abstract normative ideal, 
namely the ideal of global equality of opportunity, and might therefore be conceived of as a 
type of transitional theory, they also consider a particular type of practice, namely 
differentiated treatment of migrants on the basis of skills. So while I am using an abstract 
ideal, I am also considering the impact of concrete real-world policies. Yet, it should be noted 
that this description of a practice also makes use of an abstraction.  
In this thesis the description of skills-based immigration policies is an abstraction. An 
abstraction is here “understood to consist in bracketing off some complexities of a given 
problem, without assuming any falsehoods about them” (Hamlin & Stemplowska, 2012, p. 
50). As I write in 2.2.4 and in App. ii, such admissions policies are many and varied, and I do 
simplify by lumping them together. Skills-based admissions policies vary according to the 
criteria they use, such as language skills, education, wealth or health, how such criteria are 
applied and weighed, and how such an application affects treatment of migrants. One might 
therefore ask whether one can or should consider normative arguments about the fairness of 
such systems in general, instead of considering each immigration policy on its own merits. 
Are such policies similar enough to be the subject of a normative enquiry? As I argue in the 
article “Statements on race and class: the fairness of skills-based immigration criteria” (see 
App.ii), I do consider the various skills-based selection policies sufficiently similar to 
normatively analyse them together. Many of them employ similar criteria, for similar reasons. 
That being said, that does not mean that some are not better or worse than others in regards to 
their impact on equality of opportunity. Clearly, the degree to which a policy can be said to 
contribute to alleviating global inequality of opportunity or impacting structural injustice, will 
depend on the particular criteria that are applied and how they are used. As I argue in the 
article “Towards fairer borders: Alleviating global inequality of opportunity“ (see 4.1 and 






opportunity into account, and uses criteria to identify those migrants whose migration would 
most contribute towards this normative ideal. But what facts do I assume when making this 
argument? 
This brings us to another dimension of the ideal/non-ideal debate, namely whether the 
assumptions being made are fact-sensitive. When it comes to the question of what is 
considered a fact-sensitive approach, it quickly becomes clear that what the facts are, is also 
up for debate. Sarah Fine has criticised David Miller along these lines, and pointed out that 
his ‘realist’ foundation also embody normative judgements:  
If we are starting from the world as it is, then we are starting from a world in which 
existing territorial borders and population distributions have come about in a variety of 
complex ways, many of which have included extensive injustices, such as those 
involved in colonialism, slave trading, wars of aggression, ethnic cleansing and land 
seizures. […] Miller’s animating idea of benign, national communities stretching into 
the past and future allows him to brush over those kinds of facts about the world […]. 
(Fine, 2016b, p. 723) 
There are many different ways we can describe the world as it is, and our choices of what to 
emphasise will also embody normative judgements about what should be emphasised. Even 
our choice of which terms to use can embody evaluative content. Now, Miller argues that we 
should not use purely formal principles of justice, such as equality, and that justice is 
contextual, derived from particular instances of human association (Miller, 2007, pp. 13-17). 
However, Fine persuasively argues that Miller’s view of national communities actually 
hinders his attempt at realism. Now, this is not the place to consider the variations of real-
world assumptions in philosophy of migration in detail, but it is worth remembering that in a 
contentious research field such as migration, not only the degree to which our theories should 
be fact-sensitive, but also the facts themselves are up to debate.  
So while what is true and the degree to which one should be fact-sensitive are two different 
questions, it is clear that one relies on the other. It is therefore worth emphasising that in this 
thesis I rely on two real-world descriptions in particular. Recall that many of the suggestions 
to remedy migration injustice take their point of departure from the observation that brain 
drain harms citizens in the developing world. In the first article in particular (see 4.1 and App. 






that the causes of such inequalities to a large degree can be traced to relationships between 
states and the international trade and financial system. I believe these to be true descriptions, 
given the evidence I have available and that I have cited in the arguments in the appendix. 
That being said, if it should turn out that brain circulation outweighs the negative effects of 
brain drain, or that economic differences are in fact largely the result of domestic policies, the 
arguments I make, and the conclusions I reach, in particular in the first article (see App. i), 
would have to be revised.  
But is it realistic to assume that states will comply with suggestions to alter their practises to 
limit such inequalities? How useful is it to imagine what fair migration policies might look 
like according to a standard of fairness that is unlikely, at least currently, to be followed by 
most states? Might it not be better to look at what kinds of compromises states might be 
willing to make in the interest of global justice and start from there? With respect to how 
realistic some of my suggestions are, I might therefore be said to be towards the ideal end of 
the multidimensional spectrum, for I do attempt to clarify what kinds of practices might 
contribute towards global equality of opportunity.  
That being said, I do also take into account some feasibility constraints in all of the articles. In 
the first article (see 4.1 and App i) I discuss a reformed points-based system, in part because 
such a system is practically workable. In other words, it is a feasible in the sense that it 
describes a usable institutional design. In the second article (see 4.2 and App. ii), I propose 
ways that skills-based selection and differentiated treatment might be less damaging to the 
social bases of self-respect and equality of opportunity of the people in the states employing 
such policies, namely that they compensate for such effects by letting in the kinds of migrants 
who contribute to increasing domestic opportunities, and allow for more funding for 
educational opportunities of their own citizens. In the third article (see 4.3 and App. iii) I also 
point to specific ways individuals can and should contribute to rectifying structural migration 
injustice, such as through collective political action and support for immigrant organisations.   
Whether it is likely to expect that states might actually institute such reforms, and that 
individuals might alter their behaviour, is another matter. It is clear that states today do weight 
economic concerns a lot higher than global justice when deciding on their immigration 
policies. But that is also one of the reasons why it is useful to consider exactly how current 






current practices are morally defensible or not. But by what process can we discover what 
normative ideals imply for policy? 
When considering his philosophical method Joseph Carens distinguishes between a series of 
different presuppositions he makes at different times: the just world presupposition, the real 
world presupposition, the democratic principle presupposition and the conventional view 
presupposition (Carens, 2013, pp. 297-313). The first two presuppositions mirror the 
ideal/non-ideal distinction, where the just world uses a “background assumption of a world 
where all institutions are just, everyone is acting justly, we don’t have to worry about 
overcoming past injustices, and so on” (Carens, 2013, p. 301). The real-world presupposition, 
on the other hand, introduces more feasibility constraints, and considers the way things are 
now. The democratic principle entails a commitment to current democratic tradition, whereas 
the conventional view presupposition starts with assuming nation-states’ right to decide their 
own immigration policy. The latter is similar to what I referred to as methodological 
nationalism in section 3.1.  
Now, what is of importance here is not which particular ideal and non-ideal background 
assumptions Carens makes in his various arguments, but rather his reflections on the merits of 
varying one’s assumptions. Carens argues that we should shift between various 
presuppositions: “There is no single correct starting point for reflection, no single correct set 
of presuppositions about what is possible”(Carens, 1996, p. 169). Carens argues we should 
shift between background assumptions, thereby testing various ideals. If there is no single 
correct starting point, then we should vary our points of departure, and continually test our 
assumptions against arguments and intuitions.  
I find this line of thought compelling, and I am therefore sceptical of adopting a single set of 
presuppositions, feasibility constraints, and abstractions in order to discuss skills-based 
selection. I believe it makes sense to vary ones assumptions and focus, and apply normative 
ideals to different cases. It is also worth repeating Sen’s point regarding incommensurability. 
If there is no completely fair migration system, but rather many valid and competing 
normative ideals, such as global equality of opportunity and national self-determination, then 
varying one’s methodological assumptions is important. If we do not assume that there is one 
way of fixing a problem, but perhaps many competing interests that can be balanced in 
different ways, it makes sense to vary our perspective in order to arrive at valuable and useful 






possible to sketch out an ideal immigration system, I do think it is possible is to offer reasons 
why some normative ideals are important, and consider what their implications might be if 
they were to be followed.  
In the articles in the Appendix the background assumptions vary. In the first article (section 
4.1 and App. i), I rely on the normative ideal of global equality of opportunity, but also 
assume a methodological nationalist position; that states can and should have control over 
immigration. In the second article (section 4.2 and App. ii), I only consider the impact on 
citizens in receiving states and their levels of opportunity and self-respect, bracketing off the 
issue of global justice and assuming a prescriptive nationalist position. In the third article 
(section 4.3 and App. iii), I consider migration in the light of Young’s theory of structural 
injustice, do not assume any kind of prescriptive or methodological nationalism, and focus on 
individual responsibility. By varying my assumptions and testing various ideals I do not aim 
to reach a definite overall understanding, or at resolving migration injustice, but merely to 
better philosophically appreciate and understand what kinds of responsibility are involved and 
how one might go about satisfying them. 
As I quote in the third article (see App. iii), Iris Young makes the following point about the 
limits of philosophical theorising:  
No philosophy can tell actors just what we ought to do to discharge a responsibility, 
nor can philosophy provide a formula for a decision. This philosophy can offer, 
however, what I call parameters of reasoning to which individuals and organisations 
can refer to decide what makes the most sense for them themselves to do in the effort 
to remedy injustice, given that there are many problems to address and limited energy 
and resources for addressing them. (Young, 2010, p. 124) 
Philosophers should know their limits, we can sketch out theories of moral ideals and how 
they might apply. We can make clear how current admissions policies can be justified or 
problematic. We should do this work while acknowledging the problem of competing ideals, 
and the potential practical problems in implementation. It is up to policy experts, politicians 
and people in general, to decide what they want to do in practice. What we can do as 
philosophers is clarify ideals, and the implications of such ideals for current practices. This is 







4 Summary of articles  
This chapter contains short summaries of the three articles I have written and submitted as 
part of this thesis. The articles are included in full in the Appendix. The three articles address 
the issue of the fairness of controls on migration and skills-based admission policies, with 
three novel philosophical arguments. The first article, summarised in section 4.1., presents an 
argument for why global equality of opportunity places demands on states in relation to 
migration, and shows how states could accommodate these demands by altering their 
admission criteria. The second article, summarised in section 4.2., brackets the question of the 
effect of skills-based admission criteria on migrants and sending states, and argues that such 
criteria can have a negative impact on the social bases of self-respect and opportunities of 
individuals in receiving societies. The third, summarised in section 4.3., argues that global 
labour migration arrangements are structurally unjust, and that individuals also have a 
responsibility to help remedy this injustice.  
4.1 Towards fairer borders: Alleviating global inequality of opportunity 
This article addresses the issue of the fairness of immigration restrictions from the perspective 
of global equality of opportunity. Broadly, it argues that current admission practices have a 
negative effect on global equality of opportunity, and that states should alter their admission 
criteria in order to instead alleviate such inequalities. In order to make this argument, the 
paper addresses two specific questions: (1) What responsibility do states have to alleviate 
global equality of opportunity in relation to labour migration?  (2) And if states were to 
assume such a responsibility, what would their admission policies look like? I argue for a 
position with some latitude given to states to decide their own immigration policies, but also 
for an increased responsibility for states to take global equality of opportunity into account 
when deciding on admission policies.  
The article opens by considering why global equality of opportunity might be relevant to the 
fairness of admission policies. The point of departure is the discussion between Joseph Carens 
(2013) and David Miller (2016) on the responsibilities of states for global inequality of 
opportunity, and the implications this has for the question of open borders. As Joseph Carens 
argues, if people are morally equal, they have the same right to attempt to advance in society, 
and they need freedom to migrate in order to make use of opportunities (2013, pp. 227-228). 
Carens therefore argues for open borders. I then consider David Miller’s three objections to 






opportunities are largely the result of domestic policies, and (3) that open borders would lead 
to brain drain for many countries, thereby negatively impacting the citizens left behind 
(Miller, 2014, 2016). The article dismisses Miller’s first two objections. I argue that we can 
evaluate relevant opportunities such as education, health care and job market, and that even if 
we cannot conclusively compare opportunities, some meaningful relative comparisons can be 
made. Furthermore, I point out that while domestic policies do determine opportunities in 
countries, states’ abilities to provide opportunities for its citizens are largely impacted by the 
international political and economic system. Finally, I agree with Miller’s third objection, but 
argue that the answer to the harmful effects of brain drain on citizens in countries of 
emigration, specifically on their levels of opportunities, should be to construct admission 
policies that take global equality of opportunity into account.  
The second part of the article considers what admission policies would look like if we wished 
to contribute to alleviating global inequality of opportunity. I develop a points-based system 
for how this might work, called a fairer migration model, which takes into account the impact 
of migration on the opportunities of the migrant, the opportunities for others in the country of 
origin, and in the receiving society. Briefly put, this would mean that states have a moral 
obligation, in addition to considering their own labour market requirements, to prioritise 
migrants whose opportunities would most improve by migrating, most improve the level of 
opportunities in the country they are moving to, and least hurt their countries of origin. This 
would for example mean that if two migrants have the same skill-sets, states should prioritise 
the migrant who comes from a country with fewer opportunities, so long as a negative effect 
of their emigration does not offset the benefit for the migrant. In practise it would also mean 
that many countries in the Global North should prioritise admitting unskilled migrants over 
skilled migrants, as the former often stand to gain more by migrating, and their emigration is 
less likely to impact the overall levels of opportunities in the countries they are emigrating 
from.  
4.2 Statements on race and class: The fairness of skills-based immigration 
restrictions 
The second article considers the effect of skills-based admission policies on receiving states, 
and how these effects should impact admissions policies and the treatment of migrants. It 
brackets the effects of such policies on other states and the migrants themselves, in order to 
focus on the fairness of such policies to citizens in the countries employing skills-based 






effects it can have on the social bases of self-respect and levels of opportunities for citizens in 
general. In particular, I consider whether Michael Blake’s argument against racial selection 
(2002), might also apply to skills-based selection. Blake argues that even if one does not 
acknowledge that states have responsibilities towards so-called discretionary migrants, racial 
selection is wrong because of the message it sends to citizens who share the racial or ethnic 
identification of the dispreferred prospective immigrants.  
Blake describes two kinds of negative impact of racial selection (Blake, 2002). Firstly, such 
criteria can have an impact on the social bases of self-respect, thereby limiting some citizens’ 
ability to fully take part in society. Secondly, such selection can allow a segment of the 
population to ensure their numerical, and therefore democratic, superiority over time. I argue 
that while a straightforward analogy between Blake’s argument concerning racial selection 
and skills-based selection cannot be made, there are some similar effects that need to be 
considered and weighed when considering the normative grounds for implementing such 
policies.  
First, I point to instances where people have objected to treating people differently based on 
their skills, health and wealth, and how this might impact views of equality. As it seems clear 
that people identify differently with their race than with class, due in part to past injustices, I 
think it is unclear whether such skills-based admissions policies can have the same effect on 
social bases of self-respect. However, I emphasise that skills-based selection is relatively new 
compared to racial selection, and that it is also likely that skills-based selection has some 
impact on the social bases of self-respect and that these might increase over time. Secondly, I 
argue that while skills-based selection does not have any obvious effects in cementing 
political power, it can have effects on the opportunities of citizens in the states employing 
such policies. Among other things, recruiting skilled professionals can limit the incentive of 
governments to educate their own citizens to do such jobs, and thereby limit the educational 
and employment opportunities of citizens. I argue that such effects need to be taking into 
account when considering whether and how states should employ skills-based admission 
policies. I suggest that these kinds of adverse effects could be alleviated by for example 
letting in those migrants who would contribute to improving the opportunities of the citizens 






4.3 Structural justice and labour migration: The scope of responsibility 
The third paper argues that current inequalities in opportunities to migrate and unequal 
treatment of migrants constitutes a structural injustice, and that individuals have a 
responsibility to help remedy this. The article has two main parts. The first part critically 
discusses Young’s theory of structural injustice (Young, 2010), and argues that migration 
injustice is an instance of this kind of injustice. This is done by using an analogy with 
Young’s example of homelessness. The second part of the paper examines what this might 
mean for who has the responsibility to ameliorate such an injustice. I show how the structural 
injustice approach can be used to analyse the responsibility of many relevant agents, but 
concentrate on the responsibility of individuals, as their responsibility has been particularly 
undertheorized in the literature.  
In the first part of the paper I show how Young distinguishes her concept of structural 
injustice from liability injustice. While the latter assigns responsibility for an injustice based 
on one’s causal role in bringing it about, the former assigns responsibility based on what 
social position one occupies in the structure sustaining it. Structural injustice is also forward 
looking, in that it looks at what position agents are in to reform the structure. I argue that 
restrictions on opportunities to migrate and differentiated treatment of migrants, constitute a 
structural injustice. In a similar way to homelessness, this is a socially structured position 
brought about by many actors behaving according to generally accepted rules and practises, 
which limits the opportunities of some while benefitting others. The paper furthermore 
contributes to the theoretical debate on structural injustice by considering two criticisms 
levelled at Young’s theory: its strict distinction between liability and structural injustice, and 
its insistence that blame is counterproductive. I argue that the explanatory value of Young’s 
model does not rely on a strict distinction, and that there can also be a role for blame and 
‘disruptive politics’ in overcoming structural injustice.  
In the second part of the paper, I argue that individuals have a responsibility to ameliorate 
structural injustice in migration. I use Young’s four parameters for reasoning about 
responsibility: power, privilege, collective ability and interest. I show how wealthy and 
educated citizens, in particular from the Global North, have responsibility due to their 
privilege, which they can discharge collectively, through for example NGOs, unions or local 






responsibility due to their privilege, in particular to rectify the conditions disadvantaged 
labour migrants find themselves in.   
Finally, I argue that disadvantaged migrants also have a responsibility to ameliorate migration 
injustice, according to the structural injustice model, due to their interest in changing the 
conditions they find themselves in. While it would be absurd to claim that people lacking an 
opportunity to migrate or who are treated badly, are causally liable and therefore responsible 
for the situation they find themselves in, they do have responsibility according to the 
structural injustice model. This responsibility can be discharged through collective agency, 
such as advocacy and informal networks. However, I also argue that the insistence that 
current skills and wealth-based admission regulations are fair, can be seen as a avoidance of 
responsibility, similar to what Clarissa Hayward refers to as “white privilege” in relation to 
racial injustice (Hayward, 2017). I therefore argue that there can be a role for disruptive 
politics in overcoming structural migration injustice, and give the example of illegally 















































5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter I return to the questions I asked in the Introduction: To what extent are skills-
based migration restrictions fair, and how can they be made fairer? What do the articles, when 
considered together, contribute to the discourse on how we view such migration regulations 
and differentiated treatment of migrants? And finally, what might be worth examining in 
more detail?  
5.1 What do the articles contribute to the field? 
I begin with the question of how states ought to weigh competing demands. After all, the 
arguments in the articles, summarised in chapter 4 and included in full in the appendix, do not 
deny that states have the right to control and limit immigration. I am not arguing for an open 
borders position. Rather, I have argued that there are valid competing obligations, related to 
national interests, collective self-determination, and migrants’ opportunities. I think it is also 
reasonable to assume that there could be a degree of incommensurability; in that it is unlikely 
that all reasonable and morally justified obligations can be satisfied. At least we should not 
assume that all the obligations can be met. Furthermore, based on the discussion on 
methodology in section 3.3., it seems clear that I cannot stipulate exactly how varying 
demands can be satisfied and how they should be balanced. That said, what I have done in the 
articles, and will do here, is to help clarify the implications of theories on equality of 
opportunity and structural injustice have for how we can morally assess skills-based 
immigration policies.  
So what can we conclude on the basis of the three articles and the foregoing discussion? Well, 
even if one agrees that states have the right to control their borders and keep strict limits on 
migration, there are good justice-based reasons to be concerned with the effects of skills-
based admissions policies. Furthermore, if we think states have a responsibility to ameliorate 
global inequality of opportunity, we should take the effects of such policies, both on sending 
states and individual migrants, more into account when setting up admissions systems. In 
other words, if states, employers, international organisations and citizens in general want to 
contribute to global equality of opportunity, as I argue they are morally obligated to do, 
impact on migrants’ opportunities needs to be taken into account. Let us consider why they 
should do this, before we turn to how they might go about it.  
Obligations to alleviate inequality of opportunity and structural injustice are entailed by both 






and luck egalitarian, as discussed in section 2.4. It is clear that the state people are born in is a 
matter of chance and has a large impact on their opportunities, and if one believes such 
differences due to luck are unfair, states and individuals have a responsibility to remedy them. 
Furthermore, there are also relational arguments for why states and individuals have 
obligations to ameliorate inequalities in opportunities. These relational obligations are based 
on both contribution and benefit. They stem from taking part in structures that give 
individuals and states advantages, a lack of an effort to contribute to changing such structures, 
and their continued benefit from sustaining them.  
Furthermore, I have shown how there can be adverse effects of skills-based selection on 
domestic citizens, both through a statement of preference for some types of citizens over 
others, and a potential lack of investment in educating the domestic population. And while 
such effects might be outweighed on the normative scales by other concerns, they ought to be 
taken into account when considering instituting such policies. I have also shown that 
individuals and other agents, not merely states, have a responsibility to help ameliorate the 
inequality in opportunities that migrants face. As I discussed in sections 2.4, 3.1. and 4.3, 
there has been too much of a focus on the responsibility of states, and not enough on the 
responsibility of other agents. And while there are some notable exceptions,10 it is clear that 
there is still much work that can be done on the responsibility of other agents, particularly 
individuals. For while other global justice issues, such as climate change and poverty, are 
frequently discussed as matters of corporate and individual responsibility, this is seldom done 
with respect to migration injustice.  
We also need to be honest about the fact that there are competing ideals and interests at play. I 
doubt that a perfectly just immigration scheme can be found. Yet, one thing we can be certain 
of is that skills-based migration, at least as currently practiced, is profoundly unfair. This is 
especially true of countries in the Global North, which exclude unskilled migrants, while 
admitting those whose skills they need. In the public debate on migration, and in some of the 
philosophical literature (see section 2.2.4), skills-based selection is often taken as a neutral, 
acceptable and meritocratic practice. Yet, as the three articles in the appendix and the present 
text makes clear, this is far from the case. Such practices help perpetuate global inequalities, 
                                                            
10 Some such notable examples include the considerations of best practices for companies in order to avoid brain 
drain discussed in section 2.4.1 (Brock, 2009, pp. 201-202), work on international institutions such as the EU 






harm some nations’ ability to provide for their citizens and limit many migrants’ 
opportunities, and are therefore unjust.  
5.2 Policy implications and avenues for future research 
How should states, corporations and individuals go about fulfilling their responsibilities 
towards remedying global migration injustice? As we saw in section 2.3, the migration 
solutions in the literature are based on different theories of justice and conceptualisations of 
different problems. Yet, whether they are based on for example the negative duty to avoid 
harm, or are cosmopolitan and egalitarian, most of the solutions tend to argue for taking more 
into account the effect of migration on the citizenry at large in the countries of emigration, 
and give more weight to obligations towards less-skilled and unskilled migrants. As Kim 
Angel and Robert Huseby have argued, theories building on global equality of opportunity, 
and related cosmopolitan theories, tend towards gradually opening borders, at least for those 
who would not hurt the states they emigrate from due to brain drain (Angell & Huseby, 2019). 
This would also follow from Peter Higgins account, whereby disadvantaged social groups are 
given preference (Higgins, 2013). My own fairer migration model (4.1 and App. i) is quite 
similar to Higgins’, but whereas Higgins’ units of concern and implementation are social 
groups, I am concerned with individual migrants. However, the implications are similar. As I 
have argued, most criteria that benefit skilled and wealthy migrants are unjust, states should 
prioritise unskilled over skilled migrants, and in general treat less-skilled and unskilled 
migrants better than they do now.  
Some of the migration solution discussed in section 2.3, such as improved remittances and 
easier entry for unskilled migrants, might be compatible with differentiated treatment and 
fewer rights for guest workers, as discussed in 2.3.5. However, the trade-off between fewer 
rights for guest workers and the potential for temporary improvements in global equality this 
might bring about, would also be incompatible with some of my conclusions in the second 
and third article, since such differentiated treatment could affect the social bases of self-
respect for affected groups and would constitute a structural injustice towards guest workers. I 
agree with both Walzer (1983), and Lenard and Straehla (2012), who consider such a trade-
off ill-advised, as long as there is no pathway for citizenship for all guest workers. For while 
such trade-offs might tend towards global equality of opportunity in the short term, by giving 
some migrants more opportunities, the potential for entrenching structural inequalities is also 






creating something akin to a modern feudal hierarchy, which once in place might be difficult 
to remove. This might therefore be an instance where the solution might not actually move 
one towards the normative ideal or end-state one is striving towards, as discussed in section 
3.2. Yet, it is worth noting what Ottonelli and Torresi (2019) persuasively point out in relation 
to guest workers, that other special rights might be better suited to protect the migrants’ 
particular life situations. However, I think such rights ought to come in addition to, rather than 
instead of, the opportunity to gain citizenship rights. Irrespective of how one concludes on 
this issue though, it is clear that there is much room for further study of the impacts of 
transnationalism on the philosophy of migration. As people live increasingly across borders, it 
is likely their obligations change, and also the states’ responsibilities for such transnationals.  
Many of the proposed solutions to migration injustice, discussed in 2.3, appear to be 
compatible with each other, and are compatible with my own suggestions in the articles. That 
is, it is likely that they can and should be used concurrently. Of course, some of the proffered 
migration solutions are more encompassing than others. And while their underlying normative 
commitments might differ, from a negative duty to avoid harm to cosmopolitan equality, I 
believe most of these solutions, such as improving remittances, emigration restrictions, 
rectificatory migration solutions, and prioritising disadvantaged migrants, would all tend 
toward fulfilling cosmopolitan and egalitarian obligations. Whether this is actually the case, 
exactly which solutions might be used concurrently, and which normative commitments 
would tend towards the same policies, would also be a fruitful avenue for further study.  
In general, it should be stressed that all of my arguments also allow for the partiality of states, 
and for states to decide on admission criteria. But they also point to other normative 
responsibilities states have due to global justice, and that such responsibilities, described in 
many different ways, should lead one to go beyond prescriptive nationalism, and weigh other 
factors than mere self-interest when deciding on immigration admissions and treatment of 
migrants.  
Finally, I think the strength of my own solutions to migration injustice discussed in this thesis, 
is not merely how they might practically contribute to changing the world for the better, but 
how the various analogies and conceptual frameworks allow us to consider current migration 
inequalities in a new light. Recall for example Shachar and Hirschl’s birthright privilege levy 
discussed in section 2.3.3. They state that the strength of their proposal is not merely that 






allows us to see global differences in a new light. As they put it: “by teasing out the 
similarities between citizenship and other inherited property regimes, we hope to encourage 
debate about existing distributional schemes, as well as the proposed remedies for the 
injustice is inherent in the current membership-allocation structure”(Shachar & Hirschl, 2007, 
p. 282). 
The articles in the Appendix, and the solutions discussed above, also show that we have a 
moral obligation to perform a conceptual shift. By spelling out the implications of normative 
ideals, which I think most people would agree with, we might be able to perform a conceptual 
shift towards reconsidering global justice, migrants’ opportunities, and the impact 
immigration policies have. States, employers, institutions, and individuals should consider 
global justice and migrants needs more when making policy decisions on admission 
regulations and treatment of migrants. By considering practical solutions, we are able to see 
what injustices many agents help perpetuate, and how one might, if willing, begin to take 
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Abstract: Current admission criteria for migrants tend to favor those who are well to do, able 
bodied, and well qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global inequalities. 
In this article, I argue that we should alter admission criteria in order to alleviate some of the 
negative effects of global inequality of opportunity. In support of this argument, I discuss two 
global justice theories that are central to borders and migration, specifically a cosmopolitan 
position that argues for more open borders and a nationalist position that emphasizes the 
importance of states being in control of their borders. In particular, I address David Miller’s 
objections to using open borders to remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I 
present agrees with the benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality 
and a state’s right to control its borders. However, I argue that the roles of Western states in 
particular in perpetuating global inequality of opportunity lead to moral demands, which can 
in part be met by fairer migration. Finally, I consider what kind of criteria fairer immigration 
should take into account. The system I propose would rank migrants based on their individual 
access to opportunities, how little their emigration would affect the opportunities in the 
country they are emigrating from, and to what extent it might improve the opportunities in the 
country they are moving to. 
Keywords: borders, equality of opportunity, global justice, migration 
Introduction: Why is migration relevant to questions of global equality of opportunity? 
Most normative approaches to political philosophy proceed from the generally held 
assumption that all human beings are of equal worth. However, the kinds of implications this 
assumption has for how one should actually treat people are hotly disputed. For although most 
people agree that all human beings are equally valuable, political institutions, private 
companies, and the international community treat people differently based on many different 
criteria, such as religious, economic, linguistic, or national distinctions. One of the ways in 






not. An important task for political philosophers is to consider which kinds of differentiated 
treatment are morally justified and which are not. 
When it comes to migration and questions of global justice, a useful distinction can be made 
between nationalist and cosmopolitan positions. Whereby the former emphasizes the reasons 
states are justified in prioritizing their own citizens over foreigners and argues for controlled 
migration, the latter emphasizes the illegitimacy of many migration restrictions and argues for 
open borders or more freedom of movement.11 In terms of immigration, they disagree over 
whether selective immigration regulations are normatively valid, and in which situations and 
to what extent this might be the case. Broadly put, cosmopolitans argue that the demands of 
global justice are so strong that a state is only justified in implementing limited migration 
restrictions, while nationalists argue that the global justice demands are weaker and that it is 
in everyone’s basic interest that states have comprehensive control over their migration 
restrictions. In this article, I am specifically concerned with voluntary migration, as opposed 
to forced displacement12, and with one of the arguments often put forth for the cosmopolitan 
position, namely global equality of opportunity. I will be using the equality of opportunity 
argument in order to defend a fairer migration model. This model evaluates whether migration 
regulations are justified not merely based on the impact a migrant might have on the country 
they are moving to, but also considers the effect on the country they are leaving, and the 
improvement in opportunities for the individual migrant. 
Before considering why migration might be relevant to questions of global equality of 
opportunity, I will first describe what such an equality might consist of. Perhaps the most 
prominent exponent of the cosmopolitan position on migration is Joseph Carens, who argues 
that open borders are necessary partly in order to accomplish equality of opportunity.13 Carens 
describes the equality of opportunity argument as follows: 
                                                            
11 This picture is somewhat simplified. Nationalists, such as David Miller (2016a: 76- 93), also agree that states 
have extensive duties towards refugees, while cosmopolitans, such as Kieran Oberman (2016: 49-50) and Joseph 
Carens (2013: 173- 179), will agree that states have a justifiable right to limit immigration in exceptional 
circumstances, for example for health or security reasons. In other words, there is a difference of a degree rather 
than a strict dichotomy between their positions. However, for the purposes of this paper it makes sense to 
contrast these positions, as they differ starkly in relation to migration restrictions for voluntary migrants. 
12 The reason for this focus is that there is more of an agreement that global justice should matter when it comes 
to the treatment of refugees and the forcibly displaced, than in relation to those who migrate voluntarily. 
Furthermore, it seems quite clear that forcibly moving people around contravenes other basic moral principles, 
such as individual agency, and it is therefore difficult to see how it can be justified. 
13 The equality of opportunity argument is only one of several arguments Carens puts forward for open borders. 






Within democratic states we all recognize, at least in principle, that access to social 
positions should be determined by an individual’s actual talents and effort and not 
limited on the basis of birth-related characteristics such as class, race, or gender that are 
not relevant to the capacity to perform well in the position. This ideal of equal 
opportunity is intimately linked to the view that all human beings are of equal moral 
worth, that there are no natural hierarchies of birth that entitle people to advantageous 
social positions. But you have to be able to move to where the opportunities are in order 
to take advantage of them. So, freedom of movement is an essential prerequisite for 
equality of opportunity (2013, 227-228). 
Simply put, this is an argument for open borders. Moreover, it proceeds from the premise that 
the stark divide between nations in access to opportunities is vast; that where people are born 
is a matter of chance, and that this disparity is therefore fundamentally unfair and should be 
rectified. In other words, it would seem that if we believe all people are equally valuable, we 
should provide them with similar access to opportunities. This argument is consistent with 
economic and social differences between people, often referred to as inequalities in outcomes, 
and is based on the intuitively appealing idea that people should have an equal chance to 
attain favored social positions. However, it is still necessary to specify what these 
opportunities consist in, and which social goods equality of opportunity relies upon. As 
Carens puts it, “[a] closely related point is that a commitment to equal worth entails some 
commitment to economic, social, and political equality, partly as a means of realizing equal 
freedom and equal opportunity and partly as a desirable end in itself” (2013, p. 228). I 
therefore initially consider equality of opportunity broadly to mean access to social positions, 
and that this access relies on the availability of social goods such as access to health care, 
education, and the job market.14 As we will get back to below, however, how one chooses a 
particular metric, and whether one can make a global metric of opportunities, is hotly 
contested. 
                                                            
fundamental human rights (2013: 225-254). However, as it is the equality of opportunity argument I discuss in 
this paper, these other arguments will not be considered. 
14 This is quite a broad definition, and there has been an extensive debate on exactly what equality of opportunity 
consists in. Carens’ argument for equality of opportunity relies heavily on Rawls’ description in A Theory of 
Justice, and since then much discussion has revolved around what types of opportunity need to be equalized and 
what other kinds of social goods equality of opportunity relies upon. My definition is therefore intentionally 
broad, in order to be able to accommodate various definitions. For various positions on the equality of 
opportunity globalized, see for example Gillian Brock’s Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Juistice and 






This is quite a broad definition to proceed from, as it hardly seems unreasonable to make the 
point that current global differences in opportunities are unfair and something we should 
remedy. However, this perspective raises questions of whether the goal of just policies should 
be the complete elimination of differences, the mitigation of significant differences, and what 
complete equality might look like. Furthermore, how far is fairer migration supposed to move 
us towards this goal? The answers to these questions lie beyond the scope of this article, and I 
am not advocating an ideal situation. Rather, I am pointing to current unfairness in migration 
practices and making some suggestions as to how this unfairness could be mitigated. Thus far, 
I can be seen as following Miller, whose stated aim was “to sketch the outlines of a legitimate 
and justifiable immigration policy for a democratic state in the world that we actually inhabit, 
replete with inequalities and injustices.” (2016b: 2) In short, I am moving from broadly 
uncontroversial views on global differences in opportunity, to some potentially more 
controversial suggestions about how these differences can be reduced. I begin by addressing 
two objections to using equality of opportunity as an argument for open borders, specifically 
(1) that it is problematic to compare opportunities between different societies, and (2) that 
opportunities are largely the result of states’ domestic policies. In light of this discussion, I 
then consider why altered migration regulations, rather than open borders, might contribute 
towards global equality of opportunity, before finally presenting a sketch of migration 
regulations that can contribute towards this goal. 
Nationalist objections to global equality of opportunity 
Before discussing how this type of equality of opportunity is relevant to questions of 
migration, I will consider some objections to the argument that in order to have global 
equality of opportunity, we need open borders. In Strangers in Our Midst, David Miller 
presents a comprehensive and convincing defense of the nationalist position, and argues 
against the relevance of global equality of opportunity for evaluating whether migration 
restrictions are just or not. The argument I propose must therefore be able to meet his 
objections. Miller attacks the equality of opportunity argument for open borders by arguing 
that: (1) there are problems in evaluating opportunities across cultures, (2) the level of 
opportunities are largely the result of domestic politics in states, and (3) there is a possibility 
of a brain drain from the countries of origin. The point about the brain drain will be addressed 
in the next section. Before doing so, I will comment on Miller’s other two points in particular 






One cannot compare opportunities across cultures 
First, let us consider the suggestion that evaluating opportunities across cultures poses 
problems. As Miller puts it: “There is no agreed metric that can be applied to rank the sets 
because how particular opportunities are to be valued relative to one another will depend upon 
the local culture” (Miller 2016a: 46). It should be stressed that Miller does not think this 
applies to basic human rights, and he draws a strict division between basic rights and equality 
of opportunity. The differences which he does not think can be used as a normative basis 
when it comes to alleviating global inequality of opportunity through migration, are 
differences relating to things such as “to get an education, to enter the job market, and to 
make money” (Miller 2016a: 44). While the merits of such a differentiation might be debated, 
let us take it for granted for the purpose of the present discussion. 
Miller’s argument does not claim that it is difficult to measure the differences between 
cultures, but rather that these kinds of metrics out of necessity prioritize one particular cultural 
vantage point. Different nations and cultures prefer different kinds of opportunities; therefore 
a comparison between them is not relevant to questions of global justice and migration. 
Another formulation of this argument is put forward by Gillian Brock, who argues, 
Either we must try to articulate a version of equality of opportunity that mentions 
particular social positions that are favored, and opportunities to achieve these are 
equalized, or we allow much cultural variation on what counts as a favored social 
position, and the standards of living or levels of well-being that they enable are to be 
equalized (2015: 29). 
Put simply, the problem is that either the favored social positions and standards of well-being 
are too broad, and therefore cannot be useful as a comparative metric, or the metric favors 
some particular cultural standard over others. 
Now, while it is certainly the case that various countries prioritize different sectors, such as 
health, education, and the job market, it does not necessarily follow that their ability to 
prioritize these sectors is the result of national priorities. And, if their ability to provide 
opportunities is significantly affected by outside factors, the fact that they might prioritize 
various sectors does not necessarily remove the moral culpability for creating this disparity. 
We consider this more closely in the next section, so let us first turn to the contention that it is 






It is clear that different cultures have variations in preferences. However, that does not mean 
that no significant overlap exists, and that this overlap might not be meaningful in discussions 
about variations in opportunities. For while differences in preferences might vary, it is a much 
stronger claim that they vary to such a degree that comparisons between them are not valuable 
in moral discussions about differences in equality of opportunity. After all, one would be hard 
pressed to make the case that some cultures prefer high unemployment and poor access to 
decent health care. Indeed, just because states have internal variations with respect to 
preferences, we do not consider this a reason to abandon an attempt at overall considerations 
of justice and opportunities in the domestic setting. And while the variation is undoubtedly 
greater in the international setting, the mere fact of difference does not make comparisons 
invalid as foundations for normative evaluations. As Darrel Moellendorf argues, Brock’s 
cultural variation challenge can be met “if there were an account of the goods – for which 
opportunities should be equalized – that is both free-standing, that does not derive simply 
from the cultural understandings of a particular culture, and sufficiently sensitive to empirical 
matters as to capture real differences of opportunity” (2006: 309). In short, we would need a 
sufficiently general and empirically sensitive metric in order to make valuable comparisons. 
Furthermore, access to education, the job market and decent health care certainly seem to be 
likely contenders as aspects of society that are globally valued. As Eszter Kollar points out, 
“some global egalitarians have responded [to problems of global value pluralism] by 
proposing a core set of goods that should be seen as all-purpose means in global political life” 
(2016: 4). So, while the content to be included in such an evaluative standard will be hotly 
disputed, the fact of value pluralism does not mean that a variety of meaningful evaluative 
standards cannot be found. 
There are also various ways in which one can approach the problem of deciding on an overall 
metric. One might concede that it is difficult to agree on such a global metric, and yet believe 
that meaningful comparisons can be made in the case of evaluating the opportunities of 
individual migrants. As I propose below, a measure of opportunities for individual migrants 
might take into account their access to education, the job market and health care in both the 
country they are moving from and the receiving country. So, while we might struggle to 
create an overall metric for all people, we can likely say something meaningful about specific 






In short, I do not make the claim that we can create some kind of overall objective metric by 
which to consider all opportunities and global justice. I am merely contending that some 
relative comparisons are normatively meaningful, in particular when it comes to judging 
potential migrants. Furthermore, while all people probably cannot agree on a standard system 
of differentiation, they can surely provide some facts as a basis for reasonable democratic 
deliberation of responsibility. Perhaps a general description of variations in opportunities and 
obligations that stem from them could be put forth. After all, we seldom demand empirical 
exactitude on domestic considerations of justice from philosophers, so why should this be the 
case in the international setting? 
One should not compare opportunities across cultures 
Another and perhaps more central aspect of Miller’s objection to the possibility of evaluating 
differences is that it is not fair to use these varying opportunities as a measure, since they 
follow from the self-determination of the countries in question. In other words, these 
differences are largely the results of different priorities made by different states, and therefore 
not relevant for the current discussion. As Kollar formulates this nationalist argument, 
“[g]lobal equality of opportunity wrongly neglects the normative relevance of national self-
determination that inevitably produces different opportunity sets for different nationalities. 
[…] It is not that we cannot compare, but that we should not compare opportunities across 
borders” (2016: 4). Therefore, we must consider the question of how these differences in 
opportunities come about, and make the case for why these differences are in fact relevant for 
our present discussion. 
As most people would readily agree, the differences in opportunities across borders are vast, 
in particular between countries in the Global North and the Global South. However, there is a 
lot of disagreement about whether, and to what degree, these differences are the outcome of 
legitimate national priorities or due to other causes. A nationalist position might state that 
these differences in opportunities are not normatively relevant to questions of admission 
policies, insofar as they are the result of domestic political decisions for which the nation can 
be held responsible. Higgins describes this nationalist argument as follows: 
If the global poor are understood merely as needy strangers whose poverty is causally 
unrelated to the affluence of the Global North, then choosing admission policies in a 







An initial objection to the nationalist position might question why migrants should be held 
responsible for the domestic policies in their home countries. Indeed, most of these kinds of 
decisions are taken before and without most individuals’ explicit blessing. Why should the 
opportunities in a country therefore count for anything in evaluating whether migration 
restrictions are justified? A nationalist will likely respond that the relevant question here is 
who bears the responsibility to fix global disparities in opportunities. How can one make the 
case that a prosperous country should alleviate global differences, if they are not responsible 
for bringing these differences about? While I do think this objection has merit, the nationalist 
position should nevertheless be addressed. 
It is clearly correct to state that the level of opportunities is to a certain extent the result of 
domestic policy. However, this is hardly the whole story. The level of opportunities in 
countries is also influenced by other countries’ foreign policy, trade policy, and the 
international political system to a considerable degree. Even when it is difficult to show 
exactly how disadvantages come about, this still does not mean that the causes lack normative 
validity or do not place moral demands on us. The point is that global inequalities generally 
have complex causes, and are not merely due to national priorities. As Kollar (2016: 5) says, 
“Those differences that are not the outcome of legitimate national priorities, instead, should 
be judged as unjust global inequalities of opportunity to be properly mitigated from life-
prospects.” 
One way of explicating this unequal relationship can be found in the work of Thomas Pogge. 
He points out how certain features of the international system systematically disadvantage the 
ability of other countries to fulfill the human rights of their citizens. For instance, Pogge 
(2001: 20) describes the “international borrowing privilege” and the "international resources 
privilege.” The former in part “facilitates borrowing by destructive governments” and 
“imposes upon democratic successor regimes the often huge debts of their corrupt 
predecessors” (Pogge 2001: 20). “Resources privilege” allows the group in power in a country 
to be considered the legitimate owners of that country’s resources, whether their citizens are 
represented or repressed. In short, Pogge explicates how these privileges maintain an unfair 
international system, which benefits the interests of some in richer and more influential states 
over others. If we take this to be the case, it seems clear that the vast differences in 






result of unfair trading practices. In other words, regardless of how some countries might 
decide to prioritize, the vast differences in global opportunities will remain. 
Another point pertains to aspects of the international financial system, which allows for vast 
transfers of wealth from poor to rich countries. A recently published report by Global 
Financial Integrity and the Center for Applied Research at the Norwegian School of 
Economics shows how the financial resources that flow from poor to rich countries are far 
greater than those that flow in the opposite direction, and that the international financial 
system allows for this reverse distributive effect: 
In 2012, the last year of recorded data, developing countries received a total of $1.3tn, 
including all aid, investment, and income from abroad. But that same year some $3.3tn 
flowed out of them. In other words, developing countries sent $2tn more to the rest of 
the world than they received. If we look at all years since 1980, these net outflows add 
up to an eye-popping total of $16.3tn – that’s how much money has been drained out of 
the global south over the past few decades (Hickel 2017). 
In sum, it can be argued that there are many aspects of the international economic, political 
and financial system that contribute to countries’ financial ability and political stability. 
Furthermore, since the level of opportunity in a country relies directly upon the government’s 
ability to deliver decent health care, education, and job markets, a grossly unfair international 
system that perpetuates these differences seems particularly relevant when considering states’ 
responsibilities to alleviate them. 
Why might migration be relevant to alleviate global inequality of opportunity? 
Even allowing for the arguments that some states benefit from an unjust global system and 
contribute to perpetuating global inequality, some might ask why this inequality is relevant to 
questions of migration and admission policies. Some people might indeed say that all I have 
done is show that some trade policies are unjust, that these affect the levels of opportunities, 
and that this is something that should be remedied. However, why should the solution to this 
problem have anything to do with migration? Responding to this challenge requires answering 
the question of how open borders, or increased migration, might contribute to alleviating this 
inequality. One way to respond is to follow Carens, who states, “Freedom of movement 
would contribute to a reduction of existing political, social, and economic inequalities. There 






they could find in Europe or North-America” (2013: 228). But as Miller and Higgins, among 
others, have pointed out, the idea that open borders would significantly reduce global 
inequalities does not mesh well with how migration actually occurs. Indeed, as it is only those 
who can afford to who can travel, it has been argued that open borders would not contribute 
towards alleviating global inequality of opportunity, and might even negatively affect it.15 
According to Higgins, the open border position relies “on an idealized conception of the 
typical poor migrant’s social wherewithal, as well as on an explanatorily nationalist 
understanding of the causes of severe poverty” (2013: 64). In other words, this position builds 
on a wrongly held belief that the causes of severe poverty are local, and that people lacking 
opportunities and basic rights have the social and financial resources to migrate. As Higgins 
puts it, “the structural causes of social disadvantage in virtue of which persons are vulnerable 
to severe poverty are not themselves addressed by changing potential migrants’ location of 
residence” (2013: 64). 
Since open borders might not be a solution to the problem of alleviating global inequalities of 
opportunity, why should we care about migration at all in connection with global inequalities? 
Here we must distinguish between arguments for open borders and arguments for fairer 
migration. Although the former might not improve global equality of opportunity, it seems 
more likely that fairer migration, which takes into account global inequality of opportunity, 
would do so. Nevertheless, some might argue that given the effort it would take to alter unfair 
admission practices, we should instead focus on remedying an unfair international system. As 
Pogge argues, “With the political effort it would take to pressure some Western government 
to admit an extra hundred needy foreigners, we could alternatively pressure this same 
government to allocate a few extra million dollars to global poverty eradication” (1997: 17). 
In other words, rather than making the difficult point that we should admit people according 
to fairer migration criteria, our efforts are better spent arguing for more practical measures to 
reduce extreme poverty. 
                                                            
15 Scholars do however disagree on the effects migration may have on global differences, and what the potential 
effects of open borders might be. For example, Kieran Oberman argues that there is substantial evidence that 
migration in fact reduces poverty (Oberman 2015). Even though it may be the wealthier citizens who migrate, 
and their families who receive remittances, the money that is then invested and used has broader effects on the 
sending society. Furthermore, Oberman argues that migration can diffuse knowledge and thereby be beneficial 
for the sending society, and he shows that an increase in high-skilled emigration can also lead to an increase in 
the education of highly skilled persons in society in general. While this might be the case, it does not seem to 
detract from my general line of argument. After all, Oberman also points to the negative effects of brain drain, 






One can respond to this objection in several ways: first, by pointing out that arguing for fairer 
migration will also indirectly highlight the inequalities inherent in the global system. In other 
words, a normative reconstruction of our admission criteria might draw attention to global 
inequalities, which most definitely need addressing. Second, one might show how some unfair 
admission criteria actually contribute to, indeed are perhaps even integral to, the unjust 
international order. So, whereas poverty eradication might indeed give more of a return for 
each dollar spent, unfair admission criteria can be shown to play an integral role in a globally 
unequal system that contributes to extreme poverty. Third, one might contend that this is not a 
zero sum game, and tht the more arguments that are raised concerning global inequalities and 
the systems that perpetuate them, the better. 
In short, I argue that because many affluent countries are apparently unwilling to rectify 
global inequalities, and in some cases even actively perpetuate them, these countries have a 
moral obligation to admit migrants on fair terms. I am not claiming that this is the ideal 
solution to the problem of global inequality of opportunities, merely that it is relevant to 
questions of justice and migration. While these arguably justifiable demands for fairer 
migration might not be met either, it is still important to point them out. 
Finally, some people might criticize both open borders and my suggestions for fairer 
migration criteria by pointing out that states have a right to control their borders, and that this 
right is needed, and normatively justified, in order to uphold the basic functions of a liberal 
democratic state. Miller states that liberal democracies have a right to control their borders 
due to concerns over “self-determination, the functioning of democracy, and population size” 
(2016a: 75). So there are good reasons to assume that some selective admission criteria are 
necessary to facilitate the proper functioning of a working democracy. However, even though 
a state might be justified in limiting and controlling immigration, the migration restrictions 
that a state implements can still be evaluated as to whether they are conducive to global 
equality of opportunity or not. 
The question then arises of what type of admission criteria would contribute to global equality 
of opportunity. If states are justified in controlling immigration, and open borders are not 
conducive to global equality, what kind of immigration regulations would alleviate global 
inequalities of opportunity? Furthermore, how can we practically evaluate whether states’ 
immigration regulations are appropriate to achieving such a goal? As previously discussed, a 






likely to have readily available information on the opportunities of specific migrants seeking 
admittance. Specifically, countries are more likely to be able to deliberate on relative 
differences in opportunities between sending and receiving countries than the effect migration 
regulations might have on overall global opportunities. The most readily available data for 
countries to consider is the impact a potential migrant has on the country they come from, the 
country they are moving to, and the effect of the move on the individual migrants. These 
factors could work as proxies, allowing migration regulations overall to be conducive to 
global equality of opportunity. Put simply, the moral reasons for countries to alter their 
admission criteria are the vast global disparities in opportunities, and the practical way to alter 
the admission criteria is based on the data readily available to the countries in question. In the 
following, I present an outline for what such fairer admission criteria would look like. 
What kind of migration criteria would alleviate global inequality of opportunity? 
In order to describe fairer migration regulations, I have to be able to find some criteria that are 
empirically viable, and sensitive to both the effect on the individual migrants’ opportunities, 
as well as to the effect on the overall opportunities in the country they are moving from and 
to. In brief, one needs criteria to evaluate whether and to what degree allowing someone to 
migrate alleviates global inequality of opportunity. In the following, I describe which criteria I 
believe can fulfill this function, before briefly considering some objections that my model for 
fairer migration criteria might face. The admission criteria I propose that can manage this 
must evaluate whether migrating on balance: (1) does not negatively impact the overall level 
of opportunities in the country of origin through a brain drain effect, (2) positively affects the 
overall level of opportunities in the receiving country, and (3) distinguishes to which degree a 
migrant's opportunities will be increased by moving. 
This should not be considered an exhaustive list of factors for how migration affects global 
equality of opportunity. One might for example plausibly argue that it is necessary to consider 
the effect of migration regulations on global equality of opportunity, as in the overall level of 
opportunities globally. Some might indeed contend that increased overall migration positively 
contributes to the global economy and thereby opportunities in general. However, the three 
factors listed above – effect on country of origin, effect on receiving country, and effect on 
the opportunities for the individual migrant – seem to be particularly relevant and the factors 
for which we are most likely to find readily available data. Furthermore, based on the 






opportunities in sending and receiving countries are more likely to be readily available, and 
empirically sound, than some ideal global metric. 
Brain drain, the effects on receiving country and individual migrant 
Moving on to these specific factors, we should first consider how a brain drain effect could 
negatively affect countries that migrants are moving from. As the phrase implies, this effect is 
related to the problems countries face when much of the human capital in a country moves 
abroad. Miller describes this phenomenon, saying, 
the ones who have the resources – the savings and the education – that enable them to 
do this will be the ones who are already relatively advantaged in their societies of 
origin. […] It may even turn out that the opportunities of those left behind are reduced 
in absolute terms, if those leaving are skilled professionals who would otherwise 
provide education, health services, or competent administration in their home country 
(2016a: 48). 
While there is some disagreement as to the supposed effects more open migration might have 
on brain drain, this is not the place for that discussion.16 However, it is worth considering the 
negative systemic effects that are caused by brain drains as a result of current migration 
patterns. As Higgins says: “Large-scale emigration, in fact, initiates a self-perpetuating cycle 
of underdevelopment in already poor countries, since lost human development prospects both 
discourage emigrants from returning and encourage more residents to leave” (2013: 67). 
Furthermore, states are increasingly using highly selective immigration standards, in order to 
attract the kinds of migrants they wish to admit. Ayelet Shachar points out that “[b]y 
continually ‘retooling and recalibrating’ selective skills-based admission avenues to attract the 
best and brightest, governments engaged in the global race for talent have demonstrated their 
willingness and their ability to intervene in the market for the highly skilled” (2016: 180). 
So, if we wish to avoid the negative effects of brain drain, how will this affect our admission 
criteria? Intuitively, it implies that when considering migration restrictions, we should weigh 
the impact the departing migrant has on the overall level of opportunities in the country of 
origin. A likely result of this could be that we should allow more migration of skilled 
professionals from countries with more overall opportunities to countries with fewer 
opportunities than the other way around. This is due to skilled professionals contributing 
                                                            






significantly to the overall level of social goods that opportunities rely upon. In order to have 
a decent health care system, one needs doctors, and in order to have good public education, 
one needs teachers. When it comes to unskilled migrants, it would seem that fewer restrictions 
would apply to those moving from less affluent to more affluent societies; one might even 
argue that according to this first criteria, the less skilled the better. This is due to a large 
number of unskilled workers often being a strain on social goods such as health care and 
education, as well as contributing to more competition in the job market. Such evaluations 
must furthermore be made on the basis of an examination of the opportunities in different 
countries, as the needs and supply of skilled and unskilled workers will vary from country to 
country. Different countries also have varying levels of resources with which to provide 
opportunities for their citizens, and the impact of skilled and unskilled emigration will vary. 
Some countries will benefit more from emigration, thereby freeing up opportunities in the 
labor market for the domestic populations, whereas others would suffer more if important 
institutions were affected by a lack of human capital. 
Second, the effect the migrant might have on the receiving country also needs to be taken into 
account. In relation to this second criterion, similar evaluations to those above must be made, 
but with the emphasis on the receiving country. Furthermore, in order for the migration 
restrictions to contribute to global equality of opportunity, one needs to balance the effects on 
both countries against each other. If the effect of a proposed admission policy greatly benefits 
either the sending or receiving country to the detriment of the other, it would seem to be 
problematic. However, if one country benefits greatly, while the other country is only slightly 
negatively affected, the admission policy would appear to be fairer. 
Third, one also needs to consider the effect migration might have on the opportunities of 
individual migrants. People have differing levels of opportunity in their countries of origin, 
due to different factors, such as varying levels of unemployment and access to affordable 
education. This third criterion will therefore allow us to prioritize individual migrants, where 
the effect on the first two factors, the sending and receiving countries, is similar. In short, it 
would enable prioritizing those migrants whose individual opportunities would increase the 
most by being admitted, while deprioritizing potential migrants who would benefit less. 
What would a fairer migration model look like? 
So, how might we envisage a policy that takes the benefits for the migrant, and the receiving 






immigration standards is the Australian-style points-based system. A “fairer migration” policy 
could be modeled on this points system, albeit heavily modified. The Australian system ranks 
people according to how their skills match the Australian job market, with accountants and 
mechanics ranked highly, for example (Shachar 2016: 181). Further requirements specify that 
the migrants should not place a significant burden on the Australian health service, have a 
criminal record, or pose any threat to the Australian community (Donald 2016). This system 
evaluates migrants similarly to one of the criteria listed above, namely how beneficial they 
will be to the country they are moving to. 
Conversely, a fairer migration model points system would first consider to what degree the 
potential migrant’s skill is needed in their country of origin, rather than in the receiving 
country. If the individual was particularly unhealthy or considered a danger to society, on the 
other hand, this could also cause positive discrimination to be applied, according to this first 
factor. This person's emigration could be seen as potentially contributing positively to the 
overall level of opportunities in their country of origin. Following this logic, doctors, 
university professors, or engineers might be at the back of the queue, if the professions were 
understaffed in their country of origin. This would broadly allow one to limit potential brain 
drain effects. Second, one would need to evaluate how much the overall opportunities in the 
country they are moving to would be improved. If a severe lack of doctors or teachers exists 
in the receiving country, for example, this would cause these professions to be positively 
discriminated. This is because of the positive effect they might have on the level of social 
good, which the opportunities in the receiving country rely upon. This could for example 
allow for easier movement of skilled workers, such as medical professionals, from the Global 
North to the Global South than the other way around. This is due their potential impact on 
overall opportunities being greater in the Global South than the negative impacts of their 
emigration on countries in the Global North. Third, in order to progress towards global 
equality of opportunity, people would have to be positively discriminated on the basis of how 
much their individual opportunities would increase by migrating. In other words, two 
migrants with the same skill set could be treated differently depending on how much their 
skills, or lack thereof, benefit them in their country of origin. Faced with many potential 
migrants, and states that are only willing to admit a limited number, this third criterion would 







In order to explicate how one might balance these factors, this fairer migration model can be 
contrasted with current practices controlling migration. Common migration regulations 
include: requiring people to earn a certain amount before being eligible to apply for family 
reunification; needing to show a minimal amount of capital before being accepted on student 
visas; programs letting people with particular skills receive visas; and programs making it 
easier to migrate if one is sponsored by an employer in the receiving country. Clearly, these 
practices can be criticized based on the model presented above. After all, these practices, 
implicitly or explicitly, merely evaluate a potential migrant on the basis of only one of the 
three criteria, in this case how much the receiving country might benefit from their arrival. 
If we consider some of these specific cases according to the fairer migration model, we can 
see that some of the evaluations would be significantly different. In particular, it would be 
more difficult to argue that people should earn a certain amount of money for families to be 
reunified, if the country they emigrate from does not stand to lose much from their emigration 
and their individual opportunities are greatly enhanced by migrating. In short, a large positive 
effect for the migrant and a negligible effect on the country of origin would need to be 
balanced against a slight downside for the receiving country due to lack of financial means. In 
the case of student visas, a case might also be made for the students with lesser means being 
accepted first as it greatly improves their individual opportunities, though this has to be 
weighed against the receiving state’s ability to provide higher education. All in all, the kinds 
of migration regulations that merely consider the receiving society would have to take account 
of the impact on the country of origin and on the individual migrant to be justified according 
to this fairer migration model. 
In order to evaluate the viability of such a model, I need to briefly consider some of the 
objections it might face. However, it is important to initially point out that this fairer 
migration model does not rule out other considerations of justice, such as the agency of 
migrants. While it might seem like this system has the potential to be used to justify forced 
movements in order to alleviate global inequalities, it would clearly be unjust to do so, since 
this would contravene the fundamental normative consideration of individual agency. 
Therefore, this system would only apply to people who want to migrate, or who already have 
and are seeking residency. One might furthermore object to the fairer migration model by 
arguing that this kind of migration is undesirable, as it could lead to less social unity in the 






undeserving. Another detraction might be that this system could create some perverse 
incentives, whereby individuals would be encouraged to, for example, take less education, 
thereby limiting their opportunities and increasing their possibilities to migrate. Finally, one 
might contend that I am ignoring racial and gender discrimination in immigration practices. 
While the above concerns would need to be addressed before such a fairer migration model 
could be implemented, a thorough examination of them is beyond the scope of this article. But 
it is worth adding that the system outlined above also needs to be balanced against other aims 
of general immigration policy. It should not overwhelm the receiving society, and there would 
therefore have to be a limit to the numbers of migrants being admitted. It should also not 
discriminate against people arbitrarily, on the basis of such factors as race and gender. And 
while the system could create perverse incentives for some individuals by potentially 
prioritizing unskilled over skilled migrants, it is also doubtful that these incentives will 
override their motivation to better themselves. Furthermore, a fairer immigration policy 
should allow for migrants to be properly integrated to ensure the continuing democratic 
deliberations of the receiving society, and it would somehow have to be broadly accepted 
among the host population. However, it has to be acknowledged that the latter might be hard 
to achieve in the current anti-immigration climate that prevails in many Western democracies. 
In short, any implementation of the fairer migration model would also have to take these 
objections into consideration. 
I should point out that I think it is unlikely that a system such as the one outlined above is 
likely to be implemented, considering the present situation in which the United Nations 
refugee agency is finding it difficult to convince countries to resettle even a limited number of 
refugees. Therefore, rather than delivering a fully-fledged policy proposal, I suggest that these 
kinds of criteria would be more just according to the demands of global justice. In short, I 
believe this model would be better able to fulfill the obligations states have to rectify global 
inequalities that they are responsible for perpetuating. And furthermore, I believe this model 
would be a far more just system than many current admission criteria that positively 
discriminate in favor of the wealthy and educated. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have considered how one might alter migration regulations in order to 
contribute to alleviate global inequality of opportunity. I started by considering some of the 






discussing how global inequalities might be compared. While I agree with the criticism that 
evaluations between various cultural preferences in opportunities can be problematic, I 
believe that valuable comparisons can be made, in particular in relation to health care, 
education and the job market. Secondly, I showed why migration is normatively relevant for 
considerations of global equality of opportunity. In short, as affluent countries both contribute 
to and benefit from a global trading and financial system that significantly diminishes poorer 
countries’ ability to provide opportunities for their citizens, the affluent countries have a 
moral obligation to alter this. Furthermore, since these countries do not significantly attempt 
to alter these underlying conditions, and unfair migration practices are a part of an unfair 
system, it is pertinent to consider what kind of migration might actually contribute to 
alleviating inequalities of opportunity. Third, I argued that greater equality of opportunity 
could in part be met by reevaluating admission policies for migrants. Instead of merely 
considering how much a country might benefit from receiving a migrant, one should also 
consider whether, and to what degree, potential migrants might affect the level of opportunity 
in their country of origin, and to what degree their individual opportunities might be improved 
by migrating. 
I concede that the argument outlined here somewhat oversimplifies affluent states’ part in an 
unjust global trading and financial system. Some states attempt to rectify or maintain this 
international system to varying degrees. Some differences in opportunities can also be more 
readily traced back to national priorities than others. Moreover, some countries have more 
resources than others and are more readily able to admit greater numbers of migrants. I have 
not shown to what degree various states can be seen as responsible for remedying these unjust 
conditions, as this question is beyond the scope of this article. However, this does not take 
away from the normative validity of the central argument. In sum, as affluent states benefit 
greatly from international trading and migration practices to the detriment of less developed 
states, they are morally obliged to alter their immigration practices in a way that alleviates 
these inequalities. And while it may not seem feasible to expect states to alter their practices 
in order to admit migrants whom they do not necessarily benefit from admitting, it is certainly 
not likely that they will alter their practices if their moral unfairness is not pointed out. 
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Appendix ii: Statements on race and class: the fairness of skills-




Abstract: It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards economic 
migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is morally unproblematic. In this paper, I 
argue that even if one does not endorse special obligations towards economic migrants, there 
are good reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the citizens in the 
country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the impact of migrant selection on 
domestic populations by considering Blake’s arguments against racial selection in 
immigration. He argues that racial selection is wrong because “[…] making a statement of 
racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference 
domestically as well” (Blake, 2002, p. 284). In this paper, I consider whether a similar case 
can be made against selecting migrants based on their marketable skills. I begin with a short 
overview of skills-based selection and some of the normative arguments put forward in favour 
of it, before considering Blake’s argument. Thereafter I show how Blake’s example of race 
differs significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of identification 
with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of skills-based selection on domestic 
population also need to be considered in any normative argument proposing such migration 
regulations. These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizenship, 
negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as specific disadvantages for 
segments of society and a negative effect on social mobility. 
Keywords: Economic migration, skills-based selection, self-respect, philosophy of migration, 
immigration 
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Introduction: Skills-based immigration 
In the philosophical debate on migration there has been some discussion on the fairness of the 
selection of high-skilled migrants due to its effects on countries of origin through “brain 
drains”.18 However, less attention has been paid to how skills-based selection in general 
impacts the countries these migrants are moving to, and how such an impact should affect an 
evaluation of the fairness of such policies. In this paper, I address this issue by critically 
discussing how skills-based selection affects citizens in countries enacting such regulations. 
In short, I argue that skills-based selection is morally problematic due to its effects on parts of 
the domestic population. As such, I bracket the question of whether selecting migrants based 
on their skills is unfair to the migrants seeking admittance and their country of origin, and 
show how it can be unfair to some of the citizens in the country they are migrating to. This 
unfairness is due to skills-based selection sending a message of preference to lower skilled or 
working class citizens, the effect this can have on these citizens’ social bases of self-respect, 
and the policy’s potential to limit the opportunities for the domestic population. Before I 
proceed to the normative discussion, I next give a brief overview of what is meant by skills-
based selection, and some of the arguments put forward for these kinds of immigration 
regulations.  
What is skills-based selection? 
 
Skills-based selection refers to labour migration regulations that evaluate people according to 
their marketable skills, and give differentiated treatment on the basis of these evaluations. 
These kinds of evaluations are increasingly being made, and in more sophisticated ways, as 
states attempt to fill gaps in their labour market. For example, there is an increasing global 
competition to attract many so-called highly skilled migrants, such as IT specialists and 
experienced engineers. Health care professionals are also particularly sought after, as an aging 
population and increased spending on health care have increased the need for these workers in 
many countries in the Global North. Furthermore, as Castles (2006) points out, there is a 
global trend towards more guest worker programs, whereby typically lower skilled workers 
are given temporary and conditional contracts. Finally, the need for unskilled migrants in 
many countries is fulfilled by so-called “illegal” migrants, who have no official residency 
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status. Increasingly then, countries in the Global North and Global East, such as Canada, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Denmark, are systematically differentiating 
their treatment of labour migrants, giving preference and beneficial conditions to highly 
skilled workers, while either allowing lower skilled migrants entry subject to certain 
restrictions, allowing them in on temporary visas or barring their entry.  
Before I proceed, a few points on terminology and scope are in order. It is worth noting that 
the definition of skills is highly contentious, and different approaches define skills in a variety 
of ways. These definitions can be based on higher education qualifications, work experience, 
occupation and/or salary.19 Different countries all have their own definitions of high-skilled, 
low-skilled and unskilled. While the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) defines a persons level of skill on the basis of years of education, some 
countries define it according to what types of visas they are eligible for. The UK has no 
official definition of what counts as low-skilled, but it is commonly used about people who do 
not qualify for Tier 2 working Visas. As these are given on the basis of projected earnings, 
low-skilled can therefore for example refer to carers or cleaners.20 Canada on the other hand 
has several different types of skill levels (0, A, B, C and D)  in its official immigration 
regulations, wherein managers, professionals and certain trades are amongst those considered 
high-skilled, whereas: “Skill Levels C and D occupations include semi- and low-skilled 
workers in the trades, primary and manufacturing industries, sales and services, as well as 
certain clerical and assistant categories” (Canada, 2019). It therefore seems difficult to 
conclusively define what counts as “high-skilled”, “low-skilled”, “unskilled”, or even “semi-
skilled”. However, I will for the purpose of this paper consider high-skilled individuals to 
typically be higher earners working in sectors such as management, IT, or medicine, whereas 
low-skilled refers to lower earners such as carers, cleaners, etc. Finally, unskilled refers to 
people without any trade specialisation, higher education or personal wealth.  
Although skills-based selection varies from country to country, both in terms of which factors 
they consider and the proportion of migrants selected by these systems, I consider them 
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similar enough to treat them as one type of migration regulation in this paper.21 When it 
comes to the scope of the paper, I am primarily referring to skills-based migration restrictions 
enacted by countries in the Global North, as these are the countries that have come furthest in 
instituting these kinds of restrictions. Now it is worth noting that many countries have 
migration streams in addition to skills-based selection, most notably family reunification and 
refugeehood. However, skills-based selection is increasingly being adopted and advocated by 
politicians. Many countries are also placing restrictions on other migration streams, for 
example by limiting the number of refugees they receive, and making it harder for people to 
be reunited with their families. Skills-based selection is also increasingly being used on other 
migration streams. Antje Ellermann traces this development to the rise of human capital 
citizenship: “As a membership status, human-capital citizenship renders the link between 
membership and its benefits conditional and tenuous, transforming rights into earned 
privileges” (Ellermann, 2019b, p. 2). This leads to increasing precariousness of many 
migrants’ rights, whereby they have to continuously live up to the varying countries 
assessment of their skills and economic contribution.  
Ayelet Shachar has shown how there has been a paradigm shift in countries’ immigration 
regulations from selecting by origin to selecting by skills. Whereas previously most countries 
decided who could immigrate to their country based on the nationality of the person seeking 
admittance, countries are increasingly using skills-based systems to evaluate who should be 
allowed entry. These systems are said to be impartial and fair, as they evaluate all potential 
migrants according to an objective, impartial and transparent metric, rather than according to 
their race, religion, or country they were born in. As Shachar puts it: “Today’s skills-based 
migration priorities reflect a technocratic, econometric, and managerial logic that aims to 
bring an air of objectivity (though measures such as the point-system rubric) into the 
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otherwise deeply charged and politicized terrain of discretionary immigration” (Shachar, 
2016, p. 183). Having briefly sketched out what is meant by skills-based selection, I will now 
move on to discuss some of the normative arguments put forward for the fairness of these 
kinds of systems.  
The arguments for skills-based migration 
Most political philosophers working on immigration do not consider education and skills-
based selection particularly problematic.22 And while most will agree that selection on the 
basis of racial grounds is ethically problematic, skills-based selection has not received as 
much normative scrutiny.23 It is often taken for granted that states have a right to control their 
borders, and as long as they do so in an open and transparent way, the selection criteria that 
are used are mostly the prerogative of the countries in question.  
In reference to what kinds of immigrations regulations are justifiable, David Miller refers to 
legitimate and illegitimate policy goals for states to pursue:  
The receiving state has certain policy goals - for example, it is aiming for economic 
growth or to provide its citizens with generous welfare services - and it is entitled to 
use immigration policy as one of the means to achieve such goals. This explains why 
selecting immigrants according to particular skills that they can deploy is a justifiable 
criterion. […] In contrast, selection by race or national background is unjustifiable, 
since these attributes cannot be linked (except by wholly spurious reasoning) to any 
goals that a democratic state might legitimately wish to pursue (Miller, 2016, pp. 105-
106). 
When evaluating what kinds of immigration regulations are morally permissible, Joseph 
Carens also argues that selecting immigrants based on their marketable skills is morally 
permissible:  
As a general matter, this is another criterion that seems morally permissible. To be 
sure, the destination country is not acting altruistically in adopting this sort of 
immigration policy. It is selecting immigrants on the basis of its perception of the 
national interest. But since the country is morally free not to take any immigrants at all 
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from the pool under consideration here [economic migrants], the fact that it is guided 
by its own interest in its selection of some for admission cannot be a decisive 
objection. Of course, states are equally free to adopt a more generous policy, taking in 
those whom they judge to be in greatest need. That is an admirable course, but it is not 
morally obligatory (Carens, 2013, p. 108). 
It should be noted that Carens primarily argues for open borders, and he is here merely 
considering legitimate and illegitimate immigration regulations, given that states are justified 
in limiting immigration. In short, both Carens and Miller think skills-based selection is 
permissible, given that states can choose those immigrants it is in their interest to receive. And 
while they discuss in detail the negative effects of brain drain on the countries of origin and 
what can be done to limit these negative impacts, they do not pay much attention to the issue 
of the potential negative effects of skills-based selection on the citizens in the countries these 
migrants are moving to.24 What is important to note in relation to both Miller’s and Carens’ 
positions, is that they both treat states’ interests as a given, without sufficiently considering 
the adverse effects for many citizens in the states enacting the proposed policies. As I argue 
below, there is reason to be sceptical of skills-based selection due to the effects on some of 
the citizens in states enacting such legislation, and an argument considering legitimate and 
illegitimate immigration criteria should address this. Furthermore, like any governmental 
policy, skills-based selection is likely to impact citizens to varying degrees. In order to 
illustrate how immigration criteria can negatively affect citizens in states enacting such 
criteria, I turn next to Blake’s argument against racial restrictions. 
Blake’s argument against racial selection 
In the philosophical debate on immigration, state-centred approaches often argue that states 
only have special obligations to their own citizens, and lesser obligations towards the people 
beyond their borders. States therefore have discretionary control over immigration 
regulations, as those subject to these regulations have no special claims on the state they seek 
to enter. However, the same theorists often argue that selection of immigrants on racial 
grounds is unjust, and therefore need to stipulate a basis for why this might be unjust, which 
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preferably does not refer to those beyond their borders.25 One of the arguments that bridges 
this gap and maintains that states have no special obligations towards immigrants, but that 
some types of selection of them is wrong, is made by Michael Blake in the article 
Discretionary Immigration (2002, pp. 282-289). This argument considers the effects of racial 
selection on domestic citizens, and argues why racial selection is wrong due to these effects.  
Now, while it might initially seem off-putting to justify the wrongs of racial discrimination 
with reference to its effects on someone other than the person being discriminated, it is worth 
noting that just because something is wrong for one reason, that does not mean it is not also 
wrong for many other reasons. As mentioned above, for the purpose of this paper, I bracket 
the issue of injustices done to migrants seeking admittance and countries of origin, in order to 
focus on the effects of skills-based selection on the citizens of the country enacting these 
regulations. 
In the article ‘Discretionary Immigration’ Blake points out that, if one believes that states do 
not have any particular moral responsibility towards prospective discretionary immigrants, it 
seems difficult to base the objection to race based selection on what is owed to these 
discretionary immigrants. In other words, if we do not have moral obligations towards 
prospective migrants, what makes selection on the basis of racial criteria unjust? Blake then 
argues that what is objectionable about this form of selection is that it also significantly 
negatively impacts the state’s own citizens: 
Racially conscious immigration is of moral importance, in this instance, more for what 
it says to those already present than for what it says to prospective immigrants. If we 
examine the message of a racially discriminatory pattern of immigration, we might 
understand it as a public announcement of racial favouritism. This can be understood 
as deeply problematic even if the interests and rights of the immigrants are taken off 
the table. The state making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily 
makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well. (Blake, 2002, p. 284) 
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So, according to this argument, what makes racial selection objectionable in immigration 
policies, is that the state by enacting such restrictions makes a statement of preference, which 
negatively impacts those in the domestic population who happen to share this identification.  
Blake argues that racial selection has two kinds of negative impact on the population. Firstly, 
he refers to Rawls’ description of: “the social bases of self respect. A state which articulated a 
message that one racial group is to be preferred over another in immigration makes a public 
statement; this statement undermines the ability of citizens with the disfavoured racial identity 
to see themselves as full participants in the project of self-rule” (Blake, 2002, p. 284). So, 
racial selection impacts the agency and self-respect of people who share this group identity. 
According to Rawls self-respect is fundamental to our valuing ourselves as individuals, 
something we need in order to be pursue our own ideas of the good, and to contribute in 
society as citizens. Furthermore, this self-respect is reliant on others respecting us, and fair 
treatment by institutional structures. Rawls describes the social bases of self-respect in the 
following way: “these bases are those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if 
citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as persons and to be able to develop and 
exercise their moral powers and to advance their aims and ends with self-confidence”(Rawls, 
2005, pp. 308-309). While there is much disagreement within political philosophy on how to 
conceptualise self-respect and which social structures that best support it, most agree that it is 
important to foster, and that fair treatment by institutional structures and social interactions 
foster it. So, in relation to racial selection, Blake is plausibly claiming that this practice affects 
people’s sense of their own worth, and thereby restricts their ability to exercise their agency 
as citizens in modern democracies.  
Secondly, Blake argues that racial selection also has practical implications for citizens, more 
specifically as a kind of gerrymandering of the population: “It is one thing, we might think, 
for a certain ethnic group to tend to find itself in the minority in electoral politics. It is quite 
another for a state agency to seek to alter the electoral landscape so that this minority status is 
guaranteed to continue” (Blake, 2002, p. 285). Indeed, controlling demographics has 
historically been the primary goal of racist immigration policies. The Australian Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901, part of the White Australia Policy, the British Aliens Act of 1905, 






ethnicities and races out.26 In short then, Blake argues that racial selection in immigration 
policies affects both the self-respect of the discriminated groups domestically, and allows the 
majority population to politically cement its power.  
Now, one might question whether the same argument would hold if the racial group which is 
being selected is a minority. Would “positive discrimination” of racial minorities in 
immigration regulations be morally problematic in the same way? While this is not the place 
to dwell on this question, such a policy could intuitively affect the social bases of self-respect 
of other non-selected groups. Yet, as the groups affected are not already disadvantaged the 
effect does not seem as morally problematic, and it furthermore would not seem to contribute 
to any majority cementing its power. One can also be critical of an underlying assumption 
relating to the second factor of power cementation here, namely that Blake seems to assume 
that ethnic groups vote as a block and share the same political preferences, as this varies from 
country to country. Perhaps if we expand Blake’s second point to also include power 
entrenchment of demographic groups, not merely in elections, but also in wealth and 
resources, the argument holds even more force. I will consider this in more detail in the next 
section when comparing racial selection to skills-based selection.  
Blake also argues that racial immigration policies are likely to be more unjust the more 
multicultural a society is. Furthermore, he points out that as there in a racially homogenous 
society would be no minority population to be adversely affected, it would not in principle be 
objectionable with such policies, but that no such homogenous society exists and these 
policies are therefore always objectionable.27  
Blake is not alone in grounding the objection to racial selection on effects to domestic 
population. In a similar manner, Altman and Wellman argue that racial criteria are morally 
wrong as they constitute disrespecting citizens who happen to be part of the same racial 
group. “[It] is not difficult to see how Asian Australians, for instance, would be disrespected 
by an immigration policy banning entry to non-whites because they were regarded as inferior 
to whites. Even though this policy in and of itself in no way threatens Asians with expulsion, 
it sends a clear message that, qua Asians, they are not regarded with equal concern and 
respect by their fellow white citizens” (Altman & Wellman, 2011, p. 187). As we can see, the 
                                                            
26 For an overview of the relationship between immigration regulations and racist discrimination, see Fine 
(2016a, pp. 125-150). 
27 Blake does consider that an exception might be made for ethnic groups who have been made particularly 






moral basis for the wrongness according to Altman and Wellman is also an injury to some of 
the already residing citizens’ self-respect.  
There also seems to be some empirical support in psychological research for these 
philosophical kinds of arguments against racial selection. As Hue et al. (Huo, Dovidio, 
Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018) have found, immigration policies also send a statement to 
domestic citizens, which has a measurable impact on their sense of belonging: “Subnational 
immigrant policies (i.e., those instituted at the state level in the United States) are not only key 
to successful integration, they send a message about who belongs. Our evidence suggests that 
welcoming state-level immigrant policies lead to greater belonging among foreign-born 
Latinos, US-born Latinos, and even US-born whites” (Huo et al., 2018, p. 954). As such, there 
seems to be good reason to believe that Blake’s argument concerning the negative impact on 
domestic citizens is correct, and that this can plausibly impact the social bases of self-respect. 
However, Blake does not believe the same holds for skills-based selection.  
In the article Immigration and Political Equality from 2008, Blake argues that selection based 
on “economic success”, as opposed to racial selection, is legitimate: “It is difficult to regard 
this as objectionable from the standpoint of social justice – bearing in mind […] that we are 
discussing here only individuals with no individual right to status as immigrant. […] The 
moral equality of persons, after all, requires us to give reasons to people that they could not 
reasonably reject; it rules out reasons that demand the moral denigration of some segment of 
the population in question” (Blake, 2008, p. 972). But is Blake correct in making this 
distinction? Might not skills-based selection also amount to moral denigration?  
Skills-based selection revisited 
Statements of preference on skills 
Now let us consider the case of skills-based selection, and whether it is vulnerable to the same 
criticisms as Blake’s arguments against race based selection. A certain group is being rejected 
at the border or allowed in on worse terms, people belonging to the same group are also 
citizens of this state, and by publicly announcing this group as less favourable or unfavourable 
the state is also sending a signal to its domestic population. As mentioned previously Blake 
states that: “The state making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily 
makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well” (Blake, 2002, p. 284). Now, does 






will first consider the argument concerning the social bases of self-respect, before moving 
onto the practical effects the selection might have for the population.  
On the face of it, we seem to be faced with a similar type of restriction. A group is being 
selected for admission, while others who do not match these criteria are being kept out. As 
previously mentioned, skills-based selection typically grants wealthy and high-skilled 
individuals easier entry, while keeping out, or allowing in on worse terms, the less educated, 
less healthy and less wealthy, often referred to as working class and lower class people. 
Moreover, no state is homogenous enough in the skill-levels of its citizens and class 
distribution that it does not have citizens of all skill levels and classes. As such the state is 
selecting a group of people at the border, and sending out a signal, implicitly through public 
policy and sometimes explicitly through public statements, that people without specific skills, 
education or wealth are unwanted. It is important to clarify that a problematic message can be 
sent and received, whether or not it is intended to be sent. By giving fewer rights and 
conditional residence status to the less-skilled, the state is concretely manifesting the lower 
value it places on some skills. And while states frequently reward people with different skills 
differently, through for example wages and employment, it would seem to contravene a 
liberal understanding of equality to give differentiated citizenship rights on the basis of the 
citizens’ skillsets. Furthermore, in response to countries enacting these kinds of immigration 
regulations, some researchers and politicians have pointed out how they contradict central 
political values.   
With regards to Canada’s selective skills regime, Harald Bauder stated that: “In the statistical 
exercise, the newly proposed selection guidelines were matched with data from the 1996 
census to examine how many Canadians would actually qualify to immigrate to Canada as 
skilled workers. The results indicate the vast majority of Canadians are not good enough for 
Canada” (Bauder, 2001, p. 1). While Bauder primarily believes these types of regulations are 
unfair due to their effects on the migrants, and the countries they are moving from due to a 
“brain drain”, he also points out that these kinds of regulations seem “[…]to contradict 
Canadians’ keen sense for justice, equality and democracy” (Bauder, 2001, p. 2). As such, the 
regulations seem to contradict what many Canadians think of as central political values, and 
by having an impact on their views of fairness and equality, one could argue they affects 
Canadians’ social bases for self-respect. For if everyone is not viewed equally as citizens, 






Skills-based selection has also long been a contentious issue in US politics. When 
immigration reform was discussed in the run up to the 2008 presidential elections, then 
Senator Barack Obama stated: “How many of our forefathers would have measured up under 
the point system? How many would have been turned back at Ellis Island?” (Obama, 2007, p. 
6512). Obama’s statement was made in relation to proposals that the US go from a system 
where most immigrants were being granted entry based on family reunification and 
marginally through the green card lottery and refugee status, to more of a skills-based system 
as in Canada. Now, while his emphasis was primarily on fairness to the immigrants seeking 
admittance, he also points out what this kind of migration might do to the US itself, referring 
to the points-based system as a “radical experiment in social engineering” (Obama, 2007, p. 
6512). In other words, he raised concerns about what kind of society the US would become by 
employing such policies, and questioned the underlying fairness of such policies.  
So, in both the US and Canada, critics have claimed that these policies contradict central 
political values, but what kind of message is being sent and might it also impact their own 
citizens? Yolande Pottie-Sherman has used a critical discourse analysis to analyse the US 
migration debate. As she puts it: “Admission policies (both permanent and temporary) 
embody conceptions of who belongs within the borders of the nation” (Pottie-Sherman, 2013, 
p. 559). According to Pottie-Sherman, rather than merely being a practical device to choose 
desirable immigrants, these regulations also show a preference for what kinds of citizen a 
state wants. And while there will always be diverse opinions on migrants amongst citizens of 
a state, immigration control is a concrete manifestation of a state’s preferences. Consequently, 
there seems to be good reason to assume that a state employing skills-based selection is 
sending a message of preference to its own citizens.  
It also needs to be added that skills-based selection sometimes works as a proxy. For even 
though proponents will argue that skills-based regulations are fair, objective and transparent, 
these kinds of immigration regulations in practise tend to disproportionately favour some 
groups over others. As Tannock has described in the Canadian case: “[…] education-based 
discrimination in Canadian immigration policy should be challenged not only because as 
many of the critics have recognised previously, education very often serves as a proxy 
whether intentional or not, for other forms of discrimination based on race, class, gender, or 
national origin” (Tannock, 2011, p. 1332). So, even though many countries in the Global 






to favour the same groups. In a similar manner and in relation to the US debate, Pottie-
Sherman mentions how: “The points system, because of its certain uneven racial bias against 
Latinos and other immigrants from the Global South, became a veiled way of talking about 
race (as well as class) and immigration policy” (Pottie-Sherman, 2013, p. 572). In both these 
cases, it looks like in addition to sending a message that the unskilled are less-wanted, skills-
based migration in practise discriminates against the same groups that were previously subject 
to racial restrictions.28 Therefore, unless this proxy effect is remedied, skills-based restrictions 
can still be perceived as racial, and Blake’s argument could hold more directly. As such any 
country implementing skills-based selection needs to consider whether their selections might 
still work as a proxy for selecting on other clearly impermissible grounds, such as race, 
religion and gender.29  
In sum, there does seem to be good reason to think that the state, in practicing skills-based 
selection, can be perceived to be sending a message to the domestic population; a message 
about who is wanted and who is not. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the message about 
undesirability is received by a state’s own citizens, whether or not they are the intended 
recipients of the message. However, as opposed to racial selection criteria, these policies are 
not usually taken to be normatively problematic. Why might this be the case? Let us consider 
three possible reasons why skills-based selection might not have similar effects on the social 
bases of self-respect: firstly, that the groups in question do not have as strong an in-group 
identity, secondly, that citizens believe the state is pursuing its legitimate goals through this 
selection and that they therefore are not the intended recipients of this statement of preference, 
                                                            
28 For more information on the relationship between immigration restrictions and racial injustice, see Fine 
(2016a, pp. 125-150).  
29 In the article ‘Immigration and Political Equality’, Blake addresses the issue of the proxy effect to skills-based 
migration (Blake, 2008, pp. 973-974). He uses the example of gender imbalance in education, and argues that if 
women in general are less educated, skills-based migration criteria would seem to give preference to men. Blake 
holds that this would be particularly unfair if the reasons for underdevelopment in the origin state have in any 
way been caused by the receiving state. However, he contends that this is not enough to deem skills-based 
criteria morally unfair, as firstly, it is difficult to identify who is responsible for underdevelopment, and 
secondly, this unfairness gives rise to other duties of assistance, rather than changes in migration systems. I do 
not think this response is successful, as I do not believe one needs a clear causal link to identify responsibility, 
and since other duties of assistance are not being met today. However, these issues are clearly beyond the scope 
of this paper, and what is important to note for our present purpose is that Blake’s underlying moral reasoning 
here is based on how one is treating prospective migrants, and that one needs to give prospective immigrants 
reasons they cannot reasonably object to. In other words, the argument and response does not address the issue 







and thirdly, that many citizens believe immigration in general is bad for their prospects on the 
job market.  
Firstly, we are obviously considering distinctly different kinds of groups. Most people, at least 
at present, seem to identify more with people of their own nationality and race, than people 
from other countries who might share their skill levels, social class and their level of wealth. 
Therefore, although a public announcement of skills favouritism could in principle have the 
same effect on the social bases of self-respect as public announcement of racial favouritism, 
in practice it might have less of an effect. Furthermore, the history of immigration restrictions 
is also interwoven with racism, as most of the early immigration restrictions were instituted to 
limit the arrival of unwanted ethnic and racial groups. These same groups were also subject to 
racist policies inside the countries instituting these restrictions. Therefore, there has long been 
an awareness of the interplay with racial restrictions in immigration, and internal mistreatment 
of these same groups. As such, the relative novelty of skills-based selection criteria could 
plausibly indicate less of an impact on the domestic populations’ self-respect. However, this 
could be subject to change over time as more states institute such restrictions, and the 
consciousness around the mode of selection increases. And while the degree of class 
identification differs from country to country, evidence suggests that it increases with the 
degree of economic inequality (Andersen & Curtis, 2012), so the more unequal a society 
becomes the larger the effect on self-respect could become. Furthermore, as skills-based 
evaluations are increasingly being used on other migrant streams (Ellermann, 2019b), the 
awareness of these restrictions, and consequently their impact on self-respect, is likely to 
increase.  
Secondly, while racial selection cannot claim to contribute towards the legitimate policy aims 
of a state, skills based selection can arguably do just that, as amongst others Blake (2008) and 
Miller (2016, pp. 105-106) have pointed out. So, while racial selection can only point to some 
rather ethnocentric or racist claims as reasons for this kind of selection, states can argue that 
skills-based selections are made on the basis of the benefit to the wellbeing of their own 
citizens. In a similar manner to a job interview, they are getting the best people for the task at 
hand, namely filling gaps in their labour market. This could lead citizens to realising that they 
are not the intended receiver of this statement of preference. However, it is difficult to see 
how the state can make this statement of preference without any domestic recipients who 






need some people and not others, while true, might at the same time hurt some of their 
citizens’ self-respect. It is not as if many states are refusing entry to lower-skilled and 
unskilled people; they are often letting them in, but on different terms, thereby concretely 
manifesting their evaluations of various people’s worth. It should be noted that some skills 
based selection are being made on federal levels, such as in Australia or Canada, and this 
could also affect both the message being sent, and how it is perceived. If the local selections 
vary considerably, they are less likely to be perceived as a clear statement of preference. 
Furthermore, the local citizens are more likely to see the selection as justified if they address 
specific skills shortages in the area.  
Thirdly, the view one has of skills-based selection will also be based on the perceived effect it 
might have on one’s livelihood. As Mavroudi and Nagel have pointed out: “Whether one 
views migration in positive or negative terms, it seems, hinges on the position one occupies in 
the labour market and in social hierarchies” (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 82). So, if one 
thinks one’s job is likely to be threatened and is suffering from economic anxiety, it is likely 
that one will be sceptical to a large influx of workers. For example, Hainmueller et al. have 
showed that workers in the US are not more sceptical to immigrants with their own skill-sets. 
Indeed they found that all workers in general were more positive to high-skilled than low-
skilled immigration (Hainmueller, Hiscox, & Margalit, 2015, p. 205). Furthermore, there is 
evidence, at least in the case of the US, that low-skilled citizens are more sceptical of 
economic immigration in general, and that the more skilled someone is the less sceptical they 
are (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010, p. 79). In short, many working class people are sceptical of 
immigration, as it is frequently argued that migrants have undercut and put pressure on wages. 
And whether or not this is actually the case, it is clear that a commonly held assumption that 
this is the case will have an impact on the ways in which skills-based selection affects 
people’s self-respect. In sum, although skills based selection intuitively would seem to have 
an effect on the social bases of self-respect, there are other overriding concerns that diminish 
the effect of such policies. Furthermore, the complicated nature, diversity and relative novelty 
of skills-based selection criteria might also diminish the effects of the message, as opposed to 
the clear and transparent message of racist immigration criteria.  
Practical effects: Power entrenchment and educational opportunities 
The second effect Blake argues racial selection has on domestic population are the practical 






majority population to cement its numerical advantage by granting members of their own 
group entry, while other groups are stopped at the border. As mentioned above, Blake seems 
to be making the assumption that racial selection is made on behalf of a majority and that 
members of racial groups share political interests, which while historically often the case, will 
vary between historical and societal settings. In the case of skills-based selection, the situation 
is even more complex. As previously mentioned, countries often give high-skilled people 
more rights and easier tracks to citizenship, while less-skilled individuals are given temporary 
residency and fewer rights. Furthermore, whether high skilled migrants will contribute to a 
kind of cementing of political power is questionable, after all why should we assume that they 
share the same views? For although wealth and earnings are often an indicator of how one 
votes and attempts to influence the political process, they are far from the only ones.  
It seems difficult to be certain concerning the precise effects of skills-based selection on 
political power entrenchment, yet skills-based selection has other practical effects on 
domestic citizens, primarily in relation to education and the labour market. While many have 
argued that an influx of people with particular skillsets can have a depreciative effect on 
wages in certain sectors - this is frequently an argument put forward against low-skilled 
migrants - the effects of skills-based immigration on public education has been less 
appreciated. As Mavroudi and Nagel ask: “To what extent do skilled migration programs 
allow governments and businesses to ignore the training and educational of national labour 
forces?” (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 82) While the long-term effects of skills-based 
selection on public education have yet to be revealed, it is clear that it can alter the needs of a 
government to spend funds on training their domestic population. As Tannock has recognised 
in the Canadian case: “[…] we need to recognise immigration policy as constituting another 
potential mechanism for the privatisation of public education as well” (Tannock, 2011, p. 
1340). This seems intuitively plausible, for if it is cheaper to attract a nurse from the 
Philippines or a doctor from Ethiopia than to educate a young citizen, there seems to be an 
incentive for the state to prioritise the former over the latter. In short, the influx of high-
skilled migrants could lead to fewer opportunities for advancement for citizens in general, and 
this should be considered by anyone advocating skills-based selection. It should be 
emphasised that while I have not found any empirical evidence that this has been proven, the 






“The basic concern is that if the world’s best and brightest can be “imported” at will, 
with government’s fast tracking admission to those they covet on the basis of an 
expected return - material, reputation, or otherwise - we might see decreased attention 
paid to the kind of persistent, long-term investment that is required in order to build up 
a creative and professional workforce to meet the challenges of the knowledge 
economy in the twenty-first century and to cultivate home-grown talent in arts, 
athletics, sciences, and the like” (Shachar, 2016, p. 194). 
Consequently, some states which receive many skilled migrants, such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong, have already put policies in place in order to assuage such concerns among their 
citizens (Shachar, 2016, p. 194). There are also ongoing discussions in the US to tax 
employers of skilled migrants in particular STEM sectors (science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics), and use these funds to educate the domestic population in similar degrees. 
These policies constitute concrete examples of how states are attempting to remedy the 
appearance of unfairness in giving high-skilled jobs to foreign citizens, and thereby 
prioritizing integrating them before educating their own population.  
In sum, how can we evaluate whether the effects of skills-based selection on the domestic 
population should make us limit or alter these practices due to considerations of fairness? 
Well, it might be normatively problematic to different degrees. Firstly, one might ask whether 
skills-based selection is wrong in all cases due to the kind of negative effects it has on the 
domestic population. Based on the above discussion, I cannot conclude decisively on this. 
Secondly, one can contend that these negative effects need to be part of a utilitarian calculus, 
and that when calculating the permissibility of skills-based selection one needs to consider the 
effects discussed in this paper. I believe the latter to be the case, and that a normative 
evaluation of skills-based selection should take into account the negative effects, as well as 
the gains, brought about by such migration; in particular in relation to any effects on the self-
respect of citizens in the society the migrants are moving to, and any power entrenchment that 
might come about as a result. If the society in general benefits from skills-based selection, and 
in particular the less skilled and unskilled people in that society, it would seem like a more 








The ideals of citizenship are continually being re-examined and redefined by states in various 
ways. One of the ways in which this is done is at the border, where states decide who is 
wanted, and who is not. The effects of skills-based selection on countries, not just for the 
migrants and the countries these migrants are leaving, needs to be considered when evaluating 
the fairness of such policies. Rather than being merely a neutral framework for deciding who 
is allowed in, skills-based selection makes a statement regarding the kind of citizen a state 
wants. And while this selection is not as problematic for the formation of self-respect as 
selection based on race, some negative impacts are clearly discernible. In addition to 
potentially influencing the formation of self-respect, skills-based selection has practical 
effects on the population in the short term, and its effects in the long term are uncertain and 
affected by many other governmental policies. It also seems likely that skills-based selection 
might have a detrimental effect on the funding of public education. As the effects of such 
policies have yet to reveal themselves, it is worth being mindful of how differentiated 
treatment of migrants on the basis of skills, with respect to rights and opportunities, impacts 
treatment of citizens already residing in a state. These effects should be considered in any 
normative evaluation by states before instituting, or increasing the use of, skills-based 
immigration systems.   
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Appendix iii: Structural injustice and labour migration – From 
individual responsibility to collective action, Theoria, Forthcoming 
 
Abstract: This paper argues that the vast inequalities in access to migration opportunities and 
treatment of migrants, constitute a structural injustice, and that while states are clearly the 
most powerful agents in migration injustices, individuals also bear a personal responsibility to 
ameliorate these injustices. The argument builds on Young’s theory of structural injustice and 
critically applies it to labour migration. The paper argues that wealthy migrants, and citizens 
who benefit from migrant labour, have a responsibility to contribute towards ameliorating 
migration injustice on account of their position of privilege, whereas disadvantaged migrants 
have a responsibility due to their interest in changing their situation. It then considers how 
people might discharge such an obligation through collective political action, pointing in 
particular to NGOs, labour unions and local government. Finally, the paper addresses the 
objections that positing personal responsibility for labour migration is overly demanding and 
that the current labour migration regime is meritocratic and fair. The article concludes by 
showing how this sort of stance can be seen as interest-driven by privileged groups, and 
argues for the role of disruptive politics in overcoming it. 
1. Introduction 
 
It is readily apparent that the possibilities people have to move around the world today vary 
considerably. While some cram into plastic boats over perilous seas only to be put in 
detention centres or forced back by border guards, others fly comfortably over them and are 
welcomed on arrival. The latter often have wealth, higher education and the “right” passports, 
and can therefore traverse the globe easily. They also often have the opportunity to gain 
citizenship in many countries. The former, who are often poorer, lack recognised formal 
education, and have the “wrong” passports or none at all, find crossing borders difficult if not 
impossible. They are also liable to be sent back if they attempt to stay in countries 
permanently. Most migrants occupy an intermediate position between these two extremes, 
facing some restrictions on their movements; and often make trade-offs by accepting rights 
restrictions in order to be able to migrate and work. This description of a vast disparity in 






should lack of access to mobility be seen as a type of structural injustice? And why should we 
hold individuals responsible for such injustices?  
When considering migration philosophers have mainly been concerned with what types of 
migration restrictions are fair, and what rights migrants should have access to. It is also states’ 
responsibility towards migrants that has been most debated. While most agree that states have 
some kind of responsibility to help refugees, whether states have obligations towards other 
migrants is contested. What position one holds is based on whether one believes restrictions 
on migration are compatible with liberal-democratic values, one’s position on global justice, 
and the questions of whether what we owe distant strangers should have an impact on states’ 
admissions policies. Some scholars such as Michael Walzer (1983), Michael Blake (Blake, 
2002, 2005), and David Miller (2016), argue that states have extensive rights to decide which 
non-refugee migrants to admit. They differ somewhat on the cut-off point for who should be 
considered within this discretionary group. For example Blake thinks the state only has a 
weak right to exclude people from underdeveloped and oppressive states (Blake, 2013, p. 
129). Others, such as Joseph Carens, and Philip Cole argue for open borders, based on the 
inconsistency of border controls with liberal democratic values (Cole, 2000), and the need for 
people to migrate in order to attain global equality of opportunity (Carens, 2013). What these 
positions have in common is their principled abstract discussion on rules of admittance and 
obligations to migrants, and the focus on the state.30 In this paper, I use a structural injustice 
framework to examine responsibility for migration injustice more broadly.  
While personal responsibility is often considered in relation to other issues of global justice, 
such as global poverty or climate change, when it comes to migration it has received little 
attention. I argue that while states have much to answer for, in particular their mistreatment of 
migrants, there are many other agents that are involved in, and benefit from, current 
international labour migration arrangements. Employers and recruitment agencies hire 
migrants, privileged migrants benefit from ease of travel, and citizens in general profit from 
the labour of migrant workers. While it would be patently absurd to blame an individual for 
all the wrongs done in relation to migration, I argue that individuals bear a responsibility to 
contribute to changing the systematic harms that are brought about by unjust migration 
arrangements they take part in and benefit from. 
                                                            
30 For an overview of some of these strands of argument and a discussion of the new and old open borders debate 






Some of these systematic harms are brought about by migration systems that systematically 
differentiate treatment on the basis of an individual’s wealth, health, education and skill-set. 
While some privileged migrants are given a fast-track to citizenship, others are given 
temporary residence, and their residency permit is tied to a particular employer. Recently 
there has been an increasing focus on the fairness of such migration restrictions. In particular 
there is some disagreement as to whether the rules that govern guest workers and temporary 
labour migrants (hereafter TLMs) are fair, or whether they are instruments of exploitation 
(Attas, 2000; Lenard & Straehle, 2012; Nuti, 2018; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2019; Stilz, 2010). 
On the one hand, such systems allow more migrants opportunities to migrate in order to work, 
thereby increasing their earnings and life choices, and allow host countries to fill gaps in the 
labour market. On the other hand, migrants often have to trade these opportunities for fewer 
rights in the country they move to, face restrictions on their ability to change employers, and 
their emigration can lead to a ‘brain drain’ from the countries of origin. However, as I argue 
below, irrespective of whether these migration systems on balance might contribute to 
alleviating global inequalities, they can still be structurally unjust, and people therefore have a 
responsibility to alter them.  
In this paper, I show how current inequalities in opportunities to migrate and treatment of 
migrants constitute a structural injustice, and how we can assign personal responsibility for 
such an injustice. In order to make this case, I first provide a sketch of Young’s concept of 
structural injustice in section 2, discussing in particular her wish to avoid blame and strict 
division between types of injustice. Following this, I draw on the debate concerning TLMs 
and argue in section 3 that the disparities in possibilities to migrate, and the vastly unequal 
treatment of migrants, constitute a structural injustice. In section 4, I discuss personal 
responsibility for ameliorating the structural injustice migrants face. I identify and discuss 
three relevant groups: privileged migrants who benefit from structurally unjust migration 
practices, citizens in general who benefit from migrant labour, and disadvantaged migrants 
who have an interest in changing the unjust structures they are subject to. I also consider how 
these groups might discharge this responsibility through collective action, before finally 
discussing the widespread belief that current migration regulations are fair and meritocratic, 






2. Structural injustice  
In Responsibility for Justice (2010), Iris Young distinguishes between two types of injustice. 
The first, which she calls the liability model, is the standard view, whereby some agent is 
responsible for some harm, can be causally linked to that harm, and thereby blamed and held 
responsible for it. For example, if I steal from you, I have committed an injustice, and should 
be blamed and held responsible for it. However, she points out that there are other kinds of 
harms that people experience that cannot easily be traced to some agent’s bad action, and in 
these cases it is more difficult to hold someone responsible.  
Young’s paradigmatic example is of Sandy, a working single mother, who due to a myriad of 
factors is unable to afford a place to live. These factors include low wages, gentrification, lack 
of housing regulations, unaffordable rents, requirements of deposits, competition on the 
housing market, etc. Young describes the injustice Sandy is subject to as being deprived of 
housing and being vulnerable to homelessness. She argues that while this inability to find 
housing is clearly wrong – as no one should be in such a situation - there is no single agent 
who can be blamed for it. Yet, although it might be impossible to find someone to blame, 
Sandy is clearly subjected to harm, and her situation is a moral wrong: “Structural injustice is 
a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the 
repressive policies of a state” (Young, 2010, p. 52).  
While we cannot trace the moral wrong back to a responsible agent, it is not as if the reasons 
for Sandy’s situation are inexplicable. Indeed, the reasons why she, and others like her, are in 
this situation can be investigated and described: “[…] it is predictable and explainable that 
there will be an insufficient supply of decent affordable housing in an urban area where there 
is a generally healthy capitalist economy and where large-scale nonprofit housing investment 
is absent” (Young, 2010, p. 47). So, while no one specific agent is responsible, homelessness 
in society is also not merely a question of bad luck, though it might appear so on an individual 
level. Homelessness is rather the result of a myriad of factors. “Many policies, both public 
and private, and the actions of thousands of individuals acting according to normal rules and 
accepted practices contribute to producing these circumstances” (Young, 2010, pp. 47-48). 
These factors include monetary policies, housing rules, market forces, incentives for 
landlords, economic inequalities, etc. As such, being vulnerable to homelessness is a 
predictable and explainable moral wrong, due to many complex factors, and yet no one is to 






homelessness. This kind of injustice “[…] exists when social processes put large groups of 
persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to 
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them” 
(Young, 2010, p. 52). 
Young argues persuasively that vulnerability to homelessness is morally wrong, and is caused 
by complex social processes, which benefit some to the detriment of others. But what does 
that imply about who is responsible for fixing the injustice? As opposed to a case where a 
specific agent or group of agents are to blame, which she refers to as the liability model, 
Young argues that we should not think of responsibility for structural injustices as grounded 
in who caused them. Rather we should consider who is involved in the social structures 
sustaining them. In order to do so she proposes ‘a social connection model of responsibility’, 
which analyses who is taking part in the social processes that make the harms come about, 
how these processes can be changed, and which actors are in a position to do so. “The social 
connection model says that individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because they 
contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes” (Young, 2010, p. 
105). Young gives four parameters that may be used to decide allocation of responsibility: 
power, privilege, collective ability and interest. As we will see in the case of migration, while 
this model is helpful in identifying responsible agents, a drawback is that it is difficult to say 
exactly how responsible any one agent is. It should be emphasised that Young does not 
believe that the structural injustice model can or should give an exact estimate of how 
responsible an agent is. She contrasts responsibility with duty and states that: “Because 
responsibility is more open and discretionary than duty, a theory cannot provide a set of rules 
or even a method for calculating what to do” (Young, 2010, p. 144). What we can expect of 
theory are rather tools to guide our interpretation.  
Young’s theory of structural injustice is not only motivated by her belief that it constitutes a 
better description of injustices caused by structural processes, but also that it is more useful in 
order to bring about change and alleviate the injustices she discusses. Specifically, Young 
argues that the social connection model is pragmatically better because it avoids ‘blame 
switching’: “People who perceive themselves being blamed for wrongs that some people 
endure usually react defensively” (Young, 2010, p. 117). While blaming someone might be 






it is unproductive. “A round-robin “blame-game” often ensues, with one actor after another 
being blamed and defending herself by throwing blame onto another” (Young, 2010, p. 117). 
As opposed to blaming, Young argues, we should shift our focus to look for possibilities and 
solutions.  
Let us now briefly consider two criticisms that have been levelled against Young’s theory, 
before moving onto the issue of migration. These are both relevant to the discussion in section 
4, when we will consider individual responsibility for the structural injustices in migration. 
Firstly, Young has been criticised for creating too strong a distinction between liability and 
structural injustice. As Martha Nussbaum points out in the Foreword to Young’s 
Responsibility for Justice (Nussbaum, 2010; Young, 2010), Young’s argument that one 
cannot blame someone for taking part in normal processes that they do not know create harm, 
makes sense initially. However, once they are made aware of this harm, can and should we 
not blame them for not changing their behaviour? One response to this criticism is to point out 
that Young distinguishes between moral and political responsibility, and to further develop 
Young’s account of blame. In her application of structural injustice to colonial injustice, 
Catherine Lu argues that: “Agents who perpetuate structural injustice implicated in 
wrongdoing are not morally responsible (and blameworthy) for the wrongful conduct of 
others, but they are morally responsible (and blameworthy) for failing to address structural 
injustice and its consequences” (Lu, 2017, p. 259). However, Abdel-Nour (2018) has found 
this clarification unsatisfactory, and argues that a qualitative distinction between two types of 
injustice obscures more than it reveals, preferring a continual account. Abdel-Nour argues that 
structural injustice and a liability model are not qualitatively different, but implicitly rely on 
the same kinds of conceptual tools, as both “[…] tap into that motive of seeking to make good 
what we participate in making bad” (Abdel-Nour, 2018). There is not the room here to do 
justice substantively to the interpretations and criticisms of Young’s account, nor is this my 
aim. However, I do not believe the usefulness of Young’s account is much reduced even if 
one acknowledges that there is no qualitative distinction between structural injustice and 
liability, but rather a difference of degree, and relaxes Young’s prohibition against blame. As 
we will see in the case of migration, the explanatory framework of structural injustice can be 
used whether or not one assumes such a strict distinction. Furthermore, blame might even be 
useful in the case of the structural injustice, as the second criticism, presented in the next 






Nussbaum also points out that although blaming someone can be counterproductive in finding 
solutions to injustice, this is not necessarily a given. As she writes “[…] guilt is also a 
powerful incentive to make reparations, and when the appeal to guilt is coupled in the right 
way with respect for the person, or even love, it can produce such motivations even more 
powerfully” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. xxiv). I think this seems intuitively correct. Furthermore, as 
Hayward (2017) has pointed out, Young’s account of how to remedy structural injustice 
seems to rely on the assumption that once people are told that their actions contribute to harm, 
they will take responsibility and change them. However, this disregards the fact that some 
people are wilfully ignorant. Indeed, sometimes people use ways of viewing the world as a 
method to avoid responsibility. Young acknowledges this “absolving function” of belief in 
relation to personal responsibility and individualism. In short, Young argues that since the 
1980s the conservative idea that most inequalities in society can be traced to personal choices 
rather than systematic injustice has permeated the discourse, thereby helping people to avoid 
taking responsibility for rectifying the underlying inequalities (Young, 2010, p. 4). Yet this 
acknowledgement does not seem to influence how Young thinks about how we can 
pragmatically go about influencing people to solve structural injustice. As opposed to 
Young’s opposition to blaming, Hayward argues that there is also a role for disruptive 
politics, such as civil disobedience and mass demonstrations, in order to fight such epistemic 
ignorance. As Hayward puts it “[…] disruptive politics play a crucial role in dismantling 
structural injustice. Because they interrupt privileged people’s motivated ignorance, disruptive 
politics create a political opening to institutionalise structural change” (Hayward, 2017, p. 
396). Once again, whether one agrees with Young’s pragmatic view of avoiding ´blame 
switching’ or not, I do not believe that it substantively alters the viability of the structural 
injustice model as such. Indeed, I think it will likely be a pragmatic political choice, 
depending on the case under consideration, what type of strategy is most likely to succeed. 
And while the intuition to avoid blame makes sense, I think there can be a substantive role for 
disruptive politics as well, as we will see in the case of migration injustice. 
3. The case for why migration is structurally unjust 
Before we get to the question of how to apportion responsibility and bring about change, 
however, we must ask whether a similar argument can be made with respect to inequality in 
access to migration opportunities and treatment of migrants, as Young makes for vulnerability 






injustice. In the following, I make this case by comparing Young’s case of homelessness with 
migration restrictions, and argue that Young’s concept of structural injustice is appropriate to 
describe migration restrictions. So let me first define the injustice in question, before in 
section 4 moving onto personal responsibility for this injustice.  
It is clearly the case that when it comes to access to migration and treatment of migrants, 
some people’s opportunities are severely restricted, while others have more freedom. There 
are a myriad of reasons why some people are advantaged in access to migration, while others 
are more disadvantaged. National laws, regional migration agreements, employer preferences, 
qualifications, education, nationality, language skills, poverty, race, gender, class, health, all 
create the conditions within which people can make their choices. These conditions create an 
individual migrant’s horizon of possibilities, and the size and nature of this horizon varies 
considerably. In the same way that Young argued that vulnerability to homelessness is a 
socially structured position, so is lacking access to mobility and the differing treatment one 
receives. The institutional rules and norms within which people find themselves constrain 
their possibilities. As Young puts it in the case of being housing deprived: “Persons in this 
position differ from person’s differently situated in the range of options available to them and 
in the nature of the constraints on their action” (Young, 2010, p. 45). This is plainly also the 
case with access to migration.  
Now, while in one sense the many migration restrictions people come up against are intended, 
in another sense they are not. They are intentional in that states, employers and institutions 
often seek to limit the immigration of “unwanted” migrants, while attracting those they 
believe will contribute to their state. Yet the overall limitation on the mobility of migrants is 
unintentional, in the sense that no one institution, employer or state is to blame for it. Rather it 
is the result of general trends in state preferences, and migration regulations as a whole. Many 
migrants therefore have to make trade-offs, often accepting restrictions on their rights, or in 
their ability to change employer, in order to be able to migrate. This is particularly the case in 
guest-worker programs, which are set up by states to fill gaps in their labour market, without 
assuming the expense of giving these workers long term access to citizenship rights. The 
systems are typically time-limited, migrants often tie themselves to one employer, and do not 
have access to the same rights and benefits as other citizens. The rights restrictions and 
treatment of the TLMs vary considerably from country to country, from brutal working 






Straehle point out, such temporary work programs are typically defended by pointing to the 
“moral primacy of free movement and by pointing to the redistribution of wealth that 
accompanies migration” (2012, p. 209). So such migration regimes give more people access 
to work and opportunities, and distribute wealth through people sending remittances home. 
However, does such a redistributive effect outweigh arguments for equal treatment?  
Michael Walzer argues that such guest worker programs are similar to having a 
“disenfranchised class” (1983, p. 59), and that a denial of guest workers’ civil rights is 
intertwined with their worse material conditions. Even if they might want to eventually return 
home, they should have basic civil rights and the right to attain citizenship after a period of 
time. In short, Walzer argues that having such a class of people, unable to attain political 
rights, is incompatible with being a democratic society. Others such as Robert Meyer (2005), 
Anna Stilz (2010), and Lenard and Straehle (2012), argue that some rights restrictions can be 
justified, given their benefits in alleviating inequalities and the opportunities they give some 
migrants.31 Now, I do not aim to reach a conclusion on this question of the permissibility or 
justifiability of such TLMs. For while differentiated rights for migrants might be 
pragmatically acceptable, due to their effects on alleviating inequalities and contributing to 
migration opportunities, and given that many states are unwilling to give migrants more 
rights, that does not preclude the argument that such systems are structurally unjust. In short, 
guest worker programs can be morally permissible, and still be structurally unjust. And if this 
is the case, many of the agents involved, will still have a responsibility to alter the structural 
injustice migrants find themselves subject to.  
As Ellerman convincingly shows: “[…] with the emerging conception of the individual as the 
bearer of human capital, states have privileged the admission of highly skilled, highly 
educated, and wealthy immigrants by offering them access not just to their territories and 
labour markets, but also to residents, family reunification, and, ultimately, citizenship. At the 
same time foreign workers classified as low skilled rarely enjoy equivalent rights and are only 
given temporary access to labour markets” (Ellermann, 2019, p. 14). It is clear that this 
                                                            
31 Robert Meyer argues from a sufficiency theory, that as long as a minimum standard of conditions for the 
migrants is met, the net gains outweigh the losses, then while unfair such a trade-off can be justified (2005). 
Anna Stilz also argues that some rights restrictions can be justified, given that they do not subject workers to 
“dominanting social relationships that are […] inconsistent with liberal-democratic values” (2010, p. 304). 
Lenard and Straehle argue that there are benefits to temporary work programs, yet in order to be just they need to 
allow for all guestworkers to attain citizenship after a certain amount of years has passed (2012). Ottonelli and 
Torressi point out that many TLMs would benefit from a different set of rights than permanent domestic citizens, 






differing treatment harms some migrants, while benefitting others. These harms include for 
example lack of access to job market, unsafe travel, more insecure rights, and being exploited 
by predatory employers. And while there are clearly migration injustices that are more similar 
to what Young terms liability injustices, such as a state’s mistreatment of migrants or lack of 
assistance to refugees, this does not cover the structural inequalities in how people are 
treated.32 
Furthermore, as Alasia Nuti has shown in relation to the EU context, a rights-based approach 
does not pick up all the disadvantages that many TLMs find themselves in (Nuti, 2018). Nuti 
points out that labour migrants are not merely disadvantaged by their lack of access to equal 
rights - indeed intra EU migrants often have equal formal rights - but they also face language 
barriers, and ethnic and gender discrimination. One might therefore object that differences in 
access to mobility and treatment of migrants, is not a distinct kind of harm, but rather a 
consequence of other structural inequalities, and that it therefore should not be normatively 
analysed as a distinct structural injustice. After all, many of the reasons why migrants do not 
meet states’ admission criteria are due to their being disadvantaged, poor, lacking higher 
education and access to health care, which in turn can be traced to poor government, 
inadequate state finances, global economic inequalities, colonialism, racism, capitalism, or 
unfair international trade regimes. However, even though differentiated treatment of migrants 
might be influenced by other injustices, this does not mean it does not constitute an injustice 
in itself, in the same way that vulnerability to homelessness is often connected to, and 
exacerbated by, income inequality, racial inequality, and laissez-faire capitalism. 
Furthermore, migration restrictions help reproduce the very global disparities that make many 
people want to migrate in the first place. As David Owen puts it in the case of racial 
inequalities in migration:  
Under contemporary circumstances, the normal state unilateral control over ‘voluntary’ 
migration is pivotal to the social reproduction of racialized transnational patterns of 
‘exclusion, domination, subordination, exploitation, and marginalisation’ between the citizens 
of advantaged states and those of disadvantaged states that are rooted in the history of formal 
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can be blamed for not doing so according to a liability model. However, the plight of refugees can also be 







and informal imperialism, on the one hand, and of racialized migration controls, on the other 
(Owen, 2019, pp. 7-8).  
Owen argues that this structural injustice is a result of states being able to decide the 
admission requirements for ‘voluntary’ migrants, which systematically privilege some to the 
detriment of others. He argues that this constitutes a structural injustice, which leads to 
demands on states to coordinate their actions, limit the harm they are creating and create fairer 
migration opportunities. Nuti similarily points out that labour migrant practices can help 
reproduce gender and racial injustices: “intra-EU temporary migration projects contribute to 
the establishment and reproduction of a differentiation between ‘whiter’ and ‘less white’ 
workers and of a hierarchy among (white) European ethnicities and nationalities, both of 
which significantly structure the labor market in receiving countries” (Nuti, 2018, p. 215).  
So while structural migration injustice clearly relies on, reinforces and helps reproduce other 
injustices, that does not mean normative weight should not be given, and responsibility 
assigned, to migration injustices themselves. However, it does seems clear that it is more 
difficult to trace those responsible for such systematic differentiated treatment, as opposed to 
the case when applying the liability model. Indeed, I would argue that the differing treatment 
migrants receive is a better example of structural injustice than homelessness, as providing 
accommodation can (and perhaps should) be seen as a state responsibility, which some states 
have acknowledged and addressed to varying degrees. For example, many of the factors 
Young mentions in relation to homelessness, such as monetary policies, housing rules, 
incentives for landlords, and economic inequalities, are to a greater or lesser extent factors a 
state has the power to change. Furthermore, if the state considers housing as part of their 
remit, they can provide adequate housing to every citizen. And while Young limits her case to 
a contemporary capitalist housing market, it is not clear that just because the state does not see 
housing as a responsibility, that it should not do so. However, in the case of global migration 
trends, there is no one such powerful agent. For whereas individual states have vast power 
over their own admission policies, they have less power over all other states, employer 
preferences, racial stereotypes and systemic migration trends in general. In general then, 
Young’s argument is more helpful in cases where there are multiple factors and agents, and 
where no one single agent occupies an overwhelming position of power in a social structure.  
If no single agent has such a position, to whom should we assign responsibility, and how far 






responsibility do not hold beyond state borders, I am here foregrounding the migration 
limitations people face. As Young argues this point: “The nation state view […] makes prior 
what is posterior from the moral point of view. […] Ontologically and morally, though not 
necessarily temporally, social connection is prior to political institution” (Young, 2010, p. 
139). We influence people in a myriad of different ways, socially, politically and 
economically. It therefore makes sense that our moral obligations should stem from an 
examination of these interactions. And while the types of institutions, norms and interactions 
are quite clearly different on a global level, there are certainly interactions where our impact 
is felt beyond borders. As Young puts it: “An agent’s responsibility for justice is not restricted 
to those close by or to those in the same nation-state as oneself, if one participates in social 
structural processes that connect one to others far away and outside those jurisdictions” 
(Young, 2010, p. 142). By migrating, or relying on migrant labour, one is participating in the 
social structures that go beyond borders, and a discussion of people’s responsibility for the 
harms that are caused by these social structures is clearly merited. 
 
4. Individual responsibility and collective action 
If we accept that the vast inequalities between how migrants are treated, when it comes to 
their admission and treatment, constitute a structural injustice, who is then responsible for 
alleviating it? According to the structural injustice model, we should not merely consider who 
is directly mistreating others: “We should also ask whether and how we contribute by our 
actions to structural processes that produce vulnerabilities to deprivation and domination for 
some people who find themselves in certain positions with limited options compared to 
others” (Young, 2010, p. 73). So, building on Young’s structural injustice theory, we can 
consider who is involved in the social processes in migration; more precisely, who has the 
power, privilege, interest and collective ability?  
By using Young’s four parameters for reasoning concerning responsibility, one can identify 
and discuss many of the agents involved in creating disparities in access to mobility and 
differentiated rights. These include states and transnational institutions, which have vast 
power to change migration policy; companies, wealthy citizens and employers who enjoy 
privileges due to the global migration injustices; transnational organisations and regional 
governments, which have a collective ability to contribute to changing current practices; and 






Young describes these parameters as “four parameters agents can use for reasoning about 
their actions and those of others in relation to collective action to redress injustice” (Young, 
2010, p. 144). I take it that Young does not believe that this is an exhaustive list of possible 
parameters for social positions, but rather those that seem particularly relevant and describe 
the most important social positions people have in relation to structural injustices. Indeed, the 
idea that one can have a complete and sufficient list of necessary criteria for how agents are 
involved in structural processes, and from this derive responsibility, seems implausible to me. 
Various interpretations of structural processes are likely to conceive of different relevant 
parameters. As such, the validity of the list of parameters should continually be evaluated 
according to how plausibly they track and explain the social structures.  
Many agents will of course have responsibility according to several of these parameters. As 
mentioned in section 2, while Young’s structural injustice model allows us to consider the 
responsibility of more agents than a liability model, it does make it somewhat more difficult 
to estimate exactly how responsible any particular agent is. Yet, it seems clear that when an 
agent both has more power and collective ability to rectify an injustice, that agent bears a 
heavier burden for doing so. As previously mentioned the most powerful agents in the global 
migration regime are states, international organisations and large companies. But there are 
many others who are involved in the societal processes, and who therefore also have 
responsibility for righting wrongs. Furthermore, the responsibility of states in particular, has 
received a lot of attention33, yet the role of individuals is often neglected. As individuals are 
clearly involved in migration structures, and their responsibility has received less scrutiny, in 
the following three sub-sections I discuss the responsibility individuals have in relation to 
migration injustice, and consider ways one might go about discharging such a responsibility. I 
identify three groups of people relevant to this discussion: privileged migrants who benefit 
from structurally unjust migration practices (4.1), citizens in general who benefit from 
migrant labour (4.2), and disadvantaged migrants who have an interest in changing the unjust 
structures they are subject to (4.3). 
4.1. Privileged migrants 
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of migration injustice, at least seen from the Global North, 
is that in addition to the strict border policies towards unwelcome migrants, many people are 
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(2013). Higgins, briefly put, argues that structural migration injustice leads to a normative responsibility on 






also clearly privileged. Their privilege consists in benefitting from a structure that produces 
inequalities in access to migration opportunities and treatment of migrants. Such benefits 
include being able to migrate to many different countries, being welcomed on arrival, given 
extensive rights and protections, and often given paths to citizenship. According to the 
structural injustice model, privilege leads to responsibility. As Young puts it:  
Where there are structural injustices, these usually produce not only victims of 
injustice, but also persons with relative privilege in relation to the structures. […] 
Persons and institutions that are relatively privileged within structural processes have 
greater responsibilities than others to take actions to undermine injustice. As 
beneficiaries of the process, they have responsibilities. Their being privileged usually 
means, moreover, that they are able to change their habits or make extra efforts 
without suffering serious deprivation. (Young, 2010, p. 145)  
In relation to the structural injustice of migration opportunities, educated, wealthy citizens, 
particularly from countries in the Global North, are clearly benefitting. Their freedom of 
movement, preferential treatment, and easier access to citizenship when migrating, means that 
they occupy a position of privilege in the structure of global labour migration. Their wealth, 
education also make them more likely to be able to contribute without ‘suffering serious 
deprivation’. Through benefitting from structural processes that harm others, they, according 
to the structural injustice model, therefore have some responsibility to remedy migration 
injustice.  
In relation to sweatshops and the structural injustice of the international garment industry, 
Young gives the example of ordinary consumers who benefit from cheap clothes. Due to their 
privileged position in this relationship with the people who make their clothes, they have a 
responsibility to help better the situation, and they can discharge this responsibility by, for 
example, changing their consumption habits or encouraging textile companies to treat their 
workers better. Similarly, people who benefit from unjust migration arrangements, privileged 
migrants, have a responsibility to alter their behaviour in order to remedy this injustice. Yet 
asking them to change their choices of where to migrate, is perhaps more demanding than 
changing purchasing habits for clothes. Some might retort that purchasing clothes is more 
necessary then migrating. At least it is more demanding to alter migration choices in the sense 
that larger life choices are affected, whether one migrates for work, family or education.  






reducing the structural injustice of differentiated treatment and access to migration. Indeed, if 
many people simply did not migrate in order to let other less privileged people do so, it seems 
too hopeful, and perhaps naïve, to think that this would actually alter employers’ or states’ 
behaviour towards less advantaged migrants. 
Privileged migrants could therefore respond in different ways, such as contributing politically 
through collective action. After all, the responsibility to alter structural injustice is, according 
to Young, both shared and political, rather than individual and moral:  
I have asserted that the shared responsibility for undermining injustice can be 
discharged only through collective action. Agents who participate in processes that 
produce injustice often need to reorganise their activities and relationships to 
coordinate their action and coordinate it differently. (Young, 2010, p. 147) 
Young’s examples of these kinds of organisations are unions, church groups, and stockholder 
organisations. In the case of sweatshop workers she also gives the example of student groups 
and university communities. The importance of coordinating organisations is clearly also 
paramount in the case of rectifying immobility. Any state, employer, or individual migrant, 
whether advantaged or disadvantaged, can do little to alter global structural injustice if they 
do not coordinate their actions, though some are certainly more powerful than others. In the 
case of the structural injustice of immobility and treatment of migrants, many groups have the 
collective ability to bring about change. For example, labour unions can help promote the 
opportunities of migrants, NGOs can advocate fairer migration regulations, political parties 
can impact state admission rules, global institutions can coordinate state action, and university 
communities can promote more equal access for foreign students and faculty.  
It is also important to note the role of local and regional governments. This can been 
exemplified by the role of so-called sanctuary cities in the U.S., which work to help migrants. 
They do so by making it more difficult for the central government to enforce immigration 
laws, not cooperating with governmental immigration enforcement agencies, and not 
subjecting local governmental services to checks of citizenship. By helping “illegal” migrants, 
local government can thereby discharge some of the obligations that stem from their ability 
for collective action.34 
                                                            






In short, there are many collective methods by which privileged people in general, can ¬– and 
many in fact do – contribute towards bettering the structural injustices in migration. However, 
what is important to note for our purposes is why they should be doing so. According to the 
argument presented here, such assistance or political action should not be seen as merely 
grounded in a duty of assistance to aid the less fortunate, but rather in the political 
responsibility engendered by privileges under current unjust structural migration 
arrangements. As their privilege is socially connected to harm done to others through the 
structural conditions within which they interact, they have a political responsibility to alter the 
situation. Furthermore, the more an individual is privileged, the more responsible they are. 
4.2. People that benefit from migrant labour 
Another way people can be clearly privileged by structural injustices in migration is by 
benefitting from underpaid migrant labour. Migrants often have fewer rights and are paid less 
than other workers. Whether that labour is taking place in their own state or in another 
country where the products they consume are being made, citizens who consume the products 
produced by underpaid migrants have a responsibility because they benefit. Of course, one’s 
responsibility as a consumer is likely to be different according to whether the work is being 
done in their own state or elsewhere, at least in the sense that they have more of a collective 
ability to influence the conditions in their own countries. Yet, both domestically and 
internationally, they have a responsibility to better the situation for the migrants whose work 
they are benefitting from, whether they are reliant on farm labour for the food they eat, or 
medical workers in their hospitals. People will be able to take responsibility to different 
degrees, according to how privileged they are and how easy it is for them to change their 
habits without suffering as a consequence. They can discharge this responsibility in much the 
same way as the privileged migrants above, by contributing towards bettering the migration 
opportunities and treatment of more disadvantaged migrants. Furthermore, as their 
responsibility is based on their benefitting from migrant labour, they bear a particular 
responsibility to contribute to bettering the labour and citizenship rights of such 
disadvantaged migrants, and to contribute towards more equal rights for all migrants in a 
society.  
While it is clearly too demanding to ask every citizen to have knowledge of all groups of 
migrant workers, different rights and regulations, and the specific harms that befall many 






privileged are indeed privileged, and that their advantages are maintained by harm done to 
others. The exact degree of responsibility each individual has is also difficult to establish 
according to this framework. As we saw above there are several ways one gains responsibility 
for structural injustice, and many ways one can discharge it. Furthermore, I do not think that 
the structural injustice framework can, or even should, prescribe specific action for each 
individual. What it gives is a model for deciding who has responsibility for structural 
injustices and why, not a straightforward way to decide exactly how much responsibility each 
individual has and how they should discharge it. Indeed, this seems to be a natural 
consequence of the framework of structural injustice discussed in section 2. The theory is not 
trying to trace causal liability, but rather consider how agents are involved in social structures 
sustaining injustices. And while their social positions are clearly related to the causal 
interactions by which the social system instantiates injustice, it is more difficult to prescribe 
an appropriate amount of responsibility from what social position an agent occupies. 
Furthermore, rather than merely tracing causal structures, the structural injustice model goes 
beyond that by looking at agents’ possibilities for reforming that very structure. And these 
possibilities are not given by their current interactions. As such, I would argue that structural 
injustice both is and is not qualitatively distinct from liability injustice. It is not distinct in that 
it seeks to trace causal interactions by examining structural processes. In order to reify a 
social structure, you need to examine how it works and who plays which roles. At the same 
time, Young’s model is distinct in the sense that the forward-looking solutions go beyond this 
causal interpretation of people’s roles and social positions. You are not merely responsible for 
helping making better what you contribute to making wrong, but also to make better what you 
are in a position to make better. Indeed, according to the structural injustice framework, you 
can be responsible without making anything wrong at all, as the case below makes clear. 
4.3. The responsibility of disadvantaged migrants and disruptive politics 
Sometimes agents’ interests coincide with the responsibility for justice. Victims of 
structural injustice in particular have unique interests in undermining injustice, and 
they ought to take responsibility for doing so (Young, 2010, p. 145).  
As Young points out, if we follow the liability model whereby responsibility is grounded in 
causality and blame, it would be perverse to give victims of an injustice responsibility to 
remedy it. Indeed, this would be a philosophical kind of victim blaming. However, according 






blameworthy for creating the unjust structures, disadvantaged migrants certainly have an 
interest in changing them. As mentioned in section 3, labour migrants receive vastly 
differentiated treatment, and the degree to which someone is disadvantaged varies a lot. A 
Nepalese construction worker employed under the kafala system in Qatar is clearly more 
disadvantaged than a Polish plumber working in Norway. And while there is disagreement as 
to the justifiability of the differentiated treatment of temporary labour migrants, there is no 
disagreement about the existence of such differentiated treatment and that some migrants have 
fewer advantages then others. So regardless of whether one considers the individual migrants 
exploited, there can be little doubt that they have an interest in seeing their conditions 
improved.  
In the case of the sweatshop industry, Young refers to the workers having an interest in their 
conditions being bettered. Though they most often have limited resources and ability to 
change the conditions, Young points out that they can and do attempt to organise workers, 
participate in campaigns and give information which can highlight their situation. In the same 
manner, disadvantaged migrants have an interest in increasing their mobility and the rights 
they are given. How might they go about discharging this responsibility? One way is to 
organise and speak out against current injustices, as many do. In addition to contributing with 
their perspectives and insights to the work mentioned above, an important use of collective 
ability today consists of informal networks of immigrants, who organise and aid people from 
their own countries of origin. These groups help people migrate, find work, understand local 
rules, and negotiate bureaucracy. These are clear expressions of migrants taking responsibility 
to better the situation they find themselves in.  
Another way migrants contribute to alleviating global injustice is through remittances. Indeed, 
the redistribute effect of remittances is often used as a main argument in favour of guest 
worker programs (Lenard & Straehle, 2012, p. 210). While this does not in itself combat 
migration injustice, it does contribute towards alleviating global inequalities, which are 
intricately tied to the reproduction of and reasons for migration injustices. Yet, it is clear that 
in many instances people have few avenues to contribute to political change. It is therefore 
worth considering whether there are alternative ways they might discharge this responsibility. 
Recall the discussion in section 2 concerning what is likely to bring about structural change 
and Young’s pragmatic opposition to using blame. A problem with this avoidance is that in 






to take responsibility for changing it. Indeed, as Young acknowledges in relation to 
conservative beliefs in personal responsibility in relation to structural poverty, some beliefs 
are used to absolve individuals of responsibility to change unfair structures. While this is 
more readily appreciated in the case of, for example, racist beliefs justifying white privilege 
or misogyny justifying male privilege, I believe it also applies to meritocratic and nationalist 
beliefs justifying structural migration injustice.  
One objection to the argument that migration access is structurally unjust, is that while it 
results in some people having fewer opportunities and worse treatment, this is merely an 
unfortunate result of a fair system. Current admission policies based on skills, health and 
wealth are meritocratic and fair. People are treated differently, but they have different abilities 
and states have different demands. The unequal treatment of migrants based on their skills, 
class, advantaged and abilities, is therefore fair. Now, if one agrees that the structural injustice 
argument presented above is correct, how might we read such a response? We can read it as a 
mistaken understanding of a state of affairs in the world, which once properly informed, 
people will seek to rectify. However, we can also read it as a mistaken belief that facilitates an 
avoidance of responsibility. In order to defend their position, people of privilege consider 
their position fairly acquired, whether or not this might actually be the case. This kind of 
ignorance is described by Hayward in relation to racial injustice, in the following manner: 
The mechanisms of their production include information gate-keeping by powerfully 
position members of dominant groups, dominant background beliefs and assumptions, 
which many individuals, especially (but not only) members of dominant groups 
internalise, and the psychological investment that privileged members have in 
maintaining a sense of the self as ethical, even as they enjoy systematic unearned 
advantage. (Hayward, 2017, p. 404) 
In the case of migration injustice, the belief that the current admission systems are fair and do 
not discriminate can be seen as a background assumption by means of which the privileged 
protect their unearned advantage. If this is the case, it is not likely that suggestions of more 
equitable opportunities to migrate or giving migrants equal access to rights, will be well 
received. After all, if the current system is fair, what moral problem needs to be solved? In 
light of this, it would seem that Young’s pragmatic avoidance of blame and constructive 
collective politics might not be satisfactory to bring about change, at least not on its own. The 






ability to point the finger of blame has played an important role in the work for systemic 
change. In the case of racial injustice Hayward argues for the role of disruptive politics, by 
which she means “[…] boycotts, mass protests, sit-ins, die-ins, and other forms of unruly 
political action” (Hayward, 2017, p. 405). The latter have recently been successfully 
employed in the protests following the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis in May 2020. 
It seems to me that there is good reason to assume that such disruptive political action will 
also be necessary in the case of bringing about change to migration injustice. After all, there 
seems to be little willingness in the Global North to substantially alter current admission 
requirements and treatment of migrants, regardless of how many people protest unfair 
conditions or how many migrants drown in the Mediterranean. 
In “The Ethical Consequences of Criminalizing Solidarity in the EU” Melina Duarte 
considers the impact of criminalising aid towards refugees and migrants in the EU (Duarte, 
2020). Duarte argues that this can have unintended damaging consequences for the EU, 
leading to increased polarisation, confusion of who actually counts as illegal, and making it 
harder for citizens to fulfil their moral duties to people in need. The important point to note 
here is that the continuation of such aid, even when illegal, can be seen as a form of disruptive 
politics aimed at overcoming a structural injustice. Indeed, these kinds of actions might be 
pragmatically necessary to shed some light on the deliberate avoidance of moral responsibility 
by EU states.  
Another avenue of disruptive action is discussed by Nuti who points out that temporary labour 
migrants often conform to racial and gender stereotypes that help reproduce the structures of 
injustice (Nuti, 2018, p. 214). And while they should not be blamed for this, expressions of 
non-conformity might thereby also be seen as a way to take responsibility. Furthermore, such 
expressions might contribute towards dismantling the kinds of background beliefs that help 
reproduce social inequities.  
Finally, one avenue of disruptive politics, available to disadvantaged migrants, is to migrate, 
whether or not it is legal to do so. Gwilym David Blunt argues that as migration restrictions 
are unjust, people have the right to conduct infrapolitical resistance by migrating (Blunt, 
2018). Blunt draws an analogy with slaves escaping to the north in the United States. “Slaves 
and the global poor are both denied secure access to the human rights. This is because social 
institutions that define the positions are characterised by domination” (Blunt, 2018, p. 90). He 






this case is so-called “illegal migration”. In the same way, according to a structural injustice 
argument, migrants can be seen as discharging their responsibility grounded in interest by 
migrating without permission. They are thereby contributing to shining a light on and 
undermining the structural conditions that bring about their disadvantage.  
To clarify, I am not arguing that disadvantaged migrants have a duty to illegally migrate. 
Rather, I am pointing out that given the structural injustice in access to mobility, and the 
wilful ignorance of privileged groups, illegally migrating can be seen as a morally 
praiseworthy act. Furthermore, I do not think illegally migrating will change many people’s 
minds, indeed many will react with hostility to such migration. But it is one way people can 
discharge responsibility, and it can contribute to shining a light on immoral structural 
inequalities. After all, only by people becoming aware of structural injustices, is it likely that 
people will contribute to changing current practices. As Hayward puts it: 
Disruptive politics are not a matter of moral suasion. Their aim is less to convince 
those who are systematically advantaged by structural injustice that they ought to “do 
the right thing” than to make it all but impossible for the privileged to not hear the 
voices of, to not know the political claims of, the oppressed. (Hayward, 2017, p. 406) 
Ideally, of course, revealing the facts above about the systematic injustices in international 
migration, should prompt individuals to act. After all, once they have become aware of the 
injustices and harms, should not people and states change their ways? However, as with many 
kinds of structural inequalities, such as those rooted in misogyny, colonialism and racism, 
merely revealing unfair structures is unlikely to bring about change. Therefore, there is also a 
role for disruptive politics in overcoming migration injustice, as well as the more traditional 
political avenues. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that the vastly unequal access people have to migration and the 
differences in the treatment they receive, constitute a structural injustice. I have also pointed 
out that individuals bear some of the responsibility for these injustices, and considered how 
they might discharge such responsibility. This personal responsibility is based on either their 
privilege in these societal arrangements, typically benefitting from unequal migration 
arrangements and migrant labour, or their interest in seeing these systems changed, typically 






of responsibility is difficult to ascertain according to a structural injustice model, the 
important thing to note is that individuals are indeed responsible, and to point towards some 
way they might discharge this responsibility. Possible ways to discharge this responsibility 
include contributing to NGOs, political parties, local government, employers, and informal 
networks. Finally, I considered the retort that current migration opportunities are fair, as they 
are mostly transparent and meritocratic. I argue that this, in addition to being a normative 
argument, can be understood as a kind of defence mechanism by the privileged: if my wealth 
and migration privileges do not depend on the misery of others, I am not responsible for 
helping them. Meritocratic belief and nationalism can thereby work as a defence mechanism 
for privileged citizens, in order to avoid the responsibility they have for the harms societal 
arrangements do to others.  
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